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Abstract 
This thesis addresses destitution in the United Kingdom from a human rights-based 
perspective. In order to achieve this, part one of my thesis creates a human rights-based 
definition of destitution. In part two, this definition is applied to the context of the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Destitution has not yet been explicitly defined in the language of human rights and, in fact, 
remains an unsettled concept beyond the sphere of human rights. The originality of this work 
therefore rests on the fact that it is the first work to explicitly define destitution using a human 
rights framework. 
 
The contribution of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, through framing the destitution experience 
in terms of tangible rights the aim is to further effective policy and law to tackle, and mobilise 
against, destitution. Secondly, the prevention and alleviation of destitution whilst being of 
value in itself, can also be a stimulus for the implementation of fundamental social and 
economic rights at the domestic level. 
 
This thesis argues that a rights-based definition of destitution has two elements. The component 
rights and the destitution threshold. This author’s human rights-based definition of destitution 
is: ‘If any one, or more, of an individual’s component rights are not realised to the destitution 
threshold then an individual is destitute.’  From this starting point the thesis begins and works 
towards, in part one, defining the component rights and the destitution threshold. Having 
defined these concepts and enunciated my human rights-based definition of destitution in part 
one, my definition is applied to the context of the United Kingdom in part two. Part two will 
examine the context of – and I argue cause of increasing - destitution in the UK: austerity. 
Following this I determine what it means to be destitute under my definition in the UK before 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
That a report on destitution needs to be written is itself a warning that current social support structures 
are not working. That this report is part of a new body of work that demonstrates, at best, the escape from 
destitution is via severe poverty and, at worst, that destitution is a continuing state for many individuals, 
calls into question the efficacy not just of our social systems in general but of the legal system in 
particular in protecting the basic rights and dignity of individuals in the UK.1 
1.1. General Introduction 
The findings of a 2016 Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) Report that 1.25 million people 
experience destitution in the United Kingdom (UK)2 has been the catalyst for renewed 
engagement with the concept of destitution in British society as a whole. A follow-up report in 
2018 found that the scale of destitution in British society had grown to 1.5 million.3 This is 
indicative that the problem of destitution in the UK is worsening. Now, in the summer of 2020 
whilst the UK still reels from COVID-19 which – if projections are to be believed – will only 
be compounded by a no-deal (br)exit from the European Union it is likely that the scale of 
destitution in the UK will continue to grow. Alternative approaches to addressing destitution 
may therefore be required.  
In addressing destitution in the UK through the lens of international human rights law, 
this thesis therefore contributes to an existing body of literature from an alternative perspective. 
As the quote from McKeever et al makes clear, the existence of destitution within British 
society indicates that social support structures are failing and this, in turn, has implications for 
 
1 Gráinne McKeever et al., ‘Destitution and Paths to Justice’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2018) 80 
<https://research.thelegaleducationfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Destitution-Report-Final-Full-
.pdf> accessed 2 December 2019. 
2 Suzanne Fitzpatrick et al., ‘Destitution in the UK’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2016) 
<https://www.jrf.org.uk/file/49076/download?token=HiTkHrQg&filetype=full-report> accessed 16 September 
2016. 
3 Suzanne Fitzpatrick et al., ‘Destitution in the UK 2018’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2018) 
<https://www.jrf.org.uk/file/51558/download?token=SasLBzPB&filetype=full-report> accessed 8 June 2020. 
  
 2 
the ‘basic rights and dignity of individuals in the UK.’4 The use of the phrase rights in this 
quotation does not, however, refer to international human rights law. Thus, although the 
concept of basic rights, the concept of dignity, and consequently the concept of destitution can 
be conceptualised from the perspective of international human rights law: no such 
conceptualisation has occurred. To my knowledge no existing work addresses destitution through the 
lens of international human rights and the nexus between destitution and the denial of economic, 
social and cultural rights remains unrecognised within academia and policy and practice. This 
is despite the explicit link between destitution and living conditions in which the enjoyment of 
several fundamental social and economic rights is lacking. Although Alston’s 2019 report on his 
visit to the UK as Special Rapporteur does make reference to destitution, this reference ‘merely’ quotes 
destitution figures as set out by the non-legal, non-human-rights-based work of the JRF.5 Thus, despite 
the mention of the term destitution within his report, the term destitution has not been placed explicitly 
within the sphere, language, and framework of human rights. Therein lies the originality of this 
contribution.  
In order to address destitution using human rights, that which is understood by the 
phrase destitution from the perspective of human rights must first be established. Thus, the first 
– and arguably most prominent research question – seeks to allow destitution to be defined 
from a human rights-based perspective. This research question is comprised of a number of 
sub-questions. These questions are: 1.a. What is the value-added of viewing destitution through 
the lens of human rights? 1.b. What is destitution and how should it be defined? 1.c. How does 
destitution relate to wider poverty? Research question 1 must be addressed in order to allow 
the remaining research questions to be answered. Research questions two, three, and four are:  
 
4 McKeever et al. (n 1) 80. 
5 Phillip Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: Visit to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (2019) UN.Doc.A/HRC/41/39/Add.1 para 3.  
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2. Does social security policy and provision intersect with the occurrence, prevention 
and alleviation of destitution? 
3. Does destitution represent a failure to realise ESCRs as contained within the 
ICESCR? 
4. What can be done to address destitution in the UK more widely?   
As is clear, all four research questions are interlinked. The first overarching research question 
requires that a human rights-based definition of destitution be created, and the remaining 
research questions require that this definition is utilised and applied to the context of the UK. 
As such, this thesis is split between two parts. Part one is titled ‘A Human Rights-Based 
Definition of Destitution’ and part two is titled ‘Destitution and Human Rights in the United 
Kingdom.’ This outline will be further expounded in section 1.5. 
1.2. The Added Value of Addressing Destitution through the Lens of International 
Human Rights Law 
This thesis focuses upon destitution specifically as opposed to broader notions of the non-
realisation of ESCRs more generally in the UK for a number of reasons.  There exists an 
existing policy framework within the UK which focuses on destitution. As the opening lines 
of this chapter make clear, destitution is a growing problem in the UK which is need of being 
addressed.  In addition to this, existing – albeit limited - case law demonstrates that destitution 
can be tackled in some circumstances using the ECHR and consequently mechanisms of 
enforcement which are more traditionally aligned with civil and political rights.6 The same 
cannot be said of ESCRs more broadly understood and, as such, focusing more narrowly on 
destitution may allow for initial and more concrete steps to be made with respect to 
enforcement. As well as this, destitution may be regarded as the most extreme form of 
 
6 See (n 85-93); see also (n 96-104)  
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deprivation in the UK. My analysis further in this section evidences the benefits which stem 
from addressing poverty as a concept using human rights can be combined with this reasoning 
to demonstrate the acute need which exists in the UK for examining destitution as a specific 
concept as opposed to examining the broader notion of the non-realisation of ESCRs. 
Beyond this, it is logical to address research question 1.a within this introduction. This 
is because, the rationale underlying this thesis is that conceptualising destitution through the 
lens of human rights law can contribute to addressing destitution. The contention that using a 
human rights framework can aid in tackling destitution can be supported, analogously, by the 
literature which suggests that human rights can act as a tool for combatting poverty. Thus, this 
is indicative of the added value of addressing destitution through a human rights lens. 
Despite accepting that it is not explicitly referenced in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),7 the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) has stated that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)8 
established poverty as a human rights issue9 and that poverty is ‘one of the recurring themes in 
the covenant.’10 This is because many of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR have ‘a direct and 
immediate bearing upon the eradication of poverty.’11 Thus, the CESCR views poverty as 
forming ‘an essential element of the ICESCR’12 and firmly holds the view ‘that poverty 
 
7 Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in The Implementation of The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty and The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2001) UN.Doc. E/C.12/2001/10’ para 1. Para. 1 
8 United Nations General Assembly UDHR, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Adopted 10 December 
1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR)’. 
9 CESCR, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in The Implementation of The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Poverty and The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2001) 
UN.Doc. E/C.12/2001/10’ (n 7) para 1.  
10 ibid. 
11 ibid. 
12 Mashood Baderin and Robert McCorquodale, ‘Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ in Geraldine Van Bueren (ed), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right (UNESCO 
Publishing 2010) 344–367, 360.  
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constitutes a denial of human rights.’13 Further still, the concept of poverty did arise in the 
context of discussions relating to the drafting of certain articles ‘particularly Article 11 on the 
right to an adequate standard of living,’14 with ASL seemingly being accepted as ‘the right 
relevant for all issues associated with poverty.’15 
Building on this, poverty is regarded by Sengupta as ‘the worst form of violation of 
human rights.’16 This is understandable once it is considered that ‘the poor suffer from 
important material deprivations such as inadequate housing, medical care, and food 
consumption.’17 As such, if the guarantees contained within the normative framework of 
international human rights law were fulfilled poor people would be lifted out of poverty.18 This 
is due to the fact that a human rights-based approach to poverty eradication will focus on 
building the capacity of those experiencing poverty in order to alter the structural conditions 
‘that result in a ‘poverty trap’.’19 Furthermore, a human rights-based definition is also more 
appropriate because the living conditions faced by those experiencing poverty ‘demonstrate 
violations of a large variety of human rights.’20  
Perhaps because poverty can be regarded as an obstacle to the attainment of both a 
 
13 CESCR, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in The Implementation of The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Poverty and The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2001) 
UN.Doc. E/C.12/2001/10’ (n 7) para 1.  
14 Baderin and McCorquodale (n 12) 358.  
15 ibid. 
16 Arjun Sengupta, ‘On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development’ (2002) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 
837, 884.  
17 Katherine McFate et al., Poverty, Inequality and the Future of Social Policy (Russell Sage Foundation 1995) 
109.  
18 Sigrun I Skogly, ‘Is There a Right Not to Be Poor?’ (2002) 2 Human Rights Law Review 59, 73.  
19 Amanda Cahill-Ripley and Sigrun I Skogly, ‘The Human Right to Adequate Food and to Clean and Sufficient 
Water’ in Geraldine Van Bueren (ed), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right (UNESCO Publishing 2010) 
113–137, 114.  
20 Skogly (n 18) 74.  
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decent standard of living and the realisation of human rights,21 it is regarded by Chauvier as the 
violation of ‘an authentic human right.’22 This links to Alegre’s contention that a right to be 
free from extreme poverty ‘is supported by the basic character of the interests it refers to.’23 It 
follows that if destitution is extreme poverty, and it is accepted that there is a right to be free 
from extreme poverty: there is a right to be free from destitution.  
As such, using human rights to tackle poverty may ‘empower the poor to obtain their 
rights’24 by shifting the claims of the impoverished from claims of needs25 to claims to ‘legally 
guaranteed entitlements.’26 This in turn raises the status of poverty eradication measures27 and 
places a binding obligation upon states to remove poverty.28 Further still, such a human rights 
approach offers an inclusive way of addressing poverty;29 conceiving a broader understanding  
which goes beyond low income alone30 and, as such, more accurately depicts the experience of 
those who live in conditions of poverty.31  
 A broader conception of poverty is required given that ‘the poor suffer from important 
material deprivations such as inadequate housing, medical care, and food consumption.’32 
 
21 United Nations Development Programme UNDP, Human Development Report 2000 (OUP 2000) 33. 
22 Stephane Chauvier, ‘The Right to Basic Resources’ in Thomas Pogge (ed), Freedom from Poverty as a Human 
Right (OUP 2007) 303–322, 321.  
23 Marcelo Alegre, ‘Extreme Poverty in a Wealthy World: What Justice Demands Today’ in Thomas Pogge (ed), 
Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right (OUP 2007) 237–254, 254.  
24 Tom Campbell, ‘Poverty as a Violation of Human Rights: Inhumanity of Injustice’ in Thomas Pogge (ed), 
Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right (OUP 2007) 55–74, 56–57.  
25 Alice Donald and Elizabeth Mottershaw, ‘Poverty, Inequality and Human Rights: Do Human Rights Make a 
Difference?’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2009) 5.  
26 ibid 13.  
27 Arjun Sengupta, ‘Poverty Eradication and Human Rights’ in Thomas Pogge (ed), Freedom from Poverty as a 
Human Right (OUP 2007) 323–344, 325.  
28 ibid 326.  
29 Ruth Lister, ‘Power, Not Pity: Poverty and Human Rights’ (2013) 7 Ethics and Social Welfare 109, 120. 
30 Donald and Mottershaw (n 25) 5.  
31 Valentin F Lang and Hildegard Lingnau, ‘Defining and Measuring Poverty and Inequality Post-2015’’ (2015) 
27 Journal of International Development 399, 406. 
32 McFate et al. (n 17) 109.  
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These three exemplar deprivations correlate, respectively, to the right to housing, the right to 
health, and the right to food. It follows, if access to the content of these rights is inadequate, 
that the rights of the poor - facing such material deprivations - are not being realised to the 
appropriate, or in fact required, levels. Although the component rights will not be identified 
until later in this thesis, this point is raised to demonstrate the linkages which exist between the 
experience of poverty and violations of human rights. These linkages allow the argument to be 
made that, if the rights which are being violated, are realised to the appropriate levels, and are 
respected, protected, and fulfilled, poverty would not arise.33 Although it is accepted that a lack 
of income or other economic resources plays a causal role,34 in interpreting poverty as a failure 
to satisfy basic needs35 poverty can be given a human rights focus. 
Poverty is associated with social weakness. Poverty and social weakness combined 
‘lead to exploitation and violations of human rights’36 resulting from the ‘economic 
unfreedom’37 which is also associated with poverty. This is because patterns of poverty 
contribute to insecurity which prevents the enjoyment of fundamental rights.38 Beyond acting 
as a cause of human rights violations, poverty can also act as the ‘effect of human rights 
violations.’39 Thus, poverty ‘is both a cause and consequence of human rights failings, 
especially failings in regards to ESCRs.40 This notion of poverty as both the cause and the effect 
 
33 Jurgen H Hohnholz, ‘Poverty and Human Rights’ (1991) 33 Universitas 57; Skogly (n 18) 62.  
34 Siddiqur Rahman Osmani, ‘Poverty and Human Rights: Building on the Capability Approach’ (2005) 6 Journal 
of Human Development 205, 215.  
35 Anuradha Mittal, ‘Perspective: Economic Human Rights: The Time Has Come’ (1998) 22 Update on Law 
Related Education 12, 12.  
36 Hohnholz (n 33) 63.  
37 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (OUP 1999) 8.  
38 Asbjorn Eide, ‘Obstacles and Goals to Be Pursued’ in Asbjorn Eide et al (ed), Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook (Second Revised Edition, Kluwer International Law 2001) 553–562, 556.  
39 Roberto Cuellar, ‘Poverty and Human Rights’ [2007] UN Chronicler 41, 41.  
40 Sandra Ratjen and Manav Satija, ‘Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights for All’ in Eibe Riedel et al (ed), 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law (OUP 2014) 111–133, 124.  
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of human rights violations41 links to the idea that the majority of those experiencing poverty do 
so due to socio-economic and political factors beyond their control.42 
Consequently, if it is accepted, as I contend, that theories applicable to human rights-
based approaches to poverty can also be applied to human rights-based approaches to 
destitution, it follows that such an approach has a number of benefits. Namely that such an 
approach can contribute to tackling destitution through multiple channels. The importance of 
determining a definition of human rights-based destitution is amplified given the limited nature 
of legal definitions, and consequently frameworks, in relation to destitution.43 Many states have 
laws and frameworks which work towards the provision of basic necessities which are required 
in order to avoid destitution.  
For example, the German Federal Constitutional Court has ‘read’ a ‘constitutionally 
guaranteed Existenzminimum, or "subsistence minimum,"’ into the German Basic Law.44 Hunt 
observes ‘that this places an obligation on the government to provide the minimum level of 
subsistence required to ensure the material conditions necessary for physical existence, as well 
as the opportunity for a certain level of participation in political, cultural, and social life.’ 45 
Although this does align with conceptions of destitution, this subsistence minimum is derived 
from Article 1 of the Basic law in combination with Article 20: provisions relating to human 
dignity and the social state principle respectively.46 This provides an example of how provisions 
 
41 Geraldine Van Bueren, ‘Fulfilling Law’s Duty to the Poor’ in Geraldine Van Bueren (ed), Freedom from 
Poverty as a Human Right (UNESCO Publishing 2010) 1–20, 1.  
42 Victor George and Irving Howards, Poverty amidst Affluence (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 1991) 130. 130 
43 The limited nature of the UK’s statutory definition of destitution is explored in chapter 2.2. 
44 Ingrid Leijten, ‘The German Right to an Existenzminimum, Human Dignity, and the Possibility of Minimum 
Core Socioeconomic Rights Protection’ 16 German Law Journal 23, 27. 
45 Paul Hunt, ‘Social Rights Are Human Rights’ (Centre for Welfare Reform 2017) 23 
<https://www.centreforwelfarereform.org/uploads/attachment/584/social-rights-are-human-rights.pdf> accessed 
20 September 2019. 
46 See the case of HART IV cited in Leijten (n 44) 30. 
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may offer protection against destitution without explicitly referencing destitution.  It is perhaps 
partly attributable to this that the explicit mention of destitution within legal provisions is 
extremely rare.  
For those individuals who fall under my human rights-based definition of destitution, 
this definition may be of great potential. This is because explicitly defining destitution using a 
human rights-based framework will allow destitution to in turn be addressed utilising 
mechanisms and tools inherent to the human rights framework. Therein lies the rationale of 
creating a human rights-based definition of destitution: ensuring the realisation of the 
component rights to the destitution threshold and in doing so freeing individuals from 
destitution. Support for utilising a human rights-based approach to destitution is evidenced by 
the work of Bell and Cemlyn. Their research highlights that, in the UK, there exists a large 
degree of public support for ESCRs. The research concludes that, as ESCRs may have a less 
abstract meaning for people than civil and political rights, ESCRs ‘can help to build support 
for human rights law, more generally, as well as providing protection in an era of growing 
inequality.’47 Therefore, this suggests that there would be public support for addressing 
destitution which was framed through the medium of ESCRs.   
1.3. Methodology and the Theoretical Framework of this Thesis 
Salter and Mason observe that ‘experienced legal researchers have testified that there is no 
possibility of conducting research other than through the application of a particular frame of 
reference which determines how the dissertation is created, formulated and pursued.’48 They 
observe that this frame of reference may be also termed as a paradigm of a methodology. 
 
47 Karen Bell and Sarah Cemlyn, ‘Developing Public Support for Human Rights in the United Kingdom: 
Reasserting the Importance of Socio-Economic Rights’ (2014) 18 The International Journal of Human Rights 822, 
836.  
48 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal 
Research (Pearson Education UK 2007) 39 
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/lancaster/detail.action?docID=5136574> accessed 9 June 2020. 
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Methodology – which must be distinguished from the techniques used in conducting research 
(research methods) – can be understood as ‘the study of the general approach to inquiry in a 
given field’.49 In the general sense ‘a methodology amounts to a systematic procedure that a 
scholar applies as part of an intellectual enterprise.’50 This systematic procedure – this 
methodology – ‘relates directly to the formation of research projects, and then to the 
practicalities of carrying out research – what research questions we ask, what data we use, how 
we pursue our research agendas, how we explain why we examined what we did, or why we 
went about it in a particular way.’51 Thus, the research methodology chosen will determine how 
the researcher systematically addresses the research questions posed and will also determine 
‘the steps that are generally adopted by a researcher in studying the research problem along 
with the logic behind it.’52 
Fisher et al highlight that ‘a commitment to the value of methodology is not a 
commitment to a particular methodology, but is a commitment to developing methodologies 
that are ‘best suited’ to the type of questions being asked.’53 The concept of certain 
methodologies being best suited to the area of research being addressed is well encapsulated in 
the metaphor deployed by Salter and Mason. They suggest that if there is a conflict between 
the ‘particular methodological tools selected, and the specific requirements of the task in hand,’ 
then the wrong ‘tool for the job’ has been deployed by the author.54 It follows that any research 
project must be conscious of the methodology which it employs to ensure that the methodology 
 
49 Shazia Qureshi, ‘Research Methodology in Law and Its Application to Women’s Human Rights Law’ (2015) 
22 Journal of Political Studies 629, 630. 
50 Elizabeth Fisher and others, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law 
Scholarship’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 213, 226. 
51 Tamara Hervey and others, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 
2011) 1. 
52 Qureshi (n 49) 630. 
53 Fisher and others (n 50) 227. 
54 Salter and Mason (n 48) 40. 
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best suited to addressing the research questions is used. This in turn ensures that the research 
questions are addressed appropriately.  
Concerning research methodology in the field of law, ‘legal scholarship has historically 
followed two broad traditions’: The Black Letter Approach to Law and the Socio-Legal 
Approaches.55 As the following paragraphs will make clear, these two approaches are markedly 
different and it has been observed that there exists an intellectual tension between these two 
approaches.56 This is because, ‘sociolegal research is often interpreted as posing a radical 
challenge to the credibility, even the continued existence, of black-letter approaches.’57  
The Black Letter Approach was, until recently, ‘the principal methodology in legal 
research.’58 Salter and Mason observe that the central point to be recognised is that the Black 
Letter Approach ‘is a particular way of interpreting what is deemed to count as legal research, 
including which materials are considered relevant.’59 Central to the Black Letter Approach is 
an assumption that ‘the answers and solutions to every legal problem are available in the 
underlying logic and structure of rules which can be discovered by exposition and analysis of 
the legal doctrine’60 From this assumption stems an extensive – but not sole - reliance ‘on using 
court judgments and statutes to explain law.’61  
Consequently, compared to the Socio-Legal Approach, the Black Letter Approach 
takes a restrictive and narrow view as to what materials are relevant when undertaking legal 
 
55 Mike McConville and Wing Hong (Eric) Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in Mike McConville and Wing 
Hong (Eric) Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2017) 1 
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/lancaster/detail.action?docID=5013854> accessed 9 June 2020.  
56 Salter and Mason (n 48) 34–35. 
57 ibid 35. 
58 Qureshi (n 49) 630. 
59 Salter and Mason (n 48) 44. 
60 Qureshi (n 49) 631. 
61 McConville and Chui (n 55) 4.  
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research. This restrictive approach to the relevancy of materials is understandable given that, 
regardless of the exact nature of the Black Letter Approach undertaken in any given research, 
an underlying common theme of the Black Letter Approach ‘insists that law is a pure concept, 
independent of morality, politics/power or other outer influences.’62 The aim of this is to 
preserve the ‘neutral, objective, detached and thereby superior status [of law] as a normative 
science.’63 As such,  the Black Letter Approach insulates the legal research undertaken from 
‘‘non-legal factors’ regarding, for example, policy and ideological issues as if these were 
somehow ‘external’ to, and independent of, strictly legal research.’64 This narrowness of scope 
has been raised as criticism and, the Black Letter Approach has been criticised a failing ‘to 
prepare students and legal professionals to attend to non-doctrinal questions.’65 
Even so, Berard highlights that ‘there has always been some recognition in legal 
education, albeit often implicit, of the fundamental fact that law cannot be adequately 
understood in strictly legal terms.’66 This can be expanded using Schiff’s suggestion that ‘the 
relationship of the law, in its many aspects, to a social situation, should be considered a 
necessary part of the understanding of that situation. The development of forms of analysis 
which allow for such interrelated understanding are therefore required.’67 The Socio-Legal 
Approach to legal research allows for such analysis. Although there exists no consensus as to 
the definition of the Socio-Legal Approach,68 Cotterrell observes that the ‘deliberate self-
distancing from the professional viewpoint of the lawyer’ unifies such approaches.69 Such 
 
62 Qureshi (n 49) 631. 
63 ibid. 
64 Salter and Mason (n 48) 44. 
65 McConville and Chui (n 55) 5.  
66 Timothy J Berard, ‘The Relevance of the Social Sciences for Legal Education’ (2009) 19 Legal Education 
Review 189, 190. 
67 David N Schiff, ‘Socio-Legal Theory: Social Structure and Law’ (1976) 39 The Modern Law Review 287, 287. 
68 Qureshi (n 49) 633. 
69 Roger Cotterrell, ‘The Sociological Concept of Law’ (1983) 10 Journal of Law and Society 241, 242. 
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distancing is required given that ‘an inevitable gap exists between black letter law and law- in-
action.’70 A Socio-Legal Approach seeks to bridge this gap in order to depict ‘a true picture of 
law-in-action.’71 
To achieve this, the Socio-Legal Approach is less restrictive than the Black Letter 
Approach with regard to what materials are considered relevant and credible within legal 
research. Thus, ‘the socio-legal approach can broaden the scope of legal research both by 
making available vast varieties of information and by providing conceptual frameworks within 
which the information can be evaluated.’72 This allows different topics to be addressed using a 
variety of lenses which was previously limited under the restrictive Black Letter Approach.73 
Vick observes that the obvious place for legal theorists to turn in order to cultivate this variety 
was the social sciences. 74 Borrowing ideas and techniques from other disciplines both broadens 
the scope of the research and allows the research questions to be addressed in their wider 
context.75  
Given their very nature, when Socio-Legal Approaches advocate for reform they do so 
from the position that ‘the operation of the present legal position is out of step with what a 
desirable policy should be attempting to bring about.’76 On account of this, it is little wonder 
that the Socio-Legal Approach has been considered to be ‘tied inextricably to specific liberal 
and radical political agendas.’77  
 
70 Patrick Schmidt and Simon Halliday, ‘Introduction: Socio-Legal Perspectives on Human Rights in the National 
Context’ in Simon Halliday and Patrick Schmidt (eds), Human Rights Brought Home (Hart Publishing 2004) 7. 
71 Qureshi (n 49) 632. 
72 ibid 635. 
73 ibid 633. 
74 Douglas W Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 163, 
183. 
75 Salter and Mason (n 48) 177. 
76 ibid 162. 
77 ibid 178. 
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Throughout this thesis I draw on research from a range of disciplines. As such, my 
decision to utilise a predominantly Socio-Legal Methodology can be supported using 
McConville and Wing’s contention that ‘the merits and relevance of using other disciplines 
such as sociology, political science, economics, psychology, history and feminism as aids to 
legal research have been widely recognised.’78  
Additionally, concerning the field of international human rights law specifically, 
Schmidt and Halliday argue that ‘a research agenda based in socio-legal studies has much to 
offer as a complement to such work.’79 More so, Hoffman and Rumsey contend that, as many 
international issues cross over into other fields, ‘a savvy international legal researcher will 
consult materials in other related disciplines, such as political science, public policy, health, 
economics, etc.’80 As well as this, Qureshi highlights that ‘socio-legal study of human rights 
has brought fresh insights into its theory and praxis.’81 These points are raised to demonstrate 
the relevance of Socio-Legal Approaches to research concerning international human rights 
law and to demonstrate how the interdisciplinary nature of the Socio-Legal Approach is 
required to provide a more contextually complete picture. 
 Justified by this analysis, this thesis utilises a predominantly Socio-Legal Methodology. 
This phrasing is carefully selected given that ‘some elements of doctrinal analysis are found in 
all types of legal research.’82 As such, some parts of this thesis are more socio-legal than others. 
I do engage with case law, statute, and international treaties. However, this engagement is 
supplemented by reference to a whole range of relevant materials from a diverse range of 
 
78 McConville and Chui (n 55) 5.  
79 Schmidt and Halliday (n 70) 3. 
80 Marci Hoffman and Mary Rumsey, International and Foreign Legal Research: A Coursebook (BRILL 2012) 
225 <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/lancaster/detail.action?docID=919556> accessed 9 June 2020. 




disciplines. This is not uncommon as ‘legal academics often tend to mix approaches. For 
instance, it is not uncommon that a legal researcher starts with an historical introduction, then 
turns to an analysis of the relevant case law and finally engages with socio-political 
considerations.’83 A predominantly Socio-Legal Approach is appropriate for this thesis given 
that – although destitution has been defined from a legal perspective – the experience of 
destitution is an extra-legal concept which has been addressed in the UK by several academic 
disciplines.  
As this thesis will make clear, existing research concerning destitution has 
demonstrated that destitution is intrinsically linked to political and economic policy factors. To 
comprehensively address destitution, these political and economic factors must be engaged 
with. As is clear from this section, a Socio-Legal Approach is best suited to properly and 
critically engage with these factors which are external to the law. This thesis develops new and 
original theory as part one develops a theoretical framework – my proposed human rights-
based definition of destitution – which is then applied to the context of the UK in part two. 
This socio-legal approach allows for knowledge from a variety of disciplines to be 
integrated into this thesis. In addition to this, primary legal sources are also used. For the 
reasons outlined in section 1.2., this thesis approaches destitution in the UK from the 
perspective of international human rights law. Twinned with the focus on the UK, this 
perspective limited the focus of this thesis with respect to cases, treaties, and international 
instruments. Although the ECHR is integrated into domestic law and as such is justiciable, 
other international human rights treaties are not. Despite this, the ‘UK is subject to a legal and 
moral obligation to work towards the realisation of the rights conferred, flowing from 
international law and its own statement that it does not ratify treaties “unless confident that 
 




domestic law and practice is consistent with them”.’84 As such, the key sources of law referred 
to throughout this thesis are of an international as opposed to regional nature. This is with the 
exception of the destitution case law stemming from the ECHR and HRA. Moreover, given 
that this thesis addresses destitution as a denial of ESCRs the international documents focused 
upon are those which directly address these rights. This results in the exclusion of the European 
Social Charter as it does not address the same rights as the ICESCR and most certainly does 
not address ICESCR rights in the same manner. This is because, the 1961 Charter (being the 
one applicable to the UK) does not guarantee the same rights as the ICESCR and, for example, 
the UK does not consider itself to be bound by Article 12 of the Charter which relates to the 
right to social security. 
1.4. Setting the Limits of this Thesis 
For reasons which will expounded throughout part one of this thesis, the human rights-based 
definition of destitution which I propose focuses upon Article 11 and Article 9 of the ICESCR. 
I contend that this focus on the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to social 
security most readily aligns with existing conceptions of destitution. However, this focus 
results in the exclusion of a number of other ESCRs from my proposed human rights-based 
definition of destitution. Not only this, but this focus excludes substantive analysis of the 
ECHR and its case law. 
To be clear from the outset, although an interrelationship does exist between other 
ESCRs, inter alia, the right to health, the right to education, and the right to work and 
destitution, my analysis does not support the inclusion of these rights within a human rights-
based definition of destitution. This exclusion rests upon a number of overlapping arguments.  
With respect to the right to health, although the experience of destitution does have 
 
84 Mark Simpson, Gráinne McKeever and Ann Marie Gray, ‘From Principles to Practice: Social Security in the 
Scottish Laboratory of Democracy’ (2019) 26 Journal of Social Security Law 13, 19. 
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implications for – and negatively undermines - the physical, mental, and social wellbeing 
(health) of individuals, I will evidence that the negative health outcomes which are caused by 
destitution are in fact the result of a failure to realise other ESCRs. Thus, any right to health 
claims will do little, if anything, to address destitution. Even so, the negative health outcomes 
caused by destitution can be distinguished from destitution caused by a failure to realise the 
right to health. When failures regarding the right to health cause destitution – for example if 
ill-health, which could be treated if the right to health were realised, prevents an individual 
from working – an adequate social security system would protect that individual from 
destitution. Thus, both as a consequence and cause of destitution, a failure to realise the right 
to health – although closely tied to destitution – is not the predominant human rights issue. 
Alongside resting in the peripheral of the interrelationship between human rights and 
destitution, given the variety of – very often competing – rights claims which may be made 
under the right to health it would be difficult to in anyway comprehensively determine to what 
an extent a failure to realise the right to health constitutes destitution. For these reasons, 
although I do recognise the interrelationship which exists between destitution and the right to 
health, the right to health does not form a part of my human rights-based definition of 
destitution. 
Similar reasoning can be applied to the right to education and the right to work. The 
essence is that although a failure to adequately realise these rights may cause destitution, the 
failure to adequately realise these rights will not always result in the experience of destitution. 
This is the key factor which differentiates the rights which I identify as being a part of my 
destitution definition in chapter 4; if the rights identified in chapter 4 are not adequately realised 
an individual is always regarded as destitute under my proposed definition. As such, although 
other rights do relate to destitution they go beyond the scope of this thesis as they are not central 
to the experience of destitution. 
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This foregrounding of ICESCR rights does not engender use of the ECHR as a tool by 
which to address destitution. Although the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held 
that an applicant’s living conditions can amount to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention,85 
the Court attached ‘considerable importance to the applicant’s status as an asylum-seeker and, 
as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need 
of special protection.’86 This draws parallels to the way in which the UK’s domestic courts have 
approached destitution through the lens of Article 387 and demonstrates the inadequacies of 
Article 3 of the ECHR in addressing destitution more broadly.  
In the first sense, the focus of the ECHR is civil and political rights and not ESCRs 
which – this thesis highlights – are central to human rights-based understandings of destitution. 
One implication of this is that the application of Article 3 of the ECHR ‘appears limited to 
specific circumstances where a clear relationship of dependency and need exists: it certainly 
does not constitute a transformation of the Convention into a socio-economic rights 
instrument.’88 That is that this focus on civil and political rights is not concerned with the 
experience of destitution – understood as the non-realisation of ESCRs - per se and offers no 
protections against destitution to the vast majority of individuals.  
Linking to this, Simpson highlights that a successful claim arguing that destitution 
constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR ‘would depend on 
the claimant essentially being rendered unable to access food or shelter to such an extent and 
for such a period as to cause significant suffering. This probably implies individuals not 
 
85 MSS v Belgium and Greece [2011] Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights Application no. 
30696/09 page 88.  
86 ibid 251. 
87 See (n 96-104) 
88 Colm O’Cinneide, ‘A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2008) 5 E.H.R.L.R 583, 601–602. 
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awarded a hardship payment and with no accessible charitable or familial support.’89 This 
further limits the category of persons able to utilise the shield of Article 3 against the experience 
of destitution. More so, in the second sense, a reliance on charitable assistance is incompatible 
with the realisation of ESCRs90 and such reliance is a defining feature of destitution.91 Thus, 
the vast majority of individuals experiencing destitution in the UK would be excluded from 
bringing a claim under Article 3 ECHR.  
In the third sense, O’Cinneide has highlighted the modesty of scope and ambition of 
the ‘developing case law on questions of state responsibility for individual destitution.’92 The 
focus on individual destitution is key here and, more recently, Simpson has observed that any 
finding of a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR based upon the experience of destitution ‘would 
be on the basis of individual circumstances rather than an unlawful policy.’93 This highlights 
the inadequacies of the ECHR in addressing the structural causes of destitution. This inability 
of the ECHR to address structural causes of destitution is a key weakness of such approaches 
given that – as I argue in Chapter 5 – rising destitution in the UK is a result of structural forces. 
1.5. Outline of this Thesis  
This thesis is split between two parts. Part One – A Human Rights-Based Definition of 
Destitution - is composed of three chapters. The first of these, chapter 2, will identify themes 
from existing definitions of destitution in order to allow the concept of destitution to be 
grounded within the sphere of human rights. In this sense, chapter 2 translates destitution into 
the language of human rights. This is achieved by extrapolating themes from a number of 
 
89 Mark Simpson, ‘“Designed to Reduce People...to Complete Destitution”: Human Dignity in the Active Welfare 
State’ (2015) 1 E.H.R.L.R 66, 76–77. 
90 See (n 112-116)  
91 For a human rights focused critique of a reliance on charitable provision (which I term charitable assistance) to 
realise the component rights see chapter 2.2; see also chapter 2.4.3.; see also chapter 6.3.  
92 O’Cinneide, ‘A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (n 88) 601–602. 
93 Simpson (n 89) 76–77. 
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existing definitions of destitution and identifying correlative human rights concepts. This will 
ensure that my human rights-based definition of destitution aligns with existing understandings 
of destitution. In chapter 3, this translation is applied to determining the level of rights 
realisation required in order to avert destitution.  This destitution threshold is addressed before 
the rights which are engaged by my destitution definition are addressed in chapter 4 so as to 
allow consideration of the destitution threshold to form part of the analysis of these rights. 
However, as will become clear throughout part one, the experience of destitution is not 
similar across different contexts. As such, in order to be applicable as a tool for tackling 
destitution my human rights-rights based definition of destitution must be contextualised. Part 
Two of this thesis – Destitution and Human Rights in the United Kingdom – will undertake 
such a contextualisation. This will be achieved by examining the social-policy context of 
austerity (chapter 5) in order to allow the (non-)realisation of the component rights to be more 
thoroughly understood. Having addressed the context in which destitution in the UK is 
occurring, what constitutes destitution in the UK under my rights-based definition will be 
detailed in chapter 6. Chapter 6 will apply the analysis from part one of this thesis to the context 
of the UK in order to address how destitution may be understood from the perspective of human 
rights in this context. Following this, chapter 7 explores how human rights can be used to tackle 
the destitution within the UK as highlighted in chapter 6. This will lead into the eighth and 
final chapter – the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2: Grounding Destitution Within the Sphere of Human 
Rights 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter will consider existing definitions of destitution to extrapolate the key themes 
behind them. These key themes will be utilised as a tool by which to place the concept of 
destitution within the sphere of human rights in the later chapters of Part One. Chiefly, these 
themes will be used to translate destitution into the language of human rights.  
This chapter is split between three substantive sections. The first of these, section 2.2., 
examines the existing definitions of destitution. Traditional conceptions, the UK’s statutory 
definition, and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) definition, of destitution will be 
explored here. It will be contended that these various definitions, and in fact their underlying 
themes, can be tied together via the concept of living standards. That is, that destitution is the 
experience of living below a certain standard of living. It is contended that this standard of 
living can be determined by extrapolating key themes of the destitution experience from 
existing definitions.  
Building upon this, the second substantive section of this chapter, section 2.3, will 
further examine these underlying themes. This is with the purpose of mapping these themes 
into the sphere of human rights. Following this, section 2.4 will examine each of the destitution 
themes. In translating destitution into the language of human rights, this chapter will act as the 
foundation for the remainder of the analysis in part one, which explores – and enunciates – a 
human rights-based definition of destitution. 
2.2. Existing Definitions of Destitution 
In traditional usage, as Gangopadhyay et al. contend, destitution can be defined as ‘an extreme 
form of poverty that forces individuals to rely on social transfers like public and private 
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charities, alms and welfare programmes for survival.’94 This definition has two primary 
elements. Firstly, the notion of extreme poverty as characterised by survival needs and secondly 
a reliance on social transfers. This second element is indicative of precariousness which in turn 
is a manifestation of vulnerability.  This vulnerability is further indicative of indignity. As such, 
I contend that three main destitution themes can be extrapolated from traditional conceptions 
of destitution: survival needs; vulnerability; and indignity. These concepts are representative 
of the notion of extreme hardship, which has been described as a characteristic of destitution95 
and, as such, these themes will be explored further below. 
In the context of the United Kingdom, the only statutory and legal definition of 
destitution pertains specifically to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. The Asylum and 
Immigration Act definition focuses upon either; lacking adequate accommodation, or the 
means to obtain it; or an inability to meet essential living needs.96 This would appear to align 
with the traditional conception of destitution as well as the destitution themes highlighted in 
the preceding paragraph.   
Even so, the statutory definition of destitution in the Asylum and Immigration Act does 
not apply to many of those who can be considered to be experiencing destitution within the 
U.K. as this definition is of a limited and narrow scope with no grounds for application outside 
of the asylum and immigration context. Despite this, the relevant case law has resulted in some 
positive findings, where destitution has been proven when social security payments have been 
refused or withdrawn.97 Nolan et al. highlight the Limbuela case as but one example of the 
 
94 Partha Gangopadhyay et al., ‘Working Poverty, Social Exclusion and Destitution: An Empirical Study’ (2014) 
37 Economic Modelling 241, 241. 
95 HPP Lotter, ‘Defining Poverty as Distinctively Human’ 63 HTS 1195, 1206.  
96 Asylum and Immigration Act 1999 s 95.  
97 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Adams, Tesema and Limbuela [2005] UKHL 66. 
  
 24 
failure of UK law to ‘protect fully the rights found in the ICESCR.’98 The Limbuela case 
engaged with Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This provision 
contains an absolute prohibition against torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. However, the focus in Limbuela was ‘on inhuman and degrading treatment.’99 It 
was recognised that ‘treatment is inhuman or degrading if, to a seriously detrimental extent, it 
denies the most basic needs of any human being.’100 This would appear to readily engage the 
concept of destitution.  
However, it was held that ‘a general public duty to house the homeless or provide for 
the destitute cannot be spelled out of article 3.’101 As Lord Scott made clear,  
‘if individuals find themselves destitute to a degree apt to be described as degrading the 
state’s failure to give them the minimum support necessary to avoid that degradation 
may well be a shameful reproach to the humanity of the state and its institutions but, in 
my opinion, does not without more engage article 3. Just as there is no ECHR right to 
be provided by the state with a home, so too there is no ECHR right to be provided by 
the state with a minimum standard of living: “treatment” requires something more than 
mere failure.’102  
Thus, the claimants in Limbuela succeeded in their claim not because they experienced 
destitution but due to the circumstances in which they entered into a state of destitution. The 
claimants were able to argue that, due to the fact they were legally prohibited from seeking 
employment, the state’s decision to deny them social security payments ‘forced’ them into 
 
98 Aoife Nolan and others, Applying an International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: 
Rights and Resources (Taylor & Francis Group 2014) 21 
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/lancaster/detail.action?docID=1596923> accessed 30 June 2020. 
99 ex parte Adams, Tesema and Limbuela (n 97) para 6. 
100 ibid 7. 
101 ibid. 
102 ibid 66. 
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destitution. The imposition of these policies was regarded by the court to amount to ‘positive 
action directed against asylum-seekers and not to mere inaction’ which constituted 
‘“treatment” within the meaning of the article.’103 Thus, it is clear that an Article 3 claim by a 
member of the general public who is experiencing destitution will likely fail. This is because 
it is unlikely that the circumstances leading to an individual’s experience of destitution will 
constitute ‘treatment’ for the purposes of Article 3. Although I will make clear in chapter 5, 
especially chapter 5.6, that austerity in the United Kingdom since 2010 has been inherently 
destitution inducing, it is telling that no Article 3 claims have succeeded with respect to the 
destitution experience outside of the Asylum and Immigration context in the UK. Thus, 
destitution only engages Article 3 of the ECHR in the UK in very limited circumstances. 
This suggests that the experience of destitution is not incompatible with Article 3 of the 
ECHR. This is stated explicitly in the case of R (W), which holds that ‘the fact that someone is 
“destitute” as the term is defined for the purposes of s. 95 of the 1999 Act does not necessarily 
mean that he or she is enduring treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR: the threshold of severity 
which must be reached to make out a breach of Article 3 is higher than that required for a 
finding of destitution within the s. 95(3) definition.’104 This shows the inadequacy of the ECHR 
– and the Human Rights Act which enshrines this domestically within the UK – as a tool for 
tackling not only destitution but also the non-realisation of ESCRs within the UK. Even despite 
this, these cases demonstrate the ability, and potential, of the law to tackle destitution.  
Beyond this, the statutory definition has had some wider applicability with regard to 
the income level determined as adequate, by the government, to allow for essential needs to be 
met. The case of Mensah v Salford City Council, Bello v Salford City Council [2014] evidences 
 
103 ibid 56. 
104 R (W, A Child by His Litigation Friend J) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWHC 
1299 (Admin) [42]. 
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how the level of financial assistance set by the Asylum and Immigration Act has been lawfully 
used by other public bodies to determine the ‘the basic amount considered appropriate to meet 
their subsistence needs.’105 This was with regard to assistance under section 17 of the Children 
Act 1989. This demonstrates that the subsistence level determined by the Asylum and 
Immigration Act has broader implications. As well as being provided somewhere to live, this 
level is currently set at £37.75 per person per week.106 It could therefore follow from this that, 
provided that an individual has access to housing, income of £37.75 per week is sufficient to 
meet other essential living needs and thus ward off destitution. 
Through collating existing case law, McKeever et al have analysed the definition found 
in the Asylum and Immigration Act in greater detail.107 This case law supports the notion of 
destitution being more than food, clothes and shelter.108 For example, Price suggests that the 
Refugee Action case interprets the concept of essential living needs broadly ‘to include 
toiletries, nappies and the means to maintain interpersonal relationships, meaning that those 
who cannot afford such things are considered to be destitute.’109  
However, unlike the traditional definition, the statutory definition in the Asylum and 
Immigration Act also finds that ‘it is reasonable for a local authority to assess the alternative 
support available to a family that could prevent destitution e.g., through earnings or the support 
 
105 Mensah v Salford City Council, Bello v Salford City Council [2014] EWHC (Admin) 3537 [45–57]. This case 
related to British national children whose single parents – being non-British nationals – were eligible to remain 
in the UK albeit with no recourse to public funds (ineligible for social security or housing benefit). In this case, 
the council provided a furnished flat and basic financial assistance set at a level determined by reference to the 
amount that the Secretary of State would provide to a failed asylum seeker and his or her dependants to enable 
them to purchase food and essential toiletries, pursuant to section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 [2]. 
106 ‘Asylum Support’ (GOV.UK) <https://www.gov.uk/asylum-support/what-youll-get> accessed 30 March 2020. 
107 McKeever et al. (n 1) 14–26. 
108 Refugee Action v SSHD [2014] EWHC 1033 (Admin). 
109 Jonathon Price, ‘Children and Families: Destitution, Safeguarding and Services’ (Welsh Refugee Council 
2015) 7; see also Refugee Action v SSHD (n 108) paras 50, 83, 117.  
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available from family and friends.’110 This is at odds with the traditional definition to which a 
reliance on such provision is a characteristic of the destitution experience.  
In this regard, the JRF definition of destitution aligns more readily with the traditional 
as opposed to the statutory understanding of destitution. Part of the JRF definition considers 
an individual to be destitute if their income was so extremely low that they were unable to 
purchase essentials for themselves.111 This alternative pathway to being defined as destitute is 
justified by the JRF report’s authors in that ‘a majority of the public took the view that people 
who were only able to meet their essential living needs with help from charities, for example, 
should be considered destitute.’112 
This notion of dependency on others to attain these basic necessities is representative 
of traditional conceptions of destitution and such dependency can be criticised from a human 
rights-based perspective. I therefore endorse this aspect of the JRF definition. This is because 
those who are dependent on charity, and upon others, face the risk of access to these necessities 
being withdrawn. Thus, their access to such necessities is insecure and on account of this is 
both undignified and exposes individuals to vulnerability. This insecurity is premised upon the 
fact that unlike ‘socially and legally guaranteed entitlements,’113 individuals have no means of 
enforcing any claim, nor in fact have any claim, to discretionary charity (charitable assistance). 
Thus, if the donor becomes unable or unwilling to continue in their provision of these basic 
necessities the dependant recipient will lose this source of access and, failing alternative 
sources of provision, will therefore be without these necessities. This demonstrates how 
vulnerability manifests itself through insecurity of provision. In summary, charity ‘involves 
 
110 Price (n 109) 7. 
111 Fitzpatrick et al. (n 2) 2.  
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113 Donald and Mottershaw (n 25) 13.  
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neither a right of the individual nor a duty imposed on the state.’114 Consequently, an individual 
who is dependent on charitable sources for the provision of basic necessities is in a precarious 
and insecure position as the attainment of such necessities is fully beyond their control. These 
sentiments will be expounded upon in both chapter 5 and chapter 6 of this thesis.115 A rights-
based approach can be useful here, therefore, as a tool for tackling this insecurity by reframing 
these issues of need to issues of entitlement116 and thus empowering individuals to ensure their 
own access to basic necessities. 
Additionally, in the context of the United Kingdom, the JRF definition of destitution 
determines an individual to be destitute if, due to an inability to afford them, they or their 
children, had lacked two or more out of six essentials over the past month.117 These essentials 
were determined to be shelter, food, heating, lighting, clothing and footwear, and basic 
toiletries. Although the report does not expressly refer to these essentials as rights, these 
essentials, as the constituent elements of the JRF definition, draw parallels to a number of pre-
existing rights such as the right to adequate housing, the right to clothing, the right to food, the 
right to water, and the right to sanitation. All of these rights are constituent elements of the right 
to an adequate standard of living.118 Furthermore, despite being based upon public perceptions, 
these essentials mirror those highlighted in the above analysis of destitution as an extreme form 
 
114 Asbjorn Eide, ‘Adequate Standard of Living’ in Daniel Moeckli et al. (ed), International Human Rights Law 
(Third Edition, OUP 2018) 186–207, 202.  
115 For analysis framing austerity in the UK since 2010 as inherently destitution inducing given that it was designed 
to foster a reliance on the ‘big society’ which itself relies on charity see chapter 5.6: For a human rights focused 
critique of a reliance on charitable provision (which I term charitable assistance) to realise the component rights 
see section 2.2.; see also chapter 6.3.  
116 Olivia Ball, ‘Human Rights-Based Analysis: What, Why and How?’ in Robert Garbutt (ed), Activating Human 
Rights and Peace: Universal Responsibility Conference 2008 Conference Proceedings (Centre for Peace and 
Social Justice 2010) 140.  
117 Fitzpatrick et al. (n 2) 2.  
118 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (Adopted on 16 December 1966, 
A/RES/2200) Article 11.This Article contains the right to an adequate standard of living which includes rights to 
adequate food, clothing, housing, and has been read to include rights to water and to sanitation. 
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of poverty. Thus, the JRF report demonstrates the link between basic essentials and destitution. 
The JRF report sought to ‘capture people who cannot afford to buy the absolute 
essentials that we all need to eat, stay warm and dry, and keep clean.’119 In addition to the costs 
of housing, this income figure was determined to be ‘£70 for a single adult living alone, £90 
for a lone parent with one child, £100 for a couple, and £140 for a couple with two children.’120 
This is informed by the concept of a minimum standard of living in the specific context of the 
UK. However, as will be explored below, the use of income measures to determine whether an 
individual is destitute does not adequately capture the experience of destitution.121  In relation 
to determining a minimum income standard, this minimum standard of living is said to include, 
but is not limited to, ‘food, clothes and shelter.’122 These are highlighted as being required in 
order to participate in society123 and also draw parallels to the rights to food, clothing and 
housing.  
As is made clear in figure 1 the after-housing-costs figure set by the JRF report does 
not align with the level of financial assistance provided under the asylum and immigration act. 
Although due to the fact that the statutory support is paid per person and thus benefits larger 
family units in this comparison, the level of statutory provision is insufficient to meet the 
income level set by the JRF report for family units of less than three persons. Given that the 
JRF report level is determined in reference to the minimum income standard, it follows that 
the level of statutory provision is insufficient to attain, inter alia, food and clothes. This 
indicates that the level of statutory provision may be insufficient to allow the rights to food and 
 
119 Fitzpatrick et al. (n 2) 2.  
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121 See section 2.3.3.  
122 Matt Padley and Donald Hirsch, ‘A Minimum Income Standard for the UK in 2017’ (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation 2017) 3 <https://www.jrf.org.uk/file/50351/download?token=j92YnSFi&filetype=full-report> 




clothing to be realised.   
Figure 1: Comparing post-housing costs incomes required to avert destitution 
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2.3. Extreme Poverty 
It is clear that determining an individual to be destitute proscribes judgment on their standard 
of living. That judgment is that their standard of living is too low; their status of being human 
entitles them to more; and that they are impoverished and that they are experiencing a more 
severe form of poverty. More specifically, in considering my destitution themes once again this 
judgement categorises an individual who experiences destitution as not only vulnerable but as 
also lacking in dignity.   
An examination of poverty will act as the catalyst for the analysis of survival needs, 
vulnerability, and indignity. This is because similarly to destitution, a determination of poverty 
carries these same connotations. The analysis of poverty is justified given that the experience 
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of destitution ‘sits within the much broader context of 'severe' and other forms of poverty.’124 
This reaffirms the suggestion that destitution is an extreme form of poverty. This is because the 
use of ‘broader’ in relation to poverty necessarily implies that destitution is a narrower concept 
than poverty. Lotter’s contention, that those living in absolute poverty eventually experience 
destitution,125 further justifies an examination of poverty. Therefore, in seeking to enunciate a 
definition of destitution, poverty must be examined.  
In order to inform the identification of a rights-based definition of destitution, the 
following analysis will consider a number of definitions of poverty. This is because ‘the choice 
of a definition is of practical importance in monitoring the extent of poverty and in formulating 
antipoverty programs.’126 More so, the choice of poverty definition will determine what is 
meant by extreme poverty and, as a consequence, will also influence my definition of 
destitution.   
Debate regarding defining, measuring, and combatting poverty, although old, has risen 
to the fore, once again, in the context of the discussions around the Sustainable Development 
Goals and the post-2015 development agenda.127 There exists no explicit definition of poverty 
with it being accepted, generally according to Shyshkin, ‘that no single statistical approach can 
encompass all aspects and manifestations of poverty.’128 Gordon et al suggest that poverty is 
‘both a scientific and a moral concept’129 which may have a variety of meanings ‘depending on 
 
124 Fitzpatrick et al. (n 2) 9.  
125 Lotter (n 95) 1206.  
126 Robert A Hoppe, ‘Defining and Measuring Poverty in the Nonmetropolitan United States Using the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation’ (1991) 24 Social Indicators Research 123, 124.  
127 Lang and Lingnau (n 31) 402.  
128 VS Shyshkin, ‘Defining Poverty Thresholds in Ukraine’ (2008) 57 Problems of Economic Transition 13, 13. 
129 David Gordon et al., ‘Absolute and Overall Poverty: A European History and Proposal for Measurement’ in 
David Gordon and Peter Townsend (eds), Breadline Europe: The Measurement of Poverty (Policy Press 2000) 
79–105, 91; see also Lotter (n 95) 1198.  
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what subject area or discourse is being examined.’130 The wide variance of poverty concepts, 
definitions, and measures found in ‘reviews of poverty research within and between 
countries’131 stands testament to this. Determining conclusive definitions of poverty and 
poverty levels is further hampered given the difficulties faced in achieving this ‘in universally 
applicable ways.132 Despite this, the use of the term poverty has some core connotations. This 
section will determine these core elements of poverty. 
Pogge contends that part of the poverty experience is lacking secure access to sufficient 
quantities of basic necessities such as ‘safe food and water, clothing, shelter, and basic medical 
care.’133 Others also highlight the link between poverty and access to these basic necessities.134 
Thus, poverty manifests ‘itself in a dense range of overlapping and interwoven economic, 
political and social deprivations.’135 The CESCR also endorses the view that poverty relates to 
multi-dimensional deprivations.136  
Consequently, regardless of whether a relative or the distinguishable137 absolute 
approach to determining the poverty threshold is taken,138 it is contended that in a broad sense 
 
130 Gordon et al. (n 129) 91. 
131 John Veit-Wilson, ‘Horses for Discourses: Poverty, Purpose and Closure in Minimum Income Standards 
Policy’ in David Gordon and Peter Townsend (eds), Breadline Europe: The Measurement of Poverty (Policy Press 
2000) 141–164, 158. 
132 Hohnholz (n 33) 58. 
133 Thomas Pogge, ‘Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation’ in Thomas Pogge (ed), Freedom from Poverty 
as a Human Right (OUP 2007) 11–53, 150. 
134 Alan Gewirth, ‘Duties to Fulfil the Human Rights of the Poor’ in Thomas Pogge (ed), Freedom from Poverty 
as a Human Right (OUP 2007) 219–236, 219; Deepa Narayan and others, ‘Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear 
Us’ (OUP for the World Bank 2000) 35. 
135 Harsh Mander, ‘Rights as Struggle – Towards a More Just and Humane World’ in Paul Gready and Jonathon 
Ensor (eds), Reinventing Development (Zed Books 2005) 233–253, 240. 
136 CESCR, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in The Implementation of The International Covenant on Economic, 
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(2001) UN.Doc. E/C.12/2001/10’ (n 7) para 8. 
137 Stephen P Marks, ‘Poverty’ in Daniel Moeckli et al. (ed), International Human Rights Law (Third Edition, 
OUP 2018) 599. 
138 Relative (section 2.3.1.)  and Absolute (section 2.3.2.) Poverty will be expanded upon throughout section 2.3. 
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poverty relates to living standards, of which ‘the poverty threshold is a generalized indicator.’ 139 
In this sense, a determination that an individual is experiencing poverty deems their life ‘to be 
unworthy of how humans ought to live.’140 This judgment is informed by the notion of ‘the 
minimum standards a group of humans have implicitly agreed upon as minimally adequate for 
themselves.’141 This relates to the idea of lack of resources and the notion that, based on this 
lack of resources, those experiencing poverty are those who are excluded from the ‘minimum 
way of life commonly accepted in their country of residence.’142 As poverty also means ‘a lack 
of basic capacity to participate effectively in society’143 it is contended that the minimum way 
of life required in order to avoid poverty is of a level to allow an individual to effectively 
participate in society. Further, the notion of living standards, as an indicator of poverty, suggests 
that ‘every society has standards for what is regarded as suitable styles of human living.’ 144 
Pertaining to poverty ‘suitable style of living’ can be considered in relation to the type of life a 
person can live and, more specifically, ‘a lack of basic means of living with dignity.’145 
Nationally defined poverty lines vary between the contexts of different states and this 
feature makes such contextualised poverty lines preferable to more general understandings of 
poverty. This is because contextualised poverty lines better correspond with the reality 
experienced in states.146 This in turn causes states to view them as more legitimate which in 
turn allows such contextualised poverty lines to better resonate with states than more generally 
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Poverty, as an individual’s existence below this minimum way of life, manifests itself 
in a variety of ways. This includes lack of income and/or resources with which to live 
sustainably. This in turn contributes to individuals experiencing other aspects of poverty, inter 
alia, hunger, ill health, limited or lack of access to basic services, and ‘increased morbidity and 
mortality from illness.’148 This demonstrates the role that poverty can play in multiplying 
deprivations and causing an individual to experience deteriorating conditions.149 
2.3.1. Relative Poverty 
Relative, also referred to as subjective,150 definitions of poverty determine context specific 
thresholds, usually of average incomes,151 below which an individual or a household are 
determined to be in poverty. Relative approaches to poverty are therefore influenced by, and 
linked to,152 the standards of living within a state. Thus, relative concepts of poverty are based 
on the notion that poverty cannot be fixed at one subsistence level ‘and that, as overall living 
standards rose over time, so too should our understanding of what it means to be poor.’153 
In any state where there is a disparity in incomes and living standards relative poverty 
exists. This is because deprivation will be determined by the standards of that specific state.154 
One approach to determining a relative poverty line, used by the European Union and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is to ‘set poverty lines as 
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a share of the median income in a given country.’155 This is often set at sixty-percent of the 
median income.156 Armstrong purports that the use of the median average is appropriate as the 
median value is not affected by extremely low or extremely high incomes.157 This is because 
the median value, in this scenario, is the middle income when, for ease of understanding, all 
the incomes within a given group are lined up in ascending order. Thus, even if all the incomes 
below the median value are raised to the same level, but are still lower than the median value, 
the median will stay the same.158 
Consequently, I can envision a society in which, using a relative income-based 
approach to poverty, individuals are considered to be experiencing poverty despite having each 
of their human rights realised fully. Take for example an admittedly utopian society where the 
lowest incomes are enough for a person to afford necessities, to meet their living costs, and to 
partake in all activities which they may wish to do. See Figure 2 for an example of this. 
Consider still that these lowest incomes are significantly lower than the median average of 
incomes within that society, and far below the 60% of national median income used by the 
European Union in determining the at-risk-of-poverty line.159 
In such a society, extreme income inequality does exist, and those on the lowest 
incomes, by current definitions would be regarded as living in relative poverty, or at least as 
being at-risk-of-poverty. However, the poverty experienced by those living in such a state 
would be a very different poverty experience in comparison to those currently living in the 
European Union and subject to the 60% of median income definition of being at risk of poverty. 
This demonstrates the potential of relative poverty approaches to ‘account for the important 
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link between poverty and inequality.’160 





On the discussion in the preceding paragraph, it is clear that relative approaches to 
poverty allow poverty to be ‘defined by society itself.’161 Gordon labels this as the relative 
approach’s ‘most important advantage.’162 This is advantageous as it ‘links the extent and the 
experience of poverty to the position of people within the broader social order.163 In this sense, 
such an approach may be more representative of the ‘poverty experience’ than universal levels, 
which will be addressed below. This is because relative approaches ‘account for the evolution 
of perceptions of basic needs evolving in society.’164 
Emphasis must, however, be placed upon the phrase ‘perceptions of basic needs.’ This 
is because society’s perception of basic needs may diverge from the basic needs themselves. 
This divergence may occur as relative approaches are not only informed by society’s 
perceptions but also emphasise this perception over the actual basic needs.165 For example, the 
average of a 1992 survey of a sample of Americans was ‘76 percent higher than the official 
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poverty level.’166 This demonstrates that a disjunction can exist between perceptions of basic 
needs and a universal understanding of basic needs. Further still, this example shows how 
relative approaches have the potential to classify more individuals as experiencing poverty. 
This is because in setting a higher income-based poverty line such approaches would classify 
more individuals as being in poverty.  This may perhaps be explained by the fact that those 
experiencing poverty and those who are not have different perceptions as to what constitutes 
basic necessities with the more comfortable amongst us, having not experienced poverty, 
failing to fully grasp how little the impoverished have. Even if this is the case, such approaches 
demonstrate that society believes that those who do not have access to, even this broader 
conception of, basic necessities are impoverished. 
Another approach taken by the World Bank uses the experiences of those in poverty. 
Through the involvement of those experiencing poverty, who were regarded as the primary 
stakeholders,167 the World Bank developed the Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA). Used 
in the Voices of the Poor assessment of poverty, the PPA approach determined six main 
findings.168 I highlight those findings which relate to the definition of poverty. These were: that 
poverty is multidimensional; that poverty is ‘the lack of multiple resources that leads to hunger 
and physical deprivation’; and that poverty creates vulnerability.169 This approach, unlike the 
example cited in the preceding paragraph, utilised the experience of impoverished individuals. 
More so, this report did not seek to place an income-based classification on poverty. Instead, it 
represents key aspects of the poverty experience as determined, in part, by those experiencing 
impoverishment. Thus, it may be regarded as more accurately depicting the poverty experience. 
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2.3.2. Absolute Poverty 
Relative poverty contrasts to absolute, also known as objective,170 approaches to poverty which 
‘is technically defined as poverty measured against a fixed standard.’171 This fixed standard is 
‘clearly based on some notion of basic needs.’172 Consequently, absolute poverty is ‘sometimes 
referred to as subsistence poverty’173 and ‘portrays a particularly severe condition suffered by 
humans.’174 This notion of severity is represented in that an individual can only be said to be 
experiencing absolute poverty when they do ‘not reach an absolute minimum level of 
resources.’175 
The World Summit for Social Development can be used in determining which resources 
constitute a part of this ‘absolute minimum level.’ The programme of action defined absolute 
poverty as ‘a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including 
food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It 
depends not only on income but also on access to social services.’176 This definition highlights 
a number of basic human needs. Some of these highlighted needs can be joined together under 
the umbrella of health. Lotter contends that an individual experiences absolute poverty if they 
do not have ‘sufficient economic capacities to ward off a decline in physical health.’177 Further, 
various measurements can be utilised in determining whether such a decline has taken place. 
These include, inter alia, ‘loss of weight due to lack of enough food, weight gain as result of 
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lack of resources to procure food providing adequate nutrition, increased susceptibility to 
disease.’178 This focus on physical health excludes other deprivations of basic needs found in 
the programme of action definition, such as education and information. Lack of access to these 
necessities, although negatively impactful upon an individual’s life, would not necessarily 
affect an individual’s physical health. As such, this definition does not go far enough. 
More so, focusing on physical health alone excludes the implications that experiences 
of poverty may have on an individual’s mental and social wellbeing. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.’179 Therefore, it is clear that an 
individual’s health goes beyond physical health alone. As such, to focus purely on a decline in 
physical health too narrowly defines poverty. This is because a lack of sufficient economic 
capabilities to maintain mental and social wellbeing, as well as to ward off declines in physical 
wellbeing, are required to maintain an individual’s health. Therefore, an individual must be 
regarded as in poverty if their economic capabilities do not reach this higher standard. 
Unlike the relative approach, absolute poverty is adjudged independently to the 
individual’s environment.180 Dissimilarly, therefore, to the hypothetical utopia envisioned 
above, absolute conceptions of poverty allow for societies to be regarded as poverty free. That 
is, when all individuals are able to meet their basic needs. Therefore, absolute approaches to 
poverty are capable of providing a ‘universally applicable baseline of poverty.181 The same 
cannot be said of relative conceptions of poverty. The choice of poverty line, in regard to 
absolute income set in terms of dollars per day, affects the number of people classified as poor. 
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This is because the choice of a higher poverty line such as $2, as opposed to the absurdly low 
international poverty line of $1.25, would ‘find that the number of poor has stood still or has 
actually slightly increased.’182 In 2015 the World Bank set the international poverty line at 
US$1.90 per day with this figure being determined using the ‘average of the national poverty 
lines in the poorest 15 countries.’183 However, because of this the World Bank’s extreme poverty 
standard ‘is inadequate for capturing the realities of poverty on the ground’184 and excludes, by 
definition, ‘all poverty in developed countries.’185 
Perhaps on account of this, absolute conceptions of poverty are disputed.186 One reason 
for this is that the universality of definitions of poverty, which are absolute in nature, relies on 
the concept of basic needs. This is because it is adjudged that these basic needs can transpose 
between contexts as, in being linked to subsistence, an absolute poverty line does not alter as 
societal living standards increase.187 This is based on the assumption that individuals require 
the same basic necessities in order to survive.188 Even if such an assumption is valid, difficulties 
arise in determining the content and extent of this nature of basic necessities with guiding 
phrases such as ‘minimal standard of living’ being not at all clear.189 
Another reason for this is the view that definitions of poverty so conceived do not fully 
capture the ‘poverty experience.’ For example, Lotter contends that, although useful in gauging 
a baseline for severe forms of poverty, an absolute conception of poverty must ‘be 
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supplemented by a second kind of definition.’190 Herein lies the weakness of absolutist 
conceptions of poverty.  Such conceptions are ‘often dominated by the individual’s 
requirements for physiological efficiency’191 tending ‘to be prescriptive definitions based on 
the ‘assertions’ of experts about people’s minimum needs.’192 Not only may these ‘assertions’ 
be incorrect, but they also firmly attach the notion of poverty to mere subsistence and survival. 
This implies that those who are just above this poverty line are not living in poverty despite the 
fact that their experience is not at all dissimilar to those living just below this baseline. It further 
suggests that this first category of individuals are living lives befitting of their status as 
individuals. I refute this suggestion. Seebohn Rowntree moved away from such a narrow, 
subsistence-based definition, of poverty given that ‘society’s ideas of what equated to ‘obvious 
want and squander’ had changed.’193 I endorse such an approach.  
2.3.3. Linking Relative and Absolute Approaches to Poverty: Income-based measurements 
Despite the differences between the relative and absolute approaches to poverty some common 
themes can be extrapolated. Ultimately poverty is about a ‘continuum of want’194 which 
contributes to an ‘inability to attain a minimal standard of living’195 with both the absolute and 
relative approaches to poverty being a mechanism through which this minimal standard is 
determined. Consequently, when given a choice of poverty standard ‘governments almost 
invariably choose those that report the lowest number of poor people.’196 
In defining poverty, a choice must be made ‘between whether poverty ought to be about 
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relative deprivation or subsistence needs.’197 In my view, the fundamental difference between 
absolute and relative definitions of poverty is their outcome. These definitions ‘result in very 
different measures of the numbers of people who are poor in society.’198 Pryke labels those who 
prefer the relative approach to poverty as ‘poverty-wallahs’199 and states that ‘their aim has 
been to show that the extent of poverty is worse than it appears.’200 Pryke’s argument can be 
summarised as being one which contends that only absolute poverty measures ought to be used 
and, as such, no problem of mass-poverty can be said to exist in the context of more developed 
nations such as the UK.201 
Regardless of which approach is utilised, both traditional relative and absolute 
conceptions of poverty are determined, not by rights, but by income-based measures with 
poverty being regarded as the income level separating ‘the poor from the not poor.’202 This 
income level, however, varies depending upon the approach to poverty taken. This is because 
a relative approach determines the level of income based on such factors as 60% of the median 
income whereas the absolute approach determines the income level based upon an assessment 
of how much income is required to meet very basic needs; that is to subsist. However, the 
extent to which $1.90 per day can allow an individual to subsist in more developed contexts 
such as the UK must be challenged. 
Poverty continues to be perceived exclusively, by many legal systems, as the income 
poverty of individuals.203 This is evidenced through the fact that poverty rates have come to be 
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‘defined in terms of household income.’204 Thus, poverty and deprivation have been reduced to 
a shortage of money.205 This is understandable in that lack of money, and income, can contribute 
to an individual being unable to access the basic necessities required in order to not experience 
poverty.206 Further still, income is easy to measure and is therefore a convenient method of 
poverty identification.207 This may go some way to explaining why it is the preferred means of 
measuring poverty in both absolute and relative conceptions.  
Yet, this disregards and is despite the fact that, income-based measurements of poverty 
assess only one aspect of deprivation.208 Poverty is ‘broader than income data’ alone.209 
Consequently, such a method of determining poverty has been criticised ‘for using arbitrary 
thresholds as proxies for poverty.’210 Building on this, income-only-based measurements of 
poverty have been criticised by Skogly in that they are incapable of capturing the significance 
and complexity of ‘the rights of the poor and the violations thereof.’211 Sen also posits that ‘the 
reduction of income poverty alone cannot possibly be the ultimate motivation of antipoverty 
policy.’212 
Even so, income does have a role to play in regard to poverty, with poverty as a 
deprivation of capabilities213 and income deprivations often having ‘considerable correlational 
linkages.’214  This is demonstrated through the notion of income being a ‘means to 
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capabilities’215 and, inversely, the notion that ‘deprivation of individual capabilities can have 
close links with the lowness of income.’216 As the notion of adequate income is contained in 
various international instruments some poverty activists argue that a lack of such an adequate 
income ‘represents the denial of human rights.’217 
2.3.4. Linking Poverty and Human Rights: Development and Capability 
Poverty, defined in relation to human rights, also gives rise to Sen’s ‘seminal’218 concept of 
capabilities, which in turn gives rise to the concept of development. Building upon this, poverty 
has been described by Sengupta as ‘the absence or the violation of the right to development of 
the category of people identified as ‘poor’.’219 The declaration on the right to development 
‘does not address poverty as such, although elimination of poverty is implicit in concepts’220 
contained within. The Millennium Development Goals confirmed the long-standing acceptance 
of the importance of a number of human rights, inter alia food and health, to poverty 
reduction.221 This demonstrates some of the links between human rights and development. 
This in turn allows human rights-based definitions of poverty to be linked to capabilities 
given the mutual characteristics, in the form of motivations and goals, which are shared 
between the promotion of human development and the realisation of human rights.222 This 
relates especially to ‘guaranteeing the basic freedoms that people have reason to value.’223 
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Premised on the notion that development should be informed by attention to human rights, 
rights-based approaches to development are nowadays widely endorsed.224 This is further 
supported in that the UNDP has recognised that a number of development goals are not only 
goals but are also human rights.225 
Therefore, development must also be considered given that the UNDP states that human 
development is ‘integrally connected with enhancing certain capabilities.’226 Consequently, 
given the links between human rights, poverty, and capability which have already been 
highlighted, development must also be considered in relation to determining a human rights 
definition of poverty. Human rights and development share a common purpose of human 
welfare227 and the human development approach, as represented by the human development 
index, demonstrates this.  
A multi-dimensional and human rights-based definition of poverty, in drawing on the 
work of Sen, can be defined as ‘the lack of basic capabilities to live in dignity.’228 This notion 
of dignity is both a feature of capability poverty and is a destitution theme. This demonstrates 
the suitability of capability poverty in considering destitution. The lack of such basic 
capabilities equates to the ‘sustained or chronic deprivation of resources, capabilities, choices, 
security, and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard.’229 Osmani 
demonstrates the linkage between poverty and human rights which the concept of capability, 
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as a connecting bridge,230 allows to be achieved. This is achieved through the joint contentions 
that: poverty is the failure of basic capability rights; of which many human rights may be 
regarded. Therefore, poverty can be interpreted as the non-realisation, or in fact denial, of a 
range of human rights.231 This rests on the ‘very close relationship’ which exists between 
capabilities and human rights.232 However, poverty does not denote the experience of the non-
realisation, or violation, of all human rights. Although a deprivation can be said to have 
occurred, this may not always equate to poverty which must be ‘understood in the context of 
social policy.’233 This is because only some capability failures constitute poverty.234 
In regard to relative and absolute concepts of poverty Sen claims ‘that absolute 
deprivation in terms of a person’s capabilities relates to relative deprivation in terms of 
commodities, incomes and resources.’235 Thus, the capability approach to poverty can reconcile 
relative and absolutist conceptions of poverty. This is achieved through the notion of there 
being ‘an irreducible absolutist core in the idea of poverty’236 below which, regardless of the 
relative situation, poverty can be said to exist. Examples of being below this core, cited by Sen, 
are starvation and hunger.237 
Capabilities are the substantive freedoms an individual enjoys to live the kind of life 
that individual has reason to value238 with capabilities, as means to other human ends, being 
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‘directly valuable in a way that the possession of primary goods cannot be.’239 The capability 
approach to poverty regards poverty ‘as the deprivation of basic capabilities.’240 Capability is 
the freedom to achieve functionings which in turn are defined as ‘things we value doing or 
being.’241 Examples of functionings include ‘being in good health, being literate or educated, 
being able to participate in the life of the community, being free to speak, being free to associate 
and so on.’242 Beyond this list, Sen states that the capability to function ‘comes closest to the 
notion of standard of living.’243 Thus capability is the extent to which an individual’s pursuit of 
these functionings are respected, protected and fulfilled.  
Once again, as these basic capabilities parallel the rights enshrined in international 
human rights law,244 a correlation can be made to a number of human rights: the rights to health, 
education, participation, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. Further still, 
Sengupta highlights the three ‘basic’245 rights to food, health and education as requiring 
prioritisation, albeit alongside the non-retrogression and non-violation of other rights, under 
the capability approach.246 The notion of these being basic capabilities perhaps relates to the 
contention that the rights to food and health, amongst others, have been interpreted as rights to 
capability building.247 Thus some rights allow capabilities to be accessed and built. Amongst 
other rights, the right to housing and the right to sanitation are also highlighted.248 This 
 
239 Sen (n 235) 323. 
240 Sen (n 37) 87. 
241 Sengupta (n 16) 851. 
242 ibid. 
243 Sen (n 235) 334. 
244 Van Bueren (n 41) 1. 
245 Sengupta (n 16) 886. 
246 ibid. 
247 UNDP, Human Development Report 2000 (n 21) 34. 
248 Sengupta (n 16) 887. 
  
 48 
correlation is highlighted to add credence to the contention that poverty relates to the non-
realisation of human rights which are ‘essentially related’249 to capability.  This is because Sen’s 
understanding of poverty suggests that poverty is the deprivation of basic capabilities. 
As basic capabilities have been linked to human rights it follows that the deprivation of 
basic capabilities equates to the deprivation of human rights. Thus, in defining poverty as the 
failure of basic capability rights, of which many basic human rights have been seen as, ‘poverty 
can be seen as the denial of human rights.250 On top of this, the UNDP highlights the links 
between various necessities and suggests that ‘building capabilities in one generation is a 
means to securing social and economic rights in the next—and to eradicating poverty in the 
long term.’251 Therefore, capability building is clearly important to tackling poverty. 
2.4. Destitution Themes 
As the analysis of poverty above has made clear, a human rights-based approach to destitution 
can be based upon human rights-based approaches to poverty, albeit with a narrower focus. 
This narrowing of focus must be centred around the destitution themes of survival needs, 
vulnerability, and indignity which have permeated throughout the analysis in this chapter thus 
far. 
2.4.1. Survival Needs 
Bonomo suggests that within needs-based approaches to poverty,252 the more variables (needs) 
used within the measurement of poverty increases the quantity of those considered to be 
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experiencing poverty.253 This correlation can be transferred into the context of human rights to 
state that the more human rights identified as being part of the poverty definition, the more 
poverty will be found to exist. The focus on poverty, in relation to destitution for the purposes 
of this thesis, relates specifically to ‘extreme poverty’. Extreme poverty is characterised by the 
adoption of a ‘survival culture’ in which individuals adapt and devote all of their energy to their 
struggle for survival.254 This notion of survival needs has already been highlighted as part of 
Gangopadhyay et al’s conception of traditional destitution interpretations. It follows that as 
destitution is separated from poverty through a notion of extremity, based upon survival needs, 
that survival needs are the key differentiating factor between poverty and destitution. On 
account of this, survival needs can be used as a tool in the process of identifying my rights-
based definition of destitution. 
The concept of survival needs can therefore act as a filter in determining which rights 
constitute component rights of a human rights-based definition of destitution. This concept 
highlights a number of rights which may be relevant to destitution: basic or survival rights 
which are also referred to as subsistence rights.255 This is because such rights have been 
demonstrated to be those which are considered to be unrealised in conditions of extreme 
poverty. In linking destitution with the conjoined themes of poverty and survival needs, the 
previous sections have highlighted a category of rights of which the inclusion within a rights-
based definition of destitution readily aligns with traditional conceptions of destitution. These 
rights are survival rights.  
Survival rights can act as a filter in highlighting the component rights of a destitution 
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definition as these rights are a separate question to ‘broader economic rights’256 more generally. 
Bilchitz highlights that in its general comments the CESCR has ‘adopted and modified Henry 
Shue’s framework concerning the range of obligations can be said to flow from fundamental 
socio-economic rights.’257 Alegre highlights that Shue has named such rights as ‘basic’ rights.258 
As subsistence and basic rights are synonymous it follows that Shue’s exploration of basic 
rights can be considered in relation to the notion of survival needs. Therefore, Shue’s basic 
rights framework can aid in informing the identification of my rights-based destitution 
definition. 
The process of identifying and measuring basic needs varies greatly.259 Shue recognises 
that this makes it difficult to determine what is necessary for survival. Even so, ‘the basic idea 
is to have available for consumption what is needed for a decent chance at a reasonably healthy 
and active life of more or less normal length, barring tragic interventions.’ To identify the 
component rights, it must therefore be determined which resources, and which associated rights 
constitute basic needs. To identify the destitution threshold, the level of realisation required to 
meet basic needs free from vulnerability and indignity must be determined. Basic rights, 
according to Shue, are ‘the line beneath which no one is allowed to sink;’260 ‘everyone’s 
minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity;’261 and more distinctively rights of 
which the enjoyment, and realisation, is ‘essential to the enjoyment of all other rights.’262 
Although there is no agreed list of needs, the concept of human needs ‘is based on the 
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idea that there are certain essentials necessary for survival’263 which go beyond food, water and 
shelter to also include ‘those things humans are instinctively driven to attain.’264 Shue equates 
subsistence to ‘minimal economic security’ and defines this as; unpolluted air and water; 
adequate food, clothing, and shelter; and ‘minimal preventive public health care.’265 Thus these 
are the resources which constitute Shue’s basic rights. Beyond this, Sengupta highlights not 
only the necessities that are food, water, clothing and shelter but also the ability to purchases 
these necessities when lacking access to them.266 Thus the individual’s ability to access the 
necessities is also of importance in the assessment of whether an individual is having their 
basic needs met.  
On top of this, as Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Alston has 
suggested that a right to social protection exists as a combination of the right to social security 
and the right to an adequate standard of living.267 I contend that social protection can be 
considered alongside basic needs and that consequently the rights to social security and to an 
adequate standard of living are important to the realisation of basic needs.  
The need to consider basic needs as basic rights can be justified in that human beings 
have ‘certain compelling interests’268 which are of such importance as to justify ‘being given 
protection as rights.’269 These compelling interests can be positioned within human rights-
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discourse given the potential impact of going without these basic needs and necessities.270 
Furthermore, building upon the notion of the enjoyment of basic rights being important to the 
realisation of other rights, Shue proposes that these basic rights are essential parts of other 
rights and are ‘inherent necessities.’271 
This is perhaps indicative of a hierarchy between rights. Griffiths highlights Maslow as 
a proponent of the hierarchal view; with this view prioritising ‘basic items of food, water and 
shelter’272 followed by other needs and although some have argued that this is the case,273 others 
have disputed this.274 This may be because such a contention may be regarded as undermining 
the interdependence and indivisibility of rights. Osmani, however, suggests that such a 
prioritisation, admitting only the non-realisation of some rights as poverty, does not undermine 
the indivisibility of rights.275 In relation to this thesis, I am attempting to determine a rights-
based definition not of poverty but instead of destitution. From the outset of this chapter, I have 
regarded destitution as an extreme form of poverty. It is logical therefore, in determining what 
separates the extreme poverty of destitution from poverty more broadly, that not all rights will 
constitute component rights of the destitution definition.  
2.4.2. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability, as a concept, ‘assumes partially different senses’276 in different fields and there 
exists no pure conceptual understanding of the meaning ‘vulnerable group in International 
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Law.’277 For the purposes of this thesis, I consider those experiencing destitution to be 
experiencing vulnerability. More so, I contend that with regard to destitution vulnerability has 
a dual manifestation and I use the concept of vulnerability to encapsulate two experiences.  
In the first sense, an individual is vulnerable when they cannot attain the substance of 
their basic needs. This is because in not having these needs met, for example inter alia, housing, 
food, water, sanitation, and clothing, an individual is at increased risk of harm. Vulnerability 
so conceived can be justified on the grounds that there exists a ‘normative assumption that 
vulnerability causes economic insecurity and a reduction of welfare.’278 This assumption 
justifies the contention that vulnerability ‘should be a central component of public actions to 
ensure a minimum level of economic and social protection.’279 This notion of a minimum level 
of social protection links directly to my conception of destitution as discussed above.280 As well 
as this, Turner claims that the ESCRs within the ICESCR ‘are designed to protect them from 
their vulnerability—from the afflictions and perturbations to which we are subject as embodied 
creatures’.281 The criticism that such a conception of vulnerability is ‘limited by its inability to 
explain the individual rights of liberalism’282 can be nullified, for the purposes of this thesis, 
given that my aim is to expressly address destitution using ESCRs as opposed to Civil and 
Political Rights. 
Initially, however, the destitution theme of vulnerability was extrapolated from the 
concept, inherent within the traditional and civil-society definitions of destitution, of being 
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reliant upon non-legally guaranteed sources of rights realisation in order to realise the 
component rights and the insecurity which can result on this. In this second sense, an individual 
is vulnerable when the substance of their basic needs is attained but, however, this attainment 
is precarious in nature. Thus, in this second sense, the concept of vulnerability goes beyond the 
notion of an increased risk of harm to include the notion of an individual being at an increased 
risk of vulnerability as understood in the first sense. This links to, and is informed by, my 
discussion on the relationship between charitable provision of, human rights more generally,283 
and the substantive content of the component rights284 elsewhere in this thesis.  
2.4.3. Indignity  
The destitution theme of indignity is strongly linked to and is broader than the destitution theme 
of vulnerability. The destitution theme of indignity was extrapolated from the concept, inherent 
within the traditional and civil-society definitions of destitution, of reliance upon charitable 
assistance to realise the physical substance of the component rights. The concept of dignity is 
especially pertinent to my human rights-based destitution definition. This is because ‘human 
dignity has been recognised as underlying the entire ambit of international human rights 
protection’285 and is therefore central to human rights-based analyses and consequently any 
human rights-based understanding of destitution. More so, beyond the observation that a 
connection can be drawn between dignity and an adequate standard of living, Simpson observes 
that the context dependence of dignity ‘need not be fatal to its use in this context: the state’s 
socio-economic obligations to its citizens are acknowledged to depend on "the standards 
prevailing" in society, "maximum available resources", median income or the goods deemed 
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necessary to a normal lifestyle.’286 This point serves to illustrate how integrating dignity into 
the destitution definition can serve to ensure that the human rights-based definition I propose 
is capable of being applied in a context specific manner. 
Dignity is an ambiguous and contested concept with there being no agreement as to its 
exact legal nature.287 In pursuit of clarity and given the multitude of ways in which dignity may 
be understood, it is important to determine how dignity should be understood with respect to 
destitution. Simpson’s adoption of McCrudden’s perspective of dignity, specifically in relation 
to destitution, regards dignity as an  
‘overarching concept protected by four "substantive areas" of human rights law: 
prohibition of inhuman treatment, assurance of individual autonomy, protection of 
group identity or culture and creation of the conditions for satisfaction of essential 
needs. The welfare state has an obvious role to play in upholding rights under all but 
the third of these headings.’288  
This role of the welfare state is especially obvious given that ICESCR ‘very clearly ties social 
security to the protection of dignity’289 and one interpretation of dignity, with respect to social 
security policy, requires ‘access to a minimum level of income or resources.’290 
Neal argues that the concept of dignity ‘does not mean anything that cannot be 
expressed by reference to other values, particularly the principle of autonomy and the related 
idea of ‘respect for persons.’’291 Dignity has also been argued to ‘act as a "bridge" between the 
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civil right to autonomy and the socio-economic right to satisfaction of essential needs’292 This 
notion of satisfaction of essential needs shows the clear links between dignity and destitution.   
Beyond the indignity which is inherent to the non-realisation of the physical substance 
of the component rights, the values of autonomy and respect for persons are, on account of the 
prominence they are given in Neal’s analysis, a natural starting point. This is especially so 
given that that these values align with my analysis of existing destitution definitions in section 
2.2. above. A reliance on charitable assistance, for example, engages the concept of autonomy 
in a number of ways. For example, as will be discussed in greater detail later in this thesis, a 
reliance on charitable assistance: limits the personal choice and freedom of the individual; does 
not cater to the specific needs and preferences of the recipient; is inherently precarious; and 
carries with it the burden of social stigma.293  
The concept of autonomy – or lack thereof – when engaged by a reliance on charitable 
assistance also engages the value of respect for persons. This is because, as demonstrated by 
the examples already highlighted in this paragraph, charitable assistance providers have no 
obligation to respect the autonomy of individuals. This point can be strengthened when it is 
considered that ‘although the House of Lords has made clear that charitable assistance can be 
an acceptable means of protection against inhuman or degrading living conditions, each of the 
three remaining elements [of McCrudden’s perspective] of dignity requires, or potentially 
requires, an income.’294 Consequently, reliance on charitable assistance does not conform to 
McCrudden’s perspective of dignity, specifically assurance of individual autonomy, protection 
of group identity or culture, and creation of the conditions for satisfaction of essential needs.  
Consequently, a reliance on charitable assistance is key to understandings of dignity 
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with respect to destitution. This is especially so given that, when understood as an everyday 
concept,  
‘there is a wealth of empirical evidence regarding what claimants consider it means to 
be treated with dignity, and in particular ways in which they feel the system fails to do 
so… Often, the threat to dignity flows less from the effects of poverty on physical health 
than from the demoralising experience of being forced to rely on family, friends or 
foodbanks for essentials and being unable to afford everyday social activities. This 
sense of shame does not spontaneously emerge within claimants but is linked to a 
“cultural economy of disgust” towards the poor, deliberately fostered by political and 
media narratives.’295 
2.5. Concluding Remarks 
If poverty can be defined, using a human rights framework, as the non-realisation of human 
rights. It follows that, if destitution is an extreme type of poverty, defining destitution using a 
human rights framework requires determining as to what level of realisation (destitution 
threshold) of which rights (component rights) constitutes extreme poverty. Thus, theoretically, 
and logically, any human rights-based definition of destitution must contain a number of core 
elements. These core elements are the rights which form a part of the definition, henceforth the 
component rights; and the level of rights realisation - of the component rights - below which 
destitution can be said to exist, henceforth the destitution threshold. At the most basic level, in 
considering these two theoretical core elements, destitution can be defined, from a human 
rights-based perspective, as the non-realisation of the component rights to the destitution 
threshold. Under this theoretical definition, an individual can be said to be destitute when their 
component rights are realised to a level below that of the destitution threshold.  
 
295 ibid 20. 
  
 58 
This chapter has examined existing definitions of destitution in order to identify 
common and recurring concepts and themes. Standards of living correlating to extreme poverty 
as categorised by reference to survival needs, vulnerability, and indignity were highlighted as 
themes inherent to the concept of destitution. These themes allowed the notion of basic needs 
to also be extrapolated as aligning with the destitution experience. The remaining chapters of 
Part One will apply these destitution themes to the identification of the component rights and 




Chapter 3: The Destitution Threshold  
3.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter identified the themes of survival needs, vulnerability, and indignity as 
being central to the experience of destitution. These themes may be split into two categories. 
The universal survival needs, which should not vary greatly from individual to individual or 
context to context, and the context-sensitive destitution themes of vulnerability and indignity 
which have the potential to vary greatly between contexts. The destitution threshold element 
of my human rights-based definition of destitution must therefore account for each of these 
themes.  
Plainly, a person is destitute under this definition if their component rights are not 
realised to a level which meets their survival needs in a dignified way free from vulnerability. 
This chapter will unpick this description of the destitution threshold. The interrelationship 
between the various component rights, that is to what extent is a person destitute if some but 
not all of their component rights are realised to the destitution threshold, will first be explored. 
Following this, the notion of a minimum entitlement will be explored. The view that individuals 
are minimally entitled to be free from destitution, is central to the analysis in this chapter. The 
destitution theme of survival will be examined and aligned with the notion of minimum core 
obligation.296 It will be highlighted that the minimum core obligation is not in itself a suitable 
level at which to set the destitution threshold. This is in part due to its links to the universally 
perceived survival needs and links to the debate between using universal or context-sensitive 
measures of poverty (and consequently destitution) outlined in the preceding chapter. This 
chapter will reconcile these context-specific and universal approaches by determining that the 
 
296 The minimum core obligation has also been referred to as the minimum obligation and the core obligation. 
However, for the purpose of consistency, this thesis will use the term minimum core obligation 
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minimum core obligation must be supplemented by a second standard of obligation which 
accounts for the varying contexts of states as well as the other destitution themes of 
vulnerability and indignity (see figure 3). As such a number of approaches to setting context 
specific standards of obligation will be explored. This analysis will allow a theoretical 
framework for determining the destitution threshold in a particular context to be enunciated. 





3.2. The Interrelationship Between the Component Rights 
Concerning the destitution threshold, a key conceptual issue is to determine the type of 
relationship which exists between the various component rights when making a determination 
as to whether an individual is destitute. This is because some of the component rights may be 
realised to the destitution threshold whilst, simultaneously, others are not. Therefore, more 
specifically, the purpose of this section is to establish how many of the component rights must 
remain unrealised to the destitution threshold in order for an individual to be deemed destitute 
under my definition.   
Given the recognition of all human rights as being interdependent, indivisible and 
interrelated a failure in one sphere of human rights transcends into a potential human rights 
failure across all spheres.297  One reason for this is that an individual may not be able to exercise, 
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for example, a civil or political right if a different category of right, such as an ESCR, has not 
been realised. This is affirmed by the interdependence approach which not only features in the 
preamble to the UDHR298 but has also been affirmed by the state parties themselves in accepting 
that ‘all human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent’299 and this 
affirmation has been restated in a number of other U.N documents.300 The term interdependent 
usually forms a package with the terms universal, indivisible and interrelated ‘or the separate 
words are used interchangeably’301 and the United Nations ‘has boldly declared that the 
indivisibility, interdependency, and interrelatedness of human rights is ‘beyond dispute.’’302 
Therefore, in determining the relationship between the component rights these notions must be 
considered. 
Rights are interdependent as, despite their distinctiveness as separate rights, the 
enjoyment of one right requires the enjoyment of others.303 Specifically, in relation to the 
component rights, as the analysis above made clear,304 their status as basic rights to basic needs 
rests inherently on the fact that their enjoyment is crucial to the enjoyment of other rights and 
this demonstrates that being interdependent is a defining feature of the component rights. 
Interrelatedness ‘means that they are brought into a situation of mutual relationship or 
connectedness’305 and may apply more readily than interdependency in situations where the 
 
298 Lanse Minkler, ‘Introduction: Why Economic and Social Human Rights’ in Lanse Minkler (ed), The State of 
Economic and Social Human Rights: A Global Overview (CUP 2013) 1–18, 11. 
299 UNGA (n 297) Art. 6 (2). 
300 United Nations General Assembly UNGA, ‘Resolution on the Indivisibility and the Interdependence of 
Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil and Political Rights’, (United Nations 1989) U.N. Doc A/Res/44/130. 
301 Daniel J Whelan, Indivisible Human Rights: A History (University of Pennsylvania Press 2010) 1. 
302 ibid. 
303 ibid 3. 
304 See chapter 2.4.1.  
305 Whelan (n 301) 4. 
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enjoyment of one right does not expressly depend upon the enjoyment of another.306 
Alternatively, indivisibility suggests that rights must be considered as a whole with the 
alternative being that they are divided or separated.307 These observations suggest that the 
component rights should be considered holistically in determining destitution.  
This contention can be supported further using the example of the interrelationship 
between the right to health and the right to water. Cahill-Ripley demonstrates how, despite the 
fact that realisation of the right to water partly contributes to the realisation of the right to 
health, an individual’s right to water can be fully realised whilst at the same time their right to 
health is being violated.308 Therefore, despite the interrelationship between the rights, violations 
of one right can occur independently of violations of the other and this consequently requires 
that, despite being integral to the realisation of the right to health under ICESCR Article 12,  
‘the right to water must constitute an independent right under article 11.’309 This reasoning can 
be extrapolated from the specific example of the interrelationship between the right to water 
and the right to health and applied to the component rights of my destitution definition. It 
follows that, the realisation of one component right may depend partly upon the realisation of 
another. Even though that is the case, this should not undermine one right at the expense of 
another. Instead, a holistic approach should be taken. 
In the previous chapter standards of living were highlighted as a key theme in the 
understanding of destitution. Hohmann contends that adequacy, in regard to the right to an 
adequate standard of living as enshrined in Article 25 of the UDHR, must ‘be read in light of 
 
306 ibid. 
307 ibid 6. 
308 Amanda Cahill-Ripley, The Human Right to Water and Its Application in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 




provision’s purpose, which is the health and well-being of the individual and the family.’310 
This purpose, and the notion of a holistic approach to an adequate standard of living, link the 
component rights, which will be informed by living standards, together. This can be supported 
by Cahill-Ripley’s contention that the relationship between the rights guaranteed under the 
right to an adequate standard of living can be ‘easily established’311 with all these rights being 
‘constitutive elements of the more general right to an adequate standard of living.’312 An 
example of this is the consideration of access to utilities, and other ‘certain facilities essential 
for health, security, comfort and nutrition,’313 in determining the adequacy of housing. Kamga 
contends that this view has been supported by the European Committee on Social Rights in 
holding that ‘‘adequate housing’ entails ‘all basic amenities, such as water, heating, waste 
disposal; sanitation facilities; electricity etc.’’314 In applying this to the component rights the 
implications of this are that determining adequacy in relation to one component right may entail 
considering the substance of other component rights.   
In sum, the component rights will be identified in the following chapter by reference to 
the destitution themes of survival needs, vulnerability, and indignity. Given that the component 
rights are basic rights justified by the fact that they meet basic needs, and due to the 
interdependent nature of these rights, it is contended that an individual is destitute if one, or 
any combination, of their component rights are not realised to the destitution threshold. This 
understanding of the interrelatedness of the component rights in defining destitution is 
important to ensuring that my human rights-based definition of destitution is practically 
 
310 Jessie Hohmann, The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities (Hart Publishing 2013) 16. 
311 Cahill-Ripley (n 308) 34. 
312 ibid 24. 
313 Serges Djoyou Kamga, ‘The Right to Basic Sanitation: A Human Right in Need of Constitutional Guarantee 
in Africa’ (2013) 29 South African Journal on Human Rights 615, 619. 
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applicable. Whilst being the correct position with regard to human rights theory, the 
interrelationship between the component rights as so understood provides a greater degree of 
clarity and certainty than alternative understandings of this interrelationship. This is because 
any alternative understanding of this interrelationship would allow scope for debate as to the 
destitution status of individuals. For example, it could perhaps be argued that because an 
individual has access to the substance of some of the component rights, they are not destitute 
as compared to an individual without ready access to this. Whilst running counter to the 
analysis within this section and I contend, as such, human rights principles, such alternative 
understandings of the interrelationship between the component rights would undermine the 
application of my human rights-based destitution definition. Having clarified the status of this 
interrelationship, the remainder of this chapter will determine the level of rights realisation 
below which an individual is destitute: my destitution threshold.  
3.3. The Destitution Threshold Level 
With the purpose of informing my definition of the destitution threshold level, this section will 
explore a number of approaches to determine the minimum obligation in regard to the 
realisation of ESCRs. The approaches that will be explored are the minimum core obligation, 
reasonableness, and benchmarks and indicators.  The primary focus will be the minimum core 
obligation. This is because the debate around its nature as being either a universal or instead a 
contextually relative standard will act as a catalyst for informing the design of my destitution 
definition. 
Although these approaches to determining states’ obligations are dissimilar, their 
purpose is shared. The approaches seek to balance the claims of the individual against the 
resources of the state. In this sense, these approaches are a means to determine the extent of 
the duties and obligations of states. This is required given the existence of the concepts of 
progressive realisation and maximum available resources. These two concepts are contained 
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within Article 2(1) of the ICESCR as a concession to the realities of the inability to afford to 
fully realise ICESCR rights faced by some States.315 However, concerns existed that these 
concepts could be used by States to take little action towards achieving full realisation and 
allow states to defend their failure to dispense of their obligations by using concepts enshrined 
within the covenant.316  
3.3.1. The Universal Aspect of the Destitution Threshold: Survival Needs 
3.3.1.1. The Minimum Core Obligation 
The existing, and well established, obligation under human rights law which at first glance 
would appear to most readily align with the concept of basic needs is that of the minimum core 
obligation. The minimum core obligation is intimately linked to the destitution theme of 
survival needs given that, for Bilchitz, this obligation constitutes a subsistence level.317 This 
concept was by no means included as a provision in the ICESCR and instead ‘derives from 
General Comment 3 of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.318 More so this General Comment was drafted and adopted several decades after the 
ICESCR. The CESCR has, however, read the concept of the minimum core obligation into 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR.319 The CESCR’s rationale, which has been alluded to in section 
 
315 Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No.3: The Nature of States Parties’ 
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318 Bilchitz, ‘Socio-Economic Rights, Economic Crisis, and Legal Doctrine’ (n 317) 729. 
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3.3., was to respond to the problems arising from Article 2(1) ICESCR320 and as such prevent 
the ICESCR rights from being deprived of meaning.321 
The minimum core obligation is an obligation of every state party to realise, ‘as a matter 
of priority,’322  the ‘minimum essential levels of each of the rights’323 enshrined in the ICESCR. 
The minimum core obligation can be regarded as ‘a right to basic socio-economic entitlements 
that can be claimed by everyone in desperate need.’324 It aims to provide a minimum level of 
social protection for all.325 It is therefore clear that the concept can be linked to standards of 
living correlating to survival and subsistence. It therefore links heavily to the notion of human 
dignity326 and, as the essence of any right,327 is the level that must be reached in order to prevent 
the right losing its ‘substantive value’328 and purpose.329 
Given that the minimum core obligation is not subject to either ‘maximum available 
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resources’ or ‘progressive realisation’330 it creates immediate obligations as opposed to 
obligations to be progressively realised.331 Furthermore, in order to rely on the defence of an 
inability to realise the minimum core obligation as a result of lack of available resources the 
State must demonstrate that it has made every effort to prioritise its resources in order to fulfil 
this obligation.332 This is to be seen as an initial step towards full realisation.  This step is 
achieved through reframing the obligation from one of aspiration to one of concrete and 
objective targets333 and better protects right holders ‘by closing the loophole of ‘progressive 
realization.’334 
For these reasons, despite the fact that the concept can be regarded as contested and 
complex,335 the minimum core obligation is regarded as a ‘non-derogable foundation’336 which 
must be guaranteed for all.337 More so, it is a baseline below which the realisation of ICESCR 
rights should not fall.338 This ‘irreducible’339 core should be realised without delay,340 and given 
immediate effect,341 by all State Parties to the ICESCR.342 Failure to achieve the realisation of 
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the minimum core obligation constitutes a prima facie breach of the State’s obligations343 in 
that it is a violation of the ‘corresponding core rights.’344 Therefore, the minimum core 
obligation can be defined as an immediate obligation to realise the levels of the enumerated 
rights required for human survival. Therefore, unless a state can show it has taken ‘every effort 
to realise the right’345 to the minimum core then it has breached its obligations.  
On account of this, it is clear that the minimum core obligation strongly correlates with 
the destitution theme of survival needs. However, the minimum core obligation is not 
appropriate as the sole determinant of a destitution threshold which aims to be universally 
applicable. This is because it is less clear how the minimum core obligation correlates to the 
remaining destitution themes of vulnerability and indignity. 
Although the General Comments of the CESCR have provided some guidance as to the 
minimum core obligations of specific rights it is clear that some difficulty in determining the 
extent of the minimum core obligation still exists346 with the CESCR having met with little 
success in this regard.347 Additionally, the CESCR has shifted its focus from minimum core 
obligations towards core obligations and in its work has specified and clarified the core 
obligations relating to many specific ESCRs. 348 This shift is indicative of a separation of the 
minimum entitlement from the core obligation. This separation may be explained by concerns 
that a minimum core obligation approach acts as an inducement for States to ‘limit their efforts 
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to the lower level of accomplishment, to avoid international censorship.’349 This should not be 
the case theoretically, and the minimum core obligation is envisioned to act as a springboard 
to the full and progressive realisation of all ICESCR rights,350 however the notion of 
prioritisation does undermine this. This is because the minimum core obligation approach, in 
prioritising the core of the right, ‘does not protect the individual against the collective’351 as 
there is a risk that focusing on the minimum core obligation can cause states to prioritise those 
who are below this level of realisation. Such prioritisation is supported by the Limburg 
principles.352 These principles were adopted following consideration of the nature and scope of 
States parties’ obligations under the ICESCR. Additionally, the CESCR’s General Comment 
No. 3, on the nature of States Parties’ obligations, also contains this concept of prioritisation 
with regard to ‘minimum obligations.’353 
However, it can be argued that reducing rights to a minimum core obligation threatens, 
and is counterproductive to,354 the broader long-term goals of the rights in question.355 This is 
because the State will perpetually bring new groups and individuals to the threshold required 
by the minimum core obligation, in order to avoid failing to realise its immediate obligations, 
only to leave them at that level of provision in order to uplift others. Furthermore, in relation 
to the right to health specifically, this prioritisation of the core results in the non-core aspects 
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of any right to be deprioritised.356 This point regarding the impact of prioritisation can be 
extrapolated, from the example of the right to health, to be equally applicable to all ICESCR 
rights. This does not adhere to the way in which the minimum core obligation was envisioned 
to work. Even so, the focus is not on all rights of all individuals but instead the plight of those 
facing the most severe cases of rights deprivation357 and this results in what has been termed 
‘emergency type measures.358 These measures are therefore reactive in nature and may not 
address the underlying issues and institutions which led to the non-realisation of rights in the 
first place.359 This point is in essence that in practice the minimum core obligation can become 
a ‘ceiling rather than a floor.’360 
Another key debate surrounding the minimum core obligation approach is as to whether 
the level of realisation required to satisfy this obligation is universal or relative. Bantekas and 
Oette, amongst others,361 have asked the question as to whether, pertaining to the minimum 
core obligation, different standards exist between developed and developing countries.362 This 
is of pertinence to the consideration of the concept of the minimum core obligation as a tool by 
which to determine the first universal aspect of the destitution threshold. More so, this question 
must also be answered in relation to the destitution threshold itself.  
There are two possible outcomes in this regard. Either the nature of the obligations 
under the concept of minimum core obligation are of universal applicability, and thereby hold 
all states to the same standards, or else the minimum core obligation is of a context-specific 
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nature thereby holding states to different standards of obligations. This debate is framed around 
the contention that, as the minimum core obligation is set at a level which is meant to be 
attainable for developing nations,363 developed nations should be able to attain a higher level 
of realisation than the level envisioned in the minimum core obligation. It has not always been 
clear as to which of these two approaches is the correct one.364 
The minimum core obligation threshold is determined by that which is needed to 
survive or subsist. This approach effectively excludes those in developed nations where it is 
generally assumed that people live above such a threshold. Young argues that ‘additional 
principles over simple survival’365 are required in this field and in order to make the minimum 
core obligation more appropriate in more developed nations perhaps some additional 
principles, which give the concept some relativity, are required.  
In contrast to this, Ssenyonjo argues that allowing state specificity undermines the 
purpose of the minimum core obligation and that, therefore, the minimum core obligation is 
‘an absolute international minimum.’366 Only by adopting this universal approach can the 
minimum core obligation be meaningful.367 The Maastricht Guidelines, suggest that the 
minimum core obligation applies ‘irrespective of the availability of resources of the country 
concerned or any other factors and difficulties.’368 This is because it can be inferred from this 
statement that the minimum core obligation applies in all circumstances. Such a view can be 
readily supported in assessing the aims of the CESCR in developing the concept of minimum 
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core obligation. General Comments No.3369 and No.14370 of the CESCR have been described 
as suggesting that the minimum core obligation is one of a universal nature371 and the CESCR’s 
purpose was to ‘define a minimum floor.’372 This ‘minimum floor’ applies not only to those in 
developing countries but also ‘to the disadvantaged in developed states.373 In this sense, in 
developed nations the minimum core obligation should act as a device of determining priority 
with the first priority being ensuring that the minimum core obligation is realised for all by 
ensuring that ‘all individuals are above the absolute minimum.’374 
This approach ‘theoretically’375 holds all states to the same standards. However, it can 
be contended that the universal approach does not transcend beyond this theoretical nature. 
One reason for this is that defining such concrete minimum obligations, which apply equally 
across all State Parties, fails to take account of contextual relativism.376 In this sense, given the 
differences between individuals across States, universality in relation to minimum core 
obligation may be an ‘impossible goal.’377 Sen highlights how the baseline of goods required 
for societal participation varies between societies and States378 and in relation to destitution this 
suggests that the use of the minimum core as a tool by which to determine the first element of 
the destitution threshold may be inappropriate.  
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In supporting the view that the minimum core obligation is of a context-specific nature 
the South African Constitutional Court has held that the minimum core obligation can be 
established in country specific contexts379 given the diversity of needs which can exist380 and 
which ‘may vary according to a wide range of factors.’381 These factors demonstrate the 
difficulty in establishing one minimum core. This difficulty undermines the contention that the 
nature of the minimum core obligation is universal.382 It is perhaps because of this that a 
universal determination of the minimum core obligation has been described as hardly seeming 
possible.383 
Much of the literature has addressed how the preferred nature of the minimum core 
obligation as being of a universal standard can, in some instances, impose a standard upon 
developing States which is unattainable and consequently unrealistic.384 This debate is not the 
focus of this piece, it is mentioned merely to highlight the criticism that the concept of 
minimum core obligation causes us to focus ‘only to the performance of developing states’385 
at the expense of those living ‘without’ in more developed States. Instead, the implications of 
the perceived nature of the minimum core obligation as being of a standard which is attainable 
in the poorest, as well as the richest, States will be explored in relation to the effects of setting 
such a low, attainable standard upon those living in developed States. This is because this 
notion creates a number of issues which may detrimentally affect the realisation of ESCRs for 
those living in more developed States.  
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Primarily, and simply, some argue that the minimum core obligation, in being attainable 
for developing States, is set at a level below which allows for a dignified existence in developed 
States.386 This is as a result of the universal nature of the standard which does not account for 
the varying needs of different groups.387 In this sense, by setting a lower standard of realisation 
the minimum core obligation approach limits rights.388 This is because the ‘optimal 
realisation’389 of the rights goes far beyond the minimum. This argument is based upon the 
contention that, given that only the minimum core obligation is immediate in nature and can 
constitute a violation if not realised, States prioritise390 the realisation of the minimum core to 
the detriment of those who, despite being above this threshold, are not living in a dignified 
state of existence. 
On top of this, the minimum core obligation approach does nothing to help those who, 
despite being above the minimum core obligation threshold, ‘suffer severe losses to their 
economic security and well-being.’391 It is clear that in wealthy, highly-industrialised States 
there is no reason not to approach full realisation.392 If beyond the minimum core obligation, 
within the boundaries of the concept of maximum available resources, a developed state could 
afford to fully realise the ICESCR rights for all within its territory some would argue that ‘the 
minimum and the maximum would be one and the same.’393 
Ultimately, a universal minimum core may not be appropriate in some contexts. The 
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same is also true of a destitution threshold which was only universal in nature. That is because, 
in being designed to be feasibly achievable by developing States a universally applicable 
standard may be set too low a standard for more developed nations. As a result of this, using it 
as a tool in determining the destitution threshold may exclude from my rights-based definition 
of destitution those individuals who, despite experiencing what can agreeably be regarded as 
destitution, have their rights realised to a level above that of the minimum core obligation. 
Despite this, I support the universal nature of the minimum core obligation and believes that 
an alternative middle ground can be reached between universal and relative approaches to 
minimum standards of obligations when informing the destitution threshold. In the following 
sections the potential for such a reconciliation, through an approach which sets universal as 
well as context-sensitive standards, will be explored.  
3.3.2. The Context-sensitive Aspect of the Destitution Threshold: Vulnerability and Indignity 
The previous section has established that the universal minimum core obligation, which exists 
for each component right, aligns with the destitution theme of survival needs. However, it was 
also made clear that the minimum core obligation is not an appropriate determinant of the 
destitution threshold in all contexts. Despite this, given the strong links evidenced between the 
destitution theme of survival needs and the minimum core obligation, the destitution threshold 
may never be set at a level below that of the minimum core obligation. It is therefore clear that, 
within the destitution threshold, the minimum core obligation must be supplemented so that 
the destitution themes of vulnerability and indignity are also central to determining this 
threshold. The minimum core obligation may be regarded as a universal level of minimum 
obligation and the minimum level of protection from indignity and vulnerability - within the 
universal aspect of my destitution threshold - requires that the minimum core obligation is 
realised without reliance on charitable assistance.  
However, beyond this minimum level, dignity and vulnerability will have different 
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meaning in different contexts. Consequently, other approaches to determining minimum levels 
of obligation exist which are set a context-sensitive level dependent upon the context must be 
explored. This section will explore two existing alternatives to determining the standards of 
state obligation with regard to ESCRs realisation: reasonableness and the use of indicators 
alongside benchmarks. Through exploring these context-sensitive approaches, this section will 
inform my understanding of the context-sensitive element of the destitution threshold and thus 
contribute to determining ESCRs obligations which allow for context-sensitive standards to be 
determined by reference to both vulnerability and indignity.  
3.3.2.1. The Reasonableness Approach 
The concept of reasonableness is one context-sensitive approach to determining the minimum 
obligations, and consequently rights entitlements, with regard to ESCRs. In relation to the 
assessment of ESCR provision, reasonableness is perhaps most widely associated with South 
Africa.394 This is because the South African Constitutional Court (SACC) rejected the ‘notion 
of minimum core obligations’395 in a number of cases concerning the ESCRs enshrined in the 
constitution.396 Given that South Africa did not ratify the ICESCR until 2015397 at the time that 
this standard was initialised the SACC was under no obligation to implement the minimum 
core obligation approach.  
This concept, to put it plainly, considers both the rationality and proportionality of an 
administrative action through the method of a substantive assessment.398 Along this vein this 
 
394 Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell, ‘Introduction’ in Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell (eds), Core 
Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2002) 1-19,18. 
395 Tadeg (n 380) 70. 
396 Leijten (n 44) 39. 
397 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights OHCHR, ‘Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard’ 
<http://indicators.ohchr.org/> accessed 20 September 2019. 
398 Carol Steinberg, ‘Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa’s Socio-Economic Rights 
Jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 The South African Law Journal 264, 278. 
  
 77 
approach is less concrete than the minimum core obligation approach399 and because of this 
perhaps offers more flexibility to States. In 2005 Ngwena and Cook suggested that this 
approach was at variance with the CESCR’s approach.400 Further, Berger has suggested that the 
minimum core obligation assessment was not free-standing but was instead a part of the 
reasonableness assessment.401 However, in Article 8(4) of the 2008 Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR (OP-ICESCR) the reasonableness standard of review is endorsed for when the 
CESCR is adjudicating decisions.402  As can be inferred from this, the reasonableness approach 
does maintain some aspects of the minimum core obligation albeit as a part of the substantive 
assessment.403 
Integrating the minimum core obligation into the reasonableness standard would follow 
the lead of the SACC. This could be seen by some as a merging of the reasonableness and 
minimum core obligation approaches to create a ‘reasonable minimum core’.404 The 
reasonableness approach, therefore, has great potential in more developed nations to address 
the criticisms that I have levied against the minimum core obligation in this context. In having 
the potential to raise the minimum standard to a level above that which is embedded in the 
minimum core obligation, the reasonableness approach alleviates the problem of those in 
developed States who, despite being above the minimum core obligation threshold, are below 
the threshold required to live a dignified life in that State’s society. Thus, this may well be a 
more suitable approach for developed States and may well explain as to why, as Heller 
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highlights, that the CESCR relies ‘on the standard of reasonableness and has developed criteria 
to assess whether the measures taken by States are reasonable’.405  
The reasonableness approach can perhaps best be distinguished from the minimum core 
obligation approach in that, despite having a similar function in prioritising the most in need, 
it ‘breaks definitively from the idea of core obligations as non-derogable parts of the right.’406 
For those who support the universal nature of the minimum core obligation, as highlighted 
above, this may be troubling in that by doing away with the notion of the core of the right being 
non-derogable407 those individuals in States where it is deemed unreasonable to expect this core 
survival threshold to be met may be adversely affected. Thus, the reasonableness standard may 
not be appropriate in developing States. Therefore, for some critics the reasonableness 
approach may not do enough to protect rights.408 
Even so, for some this failure of the reasonableness approach to set a non-derogable 
minimum floor has positive implications. This is because, rather than determining a rule, 
reasonableness can allow for progressive interpretations depending on the circumstances in the 
relevant State. Thus, it is ‘likely to realize lasting social reform’409 as the standard to which the 
State is held can progress along with its increasing development. On top of this, in focusing on 
ensuring fair processes as opposed to merely the outcomes to be achieved, unlike the minimum 
core obligation approach, this is perhaps more likely to ‘produce fair policies.’410 
This is as opposed to the minimum core obligation approach which, as has been touched 
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upon in the previous sections, would hold the State to the same minimum standards regardless 
of its development. The implication of such an approach would be that the minimum required 
to dispel the obligation would be determined not according to a universal minimum standard 
but instead by what is reasonable in that State.  
3.3.2.2. Benchmarks and Indicators 
Another means of setting context specific standards of obligation is through the use of 
benchmarks based on indicators. The terms benchmarks and indicators have been used 
synonymously.411 This is not surprising given that ‘for a number of experts and activists writing 
on economic, social and cultural rights, indicators appear to play a role as a sort of way station 
on the road to benchmarks.’412 However, benchmarks and indicators are ‘distinct terms’413 in 
the field of human rights. 
Benchmarks are a means of measuring performance.414 They are contextually defined 
national targets415 for state achievement which represent both human rights treaty standards 
and, consequently, the international law applicable to - and obligations of – a state. 416  In being 
defined by ‘specific human rights standards,’417 benchmarks therefore ‘set specific obligations 
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that states must achieve over a period of time with respect to the relevant indicators.’418 This 
role of benchmarks as ‘tailored targets’419  has been described as an attempt, by the monitoring 
committee, to ‘take relative resources into account when assessing state performance.’420 
No definition of indicators, on the other hand, is yet settled in human rights law.421 
Despite being regarded by some as quantitative422 and ‘essentially statistical in nature,’423 the 
term has been used within human rights to go beyond statistics alone.424 Thus indicators are 
any information relevant to measuring the extent of realisation of a human right.425 Human 
rights indicators measure human rights realisation ‘in absolute terms’426 and can therefore be 
used to evaluate whether benchmarks have been met.427 They therefore ‘provide a methodology 
for monitoring progressive realization’428 through measuring the ‘enjoyment of rights by rights 
holders.’429 In sum, whereas the benchmark is the target, the indicator is the means through 
which the target is set and the means of measuring realisation. 
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Hunt’s430 tri-partite configuration of human rights indicators, as structural, process and 
outcome based, ‘is now well settled.’431 This configuration ‘supports the selection and 
development of indicators that reflect the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.’432 These 
three types of indicator are not only complementary and interdependent but are also ‘only 
useful if combined with each other.’433 
Structural indicators look at whether structures which pertain to human rights 
realisation are in place.434 They therefore aid in assessing the commitment of a state to 
implementing the standards it has accepted by ratifying human rights treaties and can look, 
inter alia, towards the adoption of legislation ‘and the existence as well as the creation of basic 
institutional mechanisms deemed necessary for the promotion and protection of human 
rights.’435 In this sense, structural indicators have been regarded as showing the intention of a 
state to ‘abide by international human rights law’436 be measuring de jure, as opposed to de 
facto, compliance.437 
Process indicators instead focus on measuring ‘the efforts undertaken by states to 
implement international human rights.’438 Such efforts include ‘programmes, activities, and 
 
430 In 2003, Hunt had proposed a conceptual framework and recommended approach to creating and using 
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interventions.’439Therefore, the focus is a continuous assessment of the duty-bearer’s acts 
focusing on the duty bearer’s ‘commitments on the ground.’440 This focus is on the actions not 
the outcome of the actions.441 
In assessing actions both input and output factors can be considered442 and, additionally, 
the assessment of process indicators can aid in determining as to whether a failure to realise 
human rights by a state stems from its inability or instead unwillingness.443 Building on this, 
outcome indicators measure the impact of the activities undertaken to implement rights.444 This 
is achieved through capturing ‘attainments that reflect the state of enjoyment of human rights 
in a given context.’445 In this sense, outcome indicators focus on the results of efforts rather 
than the efforts themselves.446 However, it is important to note that outcome indicators alone 
‘cannot establish whether a state has failed to comply with its human rights obligations.447 
Landman regards quantitative developmental indicators as suitable proxy measures in 
capturing the extent to which states are realising their ICESCR obligations.448 Such indicators 
are, in the form of more general economic and social statistical data, ‘well developed 
internationally.’449 Therefore, data to be used in relation to assessing benchmarks and indicators 
 
439 OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation (2012) HR/PUB/12/5’ (n 
425) 36. 
440 Hunt and MacNaughton (n 415) 316–317. 
441 de Beco (n 416) 43. 
442 Damiano de Felice, ‘Business and Human Rights Indicators to Measure the Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect: Challenges and Opportunities’ (2015) 37 Human Rights Quarterly 511, 535. 
443 de Beco (n 416) 48. 
444 Hunt and MacNaughton (n 415) 316–317. 
445 OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation (2012) HR/PUB/12/5’ (n 
425) 37. 
446 de Beco (n 416) 43. 
447 ibid. 
448 Todd Landman, ‘Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Policy’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 
906, 925. 
449 Watchirs (n 417) 717. 
  
 83 
already exists and can come from many sources be that governmental, intergovernmental or 
non-governmental.450 This has resulted in there being ‘no problems with obtaining data for’451 
indicators relating to ESCRs. Although it has been highlighted that development and human 
rights indicators do differ, development indicators can still be used to measure human rights 
when the two sets of indicators overlap and through supplementing development indicators 
with other information to give them a human rights lens.452 
As well as utilising pre-existing data, human rights indicators are in fact already used 
with the General Comments of treaty bodies specifying ‘the type and role of these indicators.’453 
Additionally, UNDP and World Bank numbers have been used extensively ‘by committees 
overseeing economic, social and cultural rights, and by NGOs that monitor and report on 
national human rights compliance issues.’454 A pertinent example of the use of indicators within 
the UN system is the universal periodic review in which the CESCR reviews state reports from 
the review before publishing concluding observations.455 This process involves an assessment, 
by the CESCR, of the state’s ‘accomplishments against the benchmarks for progressive 
realization that were set during their previous review.’456 
Thus, it is clear that one benefit of using indicators is that they can be utilised without 
adding to the burden of states as much of the data required for human rights indicators already 
exists, albeit perhaps in a different form, and that they are already being utilised in submissions 
to UN bodies.457 This demonstrates the feasibility and practicality of using benchmarks and 
 
450 Bantekas and Oette (n 362) 426. 
451 de Beco (n 416) 40. 
452 ibid 28–29.  
453 U.N. Human Rights Treaty Bodies (n 425) para 9. 
454 Green (n 412) 1087. 
455 Heymann et al. (n 420) 1072–1073. 
456 ibid. 




In addition, benchmarks and indicators have a number of other benefits: they may 
contribute to the accelerated implementation, and thus realisation, of ICESCR rights. The 
CESCR has called for the implementation of benchmarks towards such ends.458 This is because 
a human rights indicator can act as a proxy in determining the level of rights realisation, and 
as such the extent to which a state has dispelled its obligations.459 Thus benchmarks and 
indicators can link state behaviour more closely to covenant norms.460 This not only allows 
progressive realisation to be monitored but, also, ‘can help states, and others, recognize when 
national and international policy adjustments are required.’461 
More so, human rights indicators are disaggregated, meaning divided, ‘into specific 
categories according to the right being monitored and the state under examination.’462 This is to 
ensure that they ‘capture the extent to which the process to implement and realize human rights 
is, for instance, participatory, inclusionary, empowering, non-discriminatory, accountable or, 
where required, supported by international cooperation.’463 Through capturing this information 
‘indicators can enhance the effectiveness of policies and programmes.’464 
Indicators are also appealing in relation to ESCRs in that the data informing them can 
‘theoretically be verified and consistently measured across time.’465 This is because, as a 
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variable conveying information, indicators are ‘consistently measurable.’466 As they can allow 
states to monitor progress over time467 indicators can be used to allow for comparison ‘within 
countries across time.’468 This allows progressive realisation to be monitored. 
This idea of monitoring progressive realisation links to the concept of accountability. 
The use of benchmarks and indicators can monitor realisation over time and as such ‘can hold 
the state to account in relation to the discharge of its responsibilities.’469 As such they have the 
potential to enhance, reinforce, and create a culture of accountability.470 This is through ‘making 
them commit to a certain performance standard on the issue under assessment.’471 Further still, 
framing indicators as being based in human rights as opposed to development shifts the focus 
from needs towards rights-based approaches which regards individuals as rights holders as 
opposed to aid recipients.472 
Additionally, across all walks of life, in business and state decisions, quantitative 
indicators are trusted as they are regarded as data which is ‘understood to be abstract, 
quantifiable, and putatively transferable.’473 In this sense, quantitative indicators introduce into 
international human rights law ‘a form of knowledge production in which numerical measures 
make visible forms of violation and inequality that are otherwise obscured.’474 As such, 
indicators, used in such a way as to be mindful of other limitations, may bring clarity to human 
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rights issues475 and this may link to the idea of indicators as allowing all those working in regard 
to one right to ‘speak the same language’.476 
However, a number of concerns exist in relation to the use of benchmarks and 
indicators. One such critique relates to concerns in gathering the required data. Contrary to the 
views espoused above that much of the appropriate data already exists, perhaps in another 
format, or is already collected by states, it has been suggested that ‘it is not feasible to quantify 
and measure human rights compliance.’477 One reason for this suggestion is that human rights 
realisation cannot be encapsulated in statistical information.478 This in turn can be based upon 
the notion of ‘slippage’ whereby indicators do not precisely measure that which they are 
designed to assess.479 As well as these limits of measurability, other limits such as the 
affordability of gathering data exist.480 This is because, the cost of gathering this data may well 
act as a barrier to the use of indicators and benchmarks.  
Additionally, the focus of indicators is not the individual. This is especially so for 
quantitative indicators which measure aggregates whilst human rights are held by individuals481 
(and sometimes collectively between a peoples). Thus, it has been suggested that the use of 
quantitative indicators may be ‘dehumanizing’482 as the use of statistics may reduce the victims 
of human rights violations to statistics and omits their lived experiences and thus ‘ignore 
individual specificity.’483 This links to the notion of slippage in that the quantitative 
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development indicators which have been used as proxies for, and absorbed into, human rights 
indicators were never designed to monitor the realisation of ESCRs.484 Thus, quantitative 
indicators will never give a complete picture of the enjoyment of a right within a specific 
jurisdiction.485 Through omitting the individual experience, quantitative indicators are 
incapable of encapsulating ‘the entire story, and must be supplemented by qualitative 
description and more in-depth analysis that provides a human dimension to the situation 
described.’486 Thus, quantitative indicators may be regarded as a process of ‘simplification and 
standardization’487 which may result in large distortions. 
Another criticism of benchmarks and indicators is that a tension exists between the view 
that they should be universal and the view that they should be context-specific. Although the 
literature accepts that not all indicators can be universally applicable across and common to all 
states,488 it has been assumed widely that indicators have the potential to be ‘universally 
applicable across countries.’489 Context specific indicators are ‘more meaningful and are more 
likely to be used’490 and the OHCHR has recognised that there exists ‘a need to strike a balance 
between universally relevant indicators and contextually specific indicators, as both are 
needed.’491 One way of atoning these two tensions, suggested by Kalantry et al., is having a list 
of universal candidate indicators from which context specific indicators are selected.492 The 
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OHCHR adopts a framework which has universally relevant indicators combined with a ‘more 
detailed and focused assessment of certain attributes of the relevant human right, depending on 
the requirements of a particular situation.’493 There exists no standard list of indicators for each 
human right and the CESCR directs states to specialist organisations such as the WHO, FAO 
and ILO as opposed to measuring obligations ‘on the basis of predefined lists of criteria.’494 
3.4. The Destitution Threshold 
As the analysis throughout this chapter makes clear, a tension exists between as to whether any 
minimum level of obligation (such as the destitution threshold) ought to be universal or 
context-sensitive in nature. It is clear from the above analysis that both universal and context-
sensitive approaches to minimum ESCRs entitlements have their advantages. However, it is 
also clear that each has disadvantages which the other can more easily and readily address. In 
order for my rights-based definition of destitution to be useful for rights holders in both 
developing and more developed States, it is clear that the destitution threshold must be 
constructed in such a way as to address the concerns of both universalists and relativists. Thus, 
the destitution threshold must have a universal minimum standard that will apply in developing 
States and this must also be supplemented by a context-sensitive standard which allows 
contextual factors to influence the standard.  
Such an approach reconciles universal and context-sensitive approaches. This 
reconciliation is crucial to ensure the applicability of my human rights-based definition of 
destitution across contexts. Such reconciliation is implicit within the application of the 
destitution themes. This is because the survival needs theme is universal in nature whereas 
what constitutes vulnerability and indignity will vary by context and is therefore context-
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sensitive in nature.  
One way of achieving these twin aims would be to understand the minimum core 
obligation as a ‘relative minimum core.’495 In order to address the concerns of the universalists, 
which have been levied against the context-sensitive approach to the nature of the minimum 
core obligation, I would support such an approach only insofar as a universal minimum 
standard is still maintained. This aligns with Bilchitz’s ‘relative minimum threshold 
approach’496 which allows for relativist standards of obligation to be set with the sole exception 
being that these standards cannot be below the standard found in the minimum core 
obligation.497 
This approach, whilst seeking to hold developed States to a higher standard, sets 
developing states the target to, at worst, dispel the minimum core obligation and for those able 
to go beyond it, at best, a higher standard. 
The approach I envision is one of a composite nature and the destitution threshold may 
be defined as having two elements. The first of these elements, the universal aspect of this 
definition, is that the component rights for an individual must be met to the standard of the 
minimum core obligation in such a way as to not surpass the universal and severe level of 
indignity and vulnerability which a reliance on charitable assistance for this realisation would 
amount to. Thus, the universally applicable minimum standard of the destitution threshold is 
that the core content of the component rights is realised without reliance on charitable 
assistance. This is representative of the destitution theme of survival needs and a universally 
minimum standard of the destitution themes of vulnerability and indignity. If the level of rights 
realisation does not reach this standard, then a person is destitute under my definition. 
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497 ibid 733. 
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However, the realisation of the minimum core obligation without reliance on charitable 
assistance forms only the first building block when determining the destitution threshold. This 
is because, in the context of many states, the standard of realisation required under the 
minimum core obligation alone is not an appropriate determinant of the destitution threshold: 
it is too low of a standard. As such this first element must be supplemented by a second context-
sensitive element. As this definition is composite in nature, the second element will always be 
considered in addition to the first element. Thus, the destitution threshold will never fall below 
the level of the minimum core obligation as the second context-sensitive element will always 
be at least equal to, if not greater than, the minimum core obligation for each component right. 
In the figure below, even if the context specific second supplementary standard of obligation, 
is equal to zero the destitution threshold remains equal to the minimum core obligation (See 
figure 4). 





This supplementary standard will directly integrate a contextually relevant 
understanding of the destitution themes of vulnerability and indignity into the destitution 
threshold. Thus, the destitution threshold is informed by, and premised upon, the destitution 
themes. The supplementary standard for any given context must be determined on a case-by-
case basis and an example of such a determination will be provided in Part Two of this thesis 
in applying the destitution threshold to the context of the UK. This is because destitution, like 
poverty, is experienced differently in different contexts and what may be considered dignified 
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and secure realisation of one right in one context may be considered undignified and insecure 
in another. The normative content of each component right will be examined in the following 
chapter. As will become clear, the normative content can act as a guide in determining the 
extent to which realisation is free from vulnerability and indignity. It is important to keep an 
assessment of the availability, accessibility, acceptability, affordability and quality (AAAAQ 
framework) of the provision in mind when assessing the normative content.  
 Thus, the destitution threshold can be described as having two, twin, composite 
elements. Firstly, the universal minimum core obligation and the requirement that the 
correlative minimum core content is realised without reliance on charitable assistance. 
Secondly, a context-sensitive supplementary element. This second element considers the 
normative content of each component right alongside the destitution themes of vulnerability 
and indignity. A destitution threshold so designed considers an individual to be destitute if any 
one or more of their component rights are not realised to a level in such a way that each of the 
concepts of availability, accessibility, acceptability, affordability, and quality are met free from 
vulnerability and indignity.498  
Considered through the lens of current approaches to the realisation of ICESCR rights, 
a destitution threshold so designed may be regarded as relating to progressive obligations. This 
is despite the inclusion of the minimum core obligation – which creates immediate obligations 
- within my definition.499 It would be an unfounded leap to attempt to argue that the mere 
inclusion of the minimum core obligation transforms the nature of the obligations stemming 
from the destitution threshold as a whole to being of an immediate nature. Rather, from the 
human rights-based understanding of destitution which I propose, whilst resulting in some 
immediate obligations (namely the attainment of the minimum core content of the component 
 
498 This AAAAQ framework will be addressed in greater detail in in chapters 4 and 6. 
499 See section 3.3.1. 
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rights), stems obligations which are progressive in nature. These progressive obligations are, 
firstly, to ensure that the minimum core content of the component rights is realised without 
reliance on charitable assistance and, then secondly, to ensure that the component rights are 
realised to the context-sensitive destitution threshold without reliance on charitable assistance. 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has considered the destitution threshold. In utilising the destitution themes, this 
chapter has considered existing minimum entitlements in human rights law. This has been in 
order to determine the standard of the component rights realisation below which an individual 
can be said to be destitute under my definition.  
It is contended that if any one or more of component rights are not realised to the 
destitution threshold then an individual is destitute under this definition. Additionally, it is 
contended that the destitution threshold, which is applicable to each component right, must be 
comprised of two elements: the universally applicable minimum and the context-sensitive 
supplementary element.  
It was demonstrated that the minimum core obligation correlates to survival and 
subsistence levels and as such the destitution threshold may never fall below this standard of 
obligation. I have twinned this minimum understanding of survival needs with a minimum 
understanding of vulnerability and indignity: no reliance on charitable assistance. Therefore, 
an individual will always be destitute if one or more of the component rights is not realised to 
the minimum core obligation or if the correlative content of the minimum core obligation can 
only be realised through a reliance on charitable assistance. This is my universally applicable 
minimum destitution threshold. However, this analysis also highlighted that this universally 
applicable minimum may not be the appropriate level for the destitution threshold in the context 
of all states. This is because the standard of realisation required to dispense of the minimum 




It follows that if one or more of the component rights is not realised to the level of the 
universally minimum destitution threshold that an individual is destitute. However, an 
individual is also destitute if any one or more of their component rights are not realised to a 
level in such a way that each of the concepts of availability, accessibility, acceptability, 
affordability, and quality are met free from vulnerability and indignity. This supplementary 
standard must be determined on a context-by-context basis. Part Two of this thesis will 
determine the supplementary standard in the context of the UK. In order to allow this 
determination to occur, however, the following chapter will identify and examine the 




Chapter 4: The Component Rights 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter will apply the destitution themes highlighted in chapter two to a determination of 
the component rights. This will expand the theoretical human rights-based definition of 
destitution I have offered above by allowing it to go beyond merely stating that an individual 
can be said to be destitute when their component rights are realised to a level below that of the 
destitution threshold. This will be achieved through identifying the component rights of my 
human rights-based destitution definition.    
In order to identify rights which may constitute component rights, this chapter will use 
the destitution themes and the concept of basic needs to highlight specific human rights which 
align with the destitution themes: the component rights. Following this, each of the identified 
component rights will be examined in turn. Through analysing both the sources and the content 
of each component right, the status of each right as a component right will be further justified. 
This will include highlighting both the minimum core obligation and the normative content of 
each component right as these two elements are required to determine the destitution threshold. 
Thus, when considered alongside the destitution threshold established in the previous chapter, 
the findings of this chapter will allow a human rights-based definition of destitution to be 
contextualised in Part Two of this thesis. 
4.2. Identifying the Component Rights 
Chapter 2 highlighted survival needs, vulnerability, and indignity as destitution themes. It has 
been contended throughout this thesis that the destitution themes can be used to inform the 
creation of a human rights-based definition of destitution. This necessitates that the destitution 
themes inform the selection of the component rights. Throughout chapter 2.4.1. a number of 
human rights were categorised as having the status of basic rights and it was contended that 
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basic rights align with the destitution themes. However, the notion of social protection was the 
concept which most readily align with these destitution themes. Social protection further links 
together the right to an adequate standard of living (ASL) and the right to social security. Thus, 
the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to social security are component rights 
for the purposes of my definition. However, as will be made clear below the right to an ASL 
also contains a number of other rights.500  These rights are; the right to housing; the right to 
water; the right to sanitation; the right to food; and the right to clothing. Thus, this chapter also 
highlights these rights as component rights of my human rights-based definition of destitution.  
These rights can be regarded as social rights which ‘improve the lives of individuals 
and communities’501 and make ‘it possible for all members of society to enjoy satisfactory 
conditions of life.’502 Building upon this, it is clear that these component rights are interlinked 
through the notion of survival and/or subsistence and that therefore these rights are intertwined 
with the notion of human health.  Taking the preceding analysis further, this chapter will 
examine the legal basis and content of the component rights. 
The tri-partite nature of obligations is imposed by all human rights. Through its General 
Comments the CESCR has affirmed,503 and repeatedly reaffirmed,504 that all human rights 
 
500 See section 4.3.1.  
501 Hunt (n 45) 7. 
502 Asbjorn Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Asbjorn Eide et al (ed), Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Second Revised Edition, Kluwer International Law 2001) 9–28, 13. 
503 Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food 
(Art.11) (1999) UN.Doc. E/C.12/1995/5’ para 15. 
504 Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education 
(Article 13 of the Covenant) (1999) UN.Doc. E/C.12/1999/10’ para 46; CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights)’ (2000) UN.Doc. E/C.12/2000/4’ (n 370) para 33; Committee on Economic and Social Rights 
CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2002) UN.Doc. E/C.12/2002/11’ para 20; Committee on Economic and 
Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from The Protection of The 
Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She 




impose three types of obligations upon States parties: the obligations to respect, to protect, and 
to fulfil. Even when a General Comment does not expressly state that this tri-partite typology 
applies to all human rights, the typology is still utilised in defining the extent of specific legal 
obligations in relation to the content of the specific General Comment alone.505 
Thus, States parties are obliged to respect, to protect, and to fulfil each of the component 
rights. Although the exact nature of each of these obligations may differ depending on the right 
in question, each element of the tri-partite typology of obligations has a generally applicable 
nucleus. The obligation to respect can be generally summarised as an obligation to refrain from 
interfering with the enjoyment of a right.506 The obligation to protect can be summarised 
generally as an obligation to ensure measures which prevent individuals or enterprises from 
interfering with the enjoyment of a right.507 Lastly, the obligation to fulfil can be generally 
summarised as an obligation to proactively engage in activities intended to further the 
 
on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work (2006) UN.Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/18’ para 22; Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 19: The 
Right to Social Security (Art. 9) (2007) UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/19’ para 43; Committee on Economic and Social 
Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art. 15, Para. 1 (a), 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2009) UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/21’ para 48; 
Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 24: State Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities (2017) 
UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/24’ paras 10–11. 
505 For examples of this see Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 16: The 
Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’(2005) UN.Doc. E/C.12/2005/’ paras 18–21; 
Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 22: The Right to Sexual and 
Reproductive Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2016) 
UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/22’ paras 39–48; Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment 
No. 23: The Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work (Article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2016) UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/23’ paras 58–60. 
506 See Sigrun I Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International 
Cooperation (Intersentia 2006) 68–69; In regard to the obligation to [respect] extraterritorially see Magdalena 
Sepúlveda Carmona, ‘The Obligations of “International Assistance and Cooperation” under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Possible Entry Point to a Human Rights Based Approach 
to Millennium Development Goal 8’ (2009) 13 The International Journal of Human Rights 86, 90. 
507 In regard to the obligation to protect extraterritorially see Sepúlveda Carmona (n 506) 90. 
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enjoyment of a right.508 This tri-partite typology will contribute to the examination of the 
component rights which will take place below.  
4.3. Examining the Component Rights 
4.3.1. The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living  
The right to an adequate standard of living (ASL) is recognised in Article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR509 which states that: ‘The States Parties to the Present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.’510 This 
‘definition is thus inclusive not exhaustive, indicating the breadth of the provision.’511 
It is clear therefore that this umbrella social right encompasses the key themes 
extrapolated from the analysis of the destitution definitions highlighted in the previous chapter 
of this thesis. The right to an ASL has been argued by Eide to be the ‘core’ of social rights 512 
and beyond the ICESCR this right is embedded in Article 25 of the UDHR513 as well as other 
sources including, inter alia, in CRC provision.514 Eide contends that Article 11 ICESCR, along 
with other subsequent guarantees, has legally strengthened the notion of an ASL as elaborated 
 
508 In regard to the obligation to fulfil (promote) extraterritorially see ibid 92. 
509 Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant)’ (1991) E/1992/23’ para 1; Just Fair, ‘Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Parallel 
Report: Submission to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (Just Fair 2015) 82 
<http://justfair.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Implementation-of-the-ICESCR-Parallel-Report.pdf>. 
510 ICESCR Article 11 (1). 
511 Stephen James, ‘A Forgotten Right? The Right to Adequate Clothing in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’ in Robert Garbutt (ed), Activating Human Rights and Peace: Universal Responsibility Conference 2008 
Conference Proceedings (Centre for Peace and Social Justice 2010) 13-19,14. 
512 Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ (n 502) 17–18. 
513 UDHR (n 8) Article 25. 




on in Article 25 of the UDHR.515 Article 25 was, in turn, inspired by Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms 
address and especially the notion of freedom from want516 and can be regarded as an elaboration 
of Article 1 of the UDHR, pertaining to dignity. This is because ‘a life in dignity requires an 
adequate standard of living.’517 
Difficulties exist in considering the right to an ASL as distinctive from the rights which 
form its constituent parts. This is amplified by the fact that ‘the term adequate standard of living 
has not been given a more precise definition in the relevant international instruments’518 with 
its meaning being understood from the context.519 That context being the basic necessities 
which are highlighted within the Articles pertaining to the right to ASL and which will be 
elaborated upon in the following sections. This demonstrates that a lack of attention has been 
paid to the right to an ASL as a holistic concept.   
Considering the right to an ASL holistically, all individuals should have dignified 
enjoyment of their basic needs.520 Eide contends that an ASL goes beyond the basic necessities 
referred to in the numerous international instruments but that exactly how far beyond this is 
dependent upon the societal conditions under consideration and, as such, ‘cannot be stated in 
general terms.’521 This notion, of an ASL going beyond the basic necessities named within the 
instruments, is representative of an holistic view of the right to an ASL. This view differs from 
the approach towards ASL which has generally understood the right as being made up of the 
 
515 Eide, ‘Adequate Standard of Living’ (n 114) 187. 
516 ibid 186. 
517 ibid 187. 
518 Asbjorn Eide, ‘The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to Food’ in Asbjorn Eide et 
al (ed), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Second Revised Edition, Kluwer International Law 
2001) 133–148, 133. 
519 ibid. 




other more tangible rights inherent within its definition. 
Eide posits that the essential point of an adequate standard of living  
‘is that everyone shall be able, without shame and without unreasonable 
obstacles, to be a full participant in ordinary, everyday interaction with other 
people. This means, inter alia, that they shall be able to enjoy their basic needs 
under conditions of dignity. No one shall have to live under conditions whereby 
the only way to satisfy their needs is by degrading or depriving themselves of 
their basic freedoms, such as through begging, prostitution or bonded labour.’522 
As such, ‘in purely material terms’523 this implies living above the context specific poverty 
line.524  It must be observed that the realisation of the right to an ASL depends not only on the 
efforts of the individual but also the obligations of the state which are subsidiary to this and 
‘come fully into play only when individuals cannot or do not manage by themselves to secure 
their own or their dependants’ standard of living.’525 
In his capacity as Chairperson of the CESCR, Phillip Alston, held that the right to an 
adequate standard of living is composed of several elements ‘as a matter of logic.’526 Building 
upon this, Alston argued that the right to the overall package of ASL rights entails a right to the 
constituent parts.527 It follows that rights exist to both a holistic ASL as well as to the constituent 
parts. Hohmann argues that a minimum basic content exists in relation to the right to an ASL, 
and that this content ‘ensures subsistence to all people in the form of food, clothing, housing 
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and necessary conditions of care.’528 The enjoyment of these subsistence rights has been 
labelled as that which is minimally required for the enjoyment of an ASL.529 Furthermore, it is 
clear that the elements of the right to an ASL have their own legal content entailing legal 
obligations for the state.530 As such these elements of the right to an ASL will be considered in 
the following sections.  
4.3.2. The Right to Clothing 
Clothing is one of life’s fundamentals531 and refers to tangible or material objects which are 
obtained and attached to, or worn, on the human body.532 Through focusing on the needs 
fulfilled by clothing, clothing has been identified by some psychologists ‘as a basic human 
need, along with food and shelter.’533 This goes some way towards explaining the inclusion of 
the right to clothing as ‘part of the more general right to an adequate standard of living.’534 
Therefore most prominently, the right is enshrined in international human rights law in Article 
25 of the UDHR and Article 11 of the ICESCR. 
 Despite this prominence, very little research has been undertaken in regard to the right 
to adequate clothing with the right being largely neglected by the CESCR.535 In fact, other than 
being listed in relation to the right to an ASL the right to clothing has hardly been referred to 
by the CESCR536 with Saul et al’s survey of the CESCR’s concluding observations finding that 
 
528 Hohmann (n 310) 7. 
529 Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ (n 502) 17–18. 
530 Jessie Hohmann, ‘Protecting the Right to Housing in England: A Context of Crisis’ (Just Fair 2015) 17–18 
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531 George W Hartmann, ‘Clothing: Personal Problem and Social Issue’ (1949) 41 Journal of Home Economics 
295. 
532 Susan B Kaiser, The Social Psychology of Clothing (Second Edition, Macmillan 1990) 5. 
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534 James (n 511) 13. 
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536 Ben Saul et al., The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, 
and Materials (OUP 2014) 925. 
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clothing was only brought up in the early sessions of the CESCR: ‘as if the committee was 
itself trying to work out what the content and meaning of the right might be in practice.’537 
Thus, the supposedly equal place of the right to clothing ‘within the context of securing 
an adequate standard of living under Article 11 is somewhat belied by the practice towards the 
right to clothing.’538 This is exemplified by the fact that, unlike the rights to food, water and 
housing, the right to clothing does not have its own UN agency.539 As well as this, the right to 
clothing has not benefited from the work of a specific Special Rapporteur or a specific General 
Comment. Consequently, the minimum core obligations pertaining to the right to clothing have 
not been expressly determined by the CESCR. 
Despite this neglect, the right to clothing has been included in relation to ‘the right of 
every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and 
social development’540 and the CRC requires States Parties to provide assistance to parents 
towards the realisation of this right. This assistance should give particular ‘regard to nutrition, 
clothing and housing.’541 Additionally, linking the Right to Clothing to the Right to Social 
Security, clothing is specified as one of the elements which should ordinarily be covered by 
family and child benefits under the right to social security.542 This suggests that individuals who 
have inadequate clothing should receive aid in realising the right to adequate clothing under 
 
537 ibid. 
538 ibid 924. 
539 ibid.: for examples of these agencies see; UN-HABITAT whose mission is to ‘promote socially and 
environmentally sustainable human settlements development and the achievement of adequate shelter for all’ 
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unwater/> Accessed 16th July 2018; the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) ‘The Food and Agriculture 
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not only the right to clothing but also the right to social security. This also suggests that an 
individual with inadequate clothing is socially insecure.  
 Saul et al. identify the CESCR’s General Comment Number 5 as holding that the right 
to clothing has ‘special significance’543 in relation to persons with disabilities. This special 
significance relates to the ‘particular clothing needs’544 of such persons which must be met in 
order ‘to enable them to function fully and effectively in society.545 Finally, Saul et al. highlight 
that during the formative debates, influencing the drafting of the ICESCR, ‘clothing was 
considered imperative.’546 This sub-section therefore demonstrates that the right to clothing is 
expressly codified as an element of the right to an adequate standard of living; that it links 
directly to the provision of the right to social security; and that in relation to specific groups of 
persons the right to clothing has been repeatedly reaffirmed at the international level.  
Although discredited as explaining initial motivations for wearing clothing, ‘because 
clothing is thought to have originated in tropical regions of the world where there was the least 
need for protection against the climate,’547 the notion of clothing as protection has been 
highlighted as a function of clothing.548 Thus clothing can be regarded as protection549 and an 
assessment of the literature highlights protection from temperature and other environmental 
factors as well as protection in the work place as two categories of protection in relation to 
clothing. 
 
543 Saul et al. (n 536) 925. 
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Clothing offers protection against natures’ elements550 and the examples of 
insufficiently warm clothing in cold climates; inappropriately warm clothing in warmer 
climates and exposure to ultraviolet rays are cited by James as examples of types of protection 
that clothing can provide against environmental factors.551 These examples are, however, 
offered with the caveat that James is not an expert in the textile industry, health sciences, or 
social work.552 As such it is crucial to ensure that a multidisciplinary approach is taken in 
assessing these claims further.  
The link drawn by the CESCR between the population’s clothing supply and a country’s 
harsh climate, pertaining to observations made upon Mongolia’s second periodic report on the 
ICESCR,553 demonstrates that the notion of clothing being linked to the individual’s 
environment is a human rights concern. Clothing can protect the body from both heat and 
cold554 through ‘preserving the balance between body heat and the outside environment.’555 In 
relation to offering protection from the cold, this is achieved through clothing preventing 
‘excessive heat loss from the human body.’ 556 In this sense, clothing is a behavioural adaption 
aimed at ‘maintaining core body temperature’557 despite hot or cold conditions.  A lack of such 
protection may result in fluctuations in core body temperature which in turn may have serious 
health implications. Additionally, these health implications may ultimately lead to death. 
 
550 Saul et al. (n 536) 924. 
551 James (n 511) 15. 
552 ibid. 
553 Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘Report on the Second Session: Supplement No. 4 (1988) 
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Additionally, individual’s around the world work in environments which expose them 
to specific risks from which their bodies need protection.’558 This suggests that another test for 
the adequacy of clothing is as to whether it provides the appropriate workplace protection. 
Linking to temperature, although such workplace protection goes beyond this, ‘the feeling of 
thermal discomfort while working directly translates into the quality of the performed tasks, 
including the efficiency of work.’559 Thus, adequate clothing will allow workers to work more 
efficiently than inadequate clothing. As well as this, inappropriately fitting clothing, especially 
in the workplace, ‘can adversely affect the wearer’s mobility and, for protective clothing, can 
impact the level of protection.’560 As such the fit of clothing will contribute to any assessments 
of its adequacy.  
The wearing of clothes has associated health and safety risks561 with, for example, some 
fabrics being prone to microorganisms which affect ‘clothing products thus affecting human 
health, like risking cases on foot inflammation, bedsore, allergies.’562 Other factors for 
consideration in relation to the links between clothing and health include the ventilation and 
breathability of materials; whether the clothing aggravates allergies and skin conditions; and 
ill-fitting footwear as contributing to serious injuries.563 Moreover, the fit of clothing also has 
implications for the health of the wearer. For example, ‘some recent studies showed that the 
use of tight trousers causes the restriction of multiple joints in the lumbo-pelvic and hip regions, 
leading to alterations in the trunk’s muscle activity and in the person’s motion patterns and 
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biomechanics of the remaining unrestricted joints.’564 These issues can contribute inter alia to 
lower back pain, disability, neurological problems, heartburn, reflux and bladder problems.565 
Therefore, I support the contention that ‘immediately one can see the link between the 
human right to adequate clothing and to health.’566 This link affirms the importance of adequate 
clothing for human well-being.567 Even beyond these effects on physical aspects of health, the 
mental and psychological effects of not having access to adequate clothing must not be 
underestimated. For example, dirty, damaged and/or outdated clothing ‘can be an invitation to 
other people to treat the wearer with contempt and ridicule’568 contributing to the stigma of 
poverty. ‘Clothing and fashion are often used to indicate social worth or status’569 and in this 
sense items of clothing may be regarded as ‘social hieroglyphics… which conceal, even as they 
communicate, the social position of the wearer.’570 This notion of concealment links to the idea 
of wearing certain fashion or clothing to ‘fit in’571 which further links to the notion of clothing 
as protection from various kinds of fears including ‘fear of ridicule’572 and fear of being judged 
as poor.573 
Additionally, inadequate clothing can contribute to exclusion from, inter alia; 
education, as a result of a lack of or incorrect uniform;574 from employment, due an inability to 
gain employment perhaps by not owning a suit to wear to an interview or due to an inability to 
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acquire the protective clothing required to undertake the role; as well as from social 
opportunities and experiences. 
Further, in some contexts those who lack access to certain items of clothing face 
increased vulnerabilities. For example, the charity ‘Smalls for All’ state on their website that, 
although the claim cannot be made that access to underwear actually prevents sexual assaults, 
‘we know from speaking to the women we help in Africa that having underwear makes them 
feel more secure.’575 This further evidences the importance of the right to clothing. Additionally, 
the CESCR has requested to receive information on the measures taken in promoting and 
improving the realisation of the right to clothing576 and Panama responded by highlighting that 
it ‘had concluded agreements with clothing manufacturers to provide, at reduced cost, uniforms 
and shoes for needy schoolchildren.’577 This is demonstrative of the types of measures which 
can be undertaken in contributing to the realisation of the right to clothing.  
From these observations, it is clear that the adequacy of clothing varies by context. 
Although these contextual factors such as climate contribute to the assessment of adequacy, 
individual factors are also evident including, inter alia, size, fit and allergies. Therefore, factors 
to be considered in relation to the quality of a garment include, inter alia, fit, durability in 
regard to wear and maintenance, and lack of harm to the wearer.578 More so, themes from the 
CESCR’s clarification of other constituent rights of the right to an ASL can also contribute to 
clarifying the content of the right to clothing.   For example, it has been observed that, in terms 
of realising the right to food, the right includes the requirement that the food corresponds ‘to 
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the cultural traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs.’579 It is contended that, if 
consideration as to cultural appropriateness must be made in relation to the right to food then 
such consideration must also be made in relation to the right to clothing. This is because these 
rights are similar in that they both form a part of the right to an adequate standard of living. 
4.3.3 The Right to Housing 
The right to housing refers ‘to the human rights, as codified in or implied into international and 
regional rights treaties and declarations, and into domestic constitutional orders through bills 
or declarations of rights’580 which relate to housing. This right was spelled out 
‘unambiguously’581 in the UDHR 1948. However, it is set within the broader enjoyment of, and 
derived from,582 the right to an ASL by Article 11(1) of the ICESCR.583 Although other 
instruments address the right to housing Article 11(1) ICESCR is significant584 as well as being 
‘the most comprehensive and perhaps the most important of the relevant provisions.’585 This is 
because it established, for the first time, legally binding obligations in relation to the right to 
housing for the states parties.  
In the European context, the European Social Charter (ESC) and its revised version 
contain various articles ‘which protect the right to housing in some aspect.’586 Further, albeit 
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indirectly through the use of other rights, right to housing claims have been addressed before 
the European Court of Human Rights ‘under Article 8 of the ECHR (right to private and family 
life), and Article 1 of Protocol Number. 1 (peaceful enjoyment of possessions).’587 
The right to housing ‘is of central importance for the enjoyment of all economic, social 
and cultural rights.’588 This is not simply given its place within the right to an ASL but also 
because ‘homelessness often results in the violation of a host of other human rights, from 
privacy to health, and in the inability to exercise civic human rights such as the right to vote.’589 
More so, living in inadequate, or in fact without, housing or shelter ‘is precarious in terms of 
coping on an everyday basis, and to secure the fulfilment of many other human rights, such as 
the right to adequate food and to health.’590 Given its linkages, inadequate access to housing 
contributes to the non-realisation of a range of other human rights.591 It is clear, on account of 
this, that the right to housing is intimately linked to both poverty and survival and as such the 
right to housing constitutes a component right of the rights-based definition of destitution. This 
is given its place as a ‘necessary basis of subsistence, adequate housing facilitates human 
participation in the life of the community.’592 It is perhaps because of this that some aspects of 
the right to housing are required to be immediately implemented and are not subject to 
progressive realisation.593 
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Although the CESCR does not use the term ‘minimum core’ in its fourth594 or seventh595 
General Comments, which address the right to housing and forced evictions respectively, the 
CESCR ‘does note that the state is prima facie violating its obligations if a significant number 
of individuals are deprived of ‘basic shelter.’596 Thus ‘one can safely assume that ‘basic shelter’ 
constitutes the minimum core of the right to housing.’597 Therefore an individual will always 
be destitute if they do not have access to basic shelter.  
However, the CESCR has interpreted the right to housing to go beyond ‘a narrow or 
restrictive sense which equates it with, for example, the shelter provided by merely having a 
roof over one’s head.’598 The right to adequate housing should therefore ‘be seen as the right to 
live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.’599 One of the reasons provided by the CESCR 
for this interpretation is that Article 11(1) ICESCR enshrines not merely a right to housing but, 
more broadly, a right to adequate housing.600 This notion of adequacy, in regards to housing, 
has a number of implications. Adequate shelter should be adequately private, adequately 
spacious, adequately secure, adequately lit and adequately ventilated, with ‘adequate basic 
infrastructure and adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities ‑ all at a reasonable 
cost.’601 Bone regards secure, affordable and decent housing as a crucial pillar ‘of stability 
within the potentially bewildering milieu of modern societies.’602 Further, Leckie offers the case 
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of Guzzardi v Italy603 as evidence for the contention that, although the state need not provide 
housing accommodation, ‘public authorities are under an obligation to ensure that they do not 
impose intolerable living conditions on a person or family.’604 This affirms the link between the 
right to adequate housing and conditions of accommodation. 
The CESCR holds that there are certain aspects of adequacy which transpose between 
contexts.605 These factors include: legal security of tenure;606 availability of services, materials, 
facilities and infrastructure;607 affordability;608 habitability;609 accessibility;610 location;611 and 
cultural adequacy.612 In its Concluding Observations on the UK’s report, the CESCR 
recommended that the U.K. take action in regard to substandard and uninhabitable housing.613 
This suggests that the quality of the accommodation forms a part of the adequacy assessment.  
The preceding paragraphs demonstrate that the right to housing incorporates the 
adequacy of housing. This assessment of adequacy can be extended to the enjoyment of 
utilities, to some of which individuals can make separate and independent rights-claims. 
Leckie, for example, suggests that the legal content of the right to housing includes, inter alia, 
a right to housing which is habitable, has electricity and has, if necessary, heating.614 The case 
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of FEANTSA V France, before the European Committee of Social Rights, is quoted by 
Hohmann as defining adequate housing as  
‘a dwelling which is safe from a sanitary and health point of view, that is, possesses all 
basic amenities, such as water, heating, waste disposal, sanitation facilities and 
electricity; is structurally secure; not overcrowded; and with secure tenure supported 
by law.’615  
Additionally, the Special Rapporteur on the right to housing has recognised the links between 
the rights to water, sanitation, and housing through emphasising that the full enjoyment of the 
right to housing is ‘interlinked with and contingent upon fulfilment of other rights and services, 
including access to safe drinking water and sanitation.’616 Therefore, access to sanitation 
facilities has generally been understood to be included within the right to adequate housing 
with it being ‘difficult to imagine characterizing a habitation as adequate if sanitation facilities 
are not available within the vicinity or are inadequate or unsafe to use.’617 This demonstrates 
how the separate and independent rights to water and sanitation can be considered, in contexts 
where access to them through the household is considered the norm, concurrently with the right 
to adequate housing. These rights will be explored in further detail below. 
4.3.4. The Right to Food 
Van Bueren highlights that the League of Nations’ 1924 Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
contains, as one of its five substantive articles, a right to food.618 This right was also 
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‘unambiguously spelled out’619 in the 1948 UDHR. These international instruments 
demonstrate the frequent reaffirmation of the right to food by the international community. 
However, even despite this ‘a disturbing gap still exists between the standards set in Article 11 
of the Covenant and the situation prevailing in many parts of the world.’620 The right to food 
forms part of the minimum basic content of the right to an adequate standard of living which 
ensures subsistence for all people.621 Consequently, ‘there can be no question that the human 
right to adequate food is a basic right.’622 This places it firmly within the category of component 
right in relation to my rights-based destitution definition. 
Beyond Article 11(1) ICESCR, ‘Article 11(2) guarantees the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger’623 and this right has been ‘indivisibly linked to the inherent 
dignity of the human person’624 in being ‘indispensable for the fulfilment of other human 
rights.’625 The CESCR has further linked the right to food to policies orientated to the 
‘eradication of poverty and the fulfilment of all human rights for all.’626 Beyond these direct 
sources, the right to food can also be found indirectly and claimed through provisions not 
explicitly guaranteeing a right to food. Cahill and Skogly have highlighted claims brought 
under the right to life before the Indian Constitutional Court as demonstrating this contention 
with the Court linking the right to food to human dignity.627 This highlights the interdependence 
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of human rights which can broaden the range of protections available ‘but conversely can leave 
gaps in provision or weakness in proving a case.’628 
For some, a lack of adequate food is the ‘ultimate criterion of poverty.’629 This is 
because, given that food is a basic survival need, the activity of acquiring food diverts the 
efforts of those in poverty away from other pressing issues with the struggle for their next meal 
becoming an impoverished person’s ‘immediate and all-consuming activity.’630 In this sense, 
lack of adequate food and the all-consuming activity of acquiring one’s next meal, has 
psychological implications, which in turn has implications for mental health and thus health 
more broadly, given that this activity results in an ‘unbearable nagging dread.’631 This firmly 
places the right to food within not only the sphere of survival needs and rights but also of 
poverty. Consequently, this thesis considers the right to food as a component right of a rights-
based definition of destitution.  
A 2010 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) fact sheet 
stipulates that the right to food does not constitute a right to be fed but is rather a right to feed 
oneself in conditions of dignity, whereby individuals live in such conditions as to allow them 
to produce their own food or instead to buy it.632 Therefore, the realisation of the right to 
adequate food requires individuals to ‘have physical and economic access at all times to 
adequate food or means for its procurement.’633 This realisation also goes beyond conceptions 
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of charity with the realisation of the right to food concerning the process of ‘ensuring that all 
people have the capacity to feed themselves in dignity.’634 Furthermore, the right to food is 
comprised of a number of different components. Namely, that food is adequate both as to 
quantity and quality; that food is sustainable; that the food allows for an appropriate diet; that 
the food is culturally acceptable; and that the food is accessible.635 
Supply, and accessibility, have both economic and physical conceptions. In the 
economic sense, accessibility relates to the affordability of food which individuals should be 
able to afford to access to sustain ‘an adequate diet without compromising on any other basic 
needs.’636 In combination with this, physically conceived, accessibility ‘means that food should 
be accessible to all, including to the vulnerable, such as children, the sick, disabled people or 
older persons, for whom it may be difficult to go out to get food.’637 
Access, in relation to the right to food more generally, must be understood to include 
the concept of food security. That is all people at all times having ‘physical and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life.’638 Thus, at the core of food security is the notion of ‘stability of 
supply.’639 Underpinning this is the concept of sustainable accessibility. That is the notion that 
adequate food must be accessible in both the short and the long term.640 
Although enough food is available to fully realise the right to adequate food this food 
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is ‘not allocated on the basis of need.641 As such those without sufficient quantities of food can 
be said to be suffering from a lack of access to food that is in fact available.642 Therefore, the 
non-realisation of the right to adequate food is the result of accessibility in relation to food. 643 
Lacking the resources to access food, which if but for lack of those resources to procure, would 
otherwise be available644 may in some instances result in individuals experiencing starvation.645 
This starvation may in turn result in an inadequate dietary intake which may lead to 
malnutrition.  
A distinction between hunger and starvation, that is insufficient supply of calories, and 
malnutrition, that is a lack of food providing sufficient calories, micronutrients, vitamins and 
minerals, must be drawn.646 This is because an individual may have access to a sufficient supply 
of calories and thus be free from hunger whilst, at the very same time, have insufficient access 
to micronutrients, vitamins and minerals and thus be malnourished. This distinction supports 
the view that the right to food goes beyond, and should not be equated to, ‘a minimum package 
of calories, proteins and other specific nutrients.647 Such an interpretation is described by the 
CESCR as being ‘narrow or restrictive.’648 This is because the right to food so conceived may 
address the problem of hunger whilst failing to address the issue of malnourishment. Thus, the 
right to food goes beyond merely having access to levels of calories or nutrients deemed 
necessary for subsistence.  
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Ziegler et al. contend that there is an obligation to provide a minimum basic 
subsistence, that is to provide ‘a minimum essential level of economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to food.’649 A consideration of the concept of malnutrition can aid in 
informing the determination of this standard. In human beings, malnutrition results when the 
process through which the human body uses food to maintain life, the normal functions 
associated with this, and growth, fails.650 The immediate causes of this are insufficient 
realisation of the right to food and disease which are often linked as an insufficient diet, and 
thus insufficient realisation of the right to food, ‘can increase vulnerability to disease.’651 
This demonstrates that chronic malnutrition can have damaging implications for the 
right to health which results in ‘prolonged impairment’652 and can have lifelong consequences. 
In relation to children, malnutrition ‘inhibits mental and physical development.’653 For 
example, undernourished children in India ‘are undersized, underweight, and likely to have IQs 
that are on average 10-15 points lower than those of well-nourished children.’654 This places 
such children at a disadvantage from which they will never recover.655 More generally, 
malnourishment can result in, inter alia,  ‘underdevelopment of brain cells, heightened 
vulnerability to disease, including HIV/AIDS, physical deformities and blindness.’656 It is 
therefore clear that the link between malnourishment and the right to health is one of crucial 
importance. This is amplified by the contention that in most deaths related to malnutrition, 
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malnutrition is not the primary cause of death but is instead ‘best understood as a risk factor’657 
which ‘weakens the human body and increases its susceptibility to disease.’658 
Thus, as Cahill and Skogly contend, the concept of ‘adequate food,’ understood broadly, 
‘should include the nutritional quality and quantity necessary to achieve a nutritious healthy 
state for all individuals.’659 This is reiterated in the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to food, as quoted by Just Fair. Here the definition of the right to food includes not only 
access, but also includes the proviso that the food is both ‘quantitatively and qualitatively 
adequate and sufficient.’660 Furthermore, the food must correspond to the consumers cultural 
traditions whilst also ensuring ‘a physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and 
dignified life free of fear.’661 
4.3.5. The Right to Water 
Although it is listed in various international conventions and documents,662 the human right to 
water is not expressly codified in the international bill of rights.663 This lack of reference to 
water contributed to the development of an international debate ‘about the existence of human 
rights obligations with respect to water and on the question of whether the human right to water 
is a self-standing right.’664 This surprising lack of codification leads to one of two contrasting 
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conclusions: ‘the omission could either be seen as the expression of a deliberate silence 
expressing the states’ (un- spoken) consensus that there should not be such a thing as a human 
right to water; or, alternatively, as a negligent silence meaning that the human right to water 
was simply forgotten at the time of drafting the two Covenants.’665 
Given the cruciality of water to both the sustaining of human life as well as to the 
realisation of other rights,666 I support the latter of these two conclusions. Although the reasons 
for this lack of codification are not clear, the view that the failure to expressly codify the right 
to water was negligent, as opposed to deliberate in nature, is supported by the agreement of 
most writers that such a right exists.667 The discussion of water within this thesis, like Cullet’s 
analysis, accepts the premise that the right to water is ‘firmly anchored in international and 
national law’668 and thus ‘moves beyond debates concerning either the existence or the legal 
status of the right in favour of a more in-depth discussion of its content.’669 
The right to water is explicitly recognised within the CEDAW and the CRC.670 This 
recognition has however been framed within the context of other rights. In relation to women 
in rural areas, Article 14(2)h of the CEDAW requires states parties to ensure the right to water 
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supply in relation to adequate living conditions.671 Additionally, the CRC contains water as a 
part of its provisions in relation to the right to health.672 Therefore, although a right to water has 
been recognised in these documents this has been in relation to other rights as opposed to as a 
freestanding right. 
As such, although recognised before the CESCR’s General Comment 15,  a free-
standing right to water ‘has been explicitly proclaimed only since 2002 when the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) officially adopted General 
Comment 15.’673 This General Comment, for the first time, defined and individualised ‘the 
human right to water as a stand-alone right,’674 and put forward ‘the first comprehensive 
definition of the human right to water.’675 That is not to state, however, that this General 
Comment created a ‘new’ human right.676 Instead, General Comment 15 extrapolated ‘the 
nature of their existing obligations’677 and inferred the right to water from Articles 11 and 12 of 
the ICESCR.678 Pertaining to Article 11, this inference was drawn partly on account of the use 
of the word ‘including’ which was evidenced as demonstrating the non-exhaustive nature of 
the elements of an Adequate Standard of Living listed within the Article.679 In relation to Article 
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12, the General Comment held that the right to water ‘is inextricably linked to the right to the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.’680, In recent years the right to water 
has gained the status of ‘an independent human right.’681 Therefore, the human right to water 
was implicitly provided for within the ICESCR682 which provides ‘the basis for the recognition 
of the right.’683 
More so, the right to water has received ‘high-profile declarative support’684 and been 
made official by the UNGA ‘Resolution A/RES/64/292 in September of 2010’685 which was 
followed later that year by a Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/15/9.686 Since 
these resolutions UN member states have been legally obligated to working towards the 
realisation of the right to water for their citizens.687  Resolution A/RES/64/292 recognised, as 
opposed to created, the right to water and this demonstrates that the UNGA were of the view 
that the right had always existed.688 It is clear, therefore, that General Comment Number 15 has 
been ‘buttressed’689 by other elements  of the UN human rights system and that this has 
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contributed to the right to water developing from being implicit in nature to being an ‘explicit 
obligation, and, finally, to independent right.690 
The right to water does not entail an unlimited amount of water691 and ‘it remains 
unclear precisely what legal obligations arise from it.’692 The right does however entitle 
everyone to, for personal and domestic uses,693 clean694 ‘sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically 
accessible and affordable water.’695  
The right to water prioritises ‘the provision of safe and clean water for drinking, 
sanitation, hygiene, and other domestic activities.’696 These purposes are linked to having 
enough water to survive and enough water to be clean in an environment free from human 
waste. This echoes the view that the 2010 resolutions of the UNGA and HRC prioritise ‘water 
for life.’697 The notion of part of the content of the right to water being water for life must 
necessarily consider the notion of basic needs. Clark highlights that the 1977 UN Conference 
on Water in Mar del Plata linked both the quantity and quality of the content of the right to 
water to being ‘equal to their basic needs.’698 This was reaffirmed, according to Gleick, by the 
1986 UN Right to Development as well as the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.699 In 2004 
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the Special Rapporteur on the relationship between the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights and the promotion of the realization of the right to drinking water supply and 
sanitation, Guisse, stated that the ‘right to drinking water is the right of every individual to have 
access to the amount of water required to meet his or her basic needs.’700 Guisse further this by 
specifying that basic needs ‘have been defined in General Comment No. 15 to include ‘personal 
and domestic uses.’’701 
In relation to water, the idea of basic needs has been twinned with the guaranteeing of 
human dignity suggesting that the standard required to meet basic needs forms the core content 
of the right to water.702 Gleick defines and quantifies the basic water requirements (equivalent 
to basic needs) ‘in terms of quantity and quality for four basic human needs: drinking water for 
survival, water for human hygiene, water for sanitation services, and modest household needs 
for preparing food.’703 Based on this, Gleick suggested that the conclusion could be drawn ‘that 
a human right to water should only apply to `basic needs' for drinking, cooking and 
fundamental domestic uses.’704 This will be explored in further detail when addressing the 
concepts of adequacy and quality below.  
General Comment No. 15 utilises adequacy and quality as part of an AAAAQ indicator 
framework in relation to the right to water.705 This framework focuses on availability, 
accessibility, acceptability, affordability derived from economic accessibility and quality.706 
These five indicators represent ‘the parameters to be met in the access to water for personal 
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and domestic uses’707 and form the normative content of the right to water.708 The different 
elements of this normative content have a core content ‘and correlative core obligations that 
must be realized immediately.’709 In providing the essential components of the right, this core 
content is ‘especially relevant to realizing the right in the context of the poor.’710 
The ‘human rights framework refrains from providing a global, absolute value to define 
‘sufficient quantity.’’711 This is despite the fact that volumetric quantities can be ascertained in 
relation to the right to water, the CESCR believes that a measurement of such quantities alone 
is not enough to adjudge realisation of the right.712 Even so Paragraph 12 (a) of General 
Comment No. 15 the CESCR holds that ‘each individual should have access to a quantity of 
water corresponding to the guidelines of the World Health Organisation.’713 This setting of 
adequacy of quantity to WHO guidelines accounts for changes to the standard. 714 Bos et al. 
highlight that a 2003 study by the World Health Organisation (WHO) ‘presents quantities based 
on levels of service and linked to levels of public health concern’715 from which an indication 
of a range of values may be derived. Chavarro highlights that the WHO has determined that, 
beyond basic needs alone and in order to prevent health concerns arising as a consequence of 
lack of water, somewhere between 50-100 l/p/d seems ‘to be sufficient to satisfy most basic 
hygienic and consumption needs.’716 Yet, this figure goes beyond basic needs. 
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Although 3±5 litres per person per day (l/p/d) of water is ‘the amount needed to 
maintain human survival’717 setting such a threshold for realisation of the core content of the 
accessibility strand of the right to water would prioritise drinking/survival water over other 
uses. This neglects the fact that water is required in order to realise other rights such as the 
right to food and the right to an adequate standard of living.718 Concerning basic needs in 
relation to water alone, Winkler suggests that the WHO refers to 20-25 l/p/d719 as a minimum. 
This can be supported in considering the South African Constitutional Court’s determination 
that the necessary quantity is 25 l/p/d720 and Chavarro contends that this figure ‘represents the 
lowest level to maintain life.’721 This is consistent with Gleick’s recommendation that 
individuals have access to 25 l/p/d of clean water.722 Beyond this, the UNDP has described 20 
l/p/d as ‘a minimum requirement for respecting the right to water—and a minimum target for 
governments.’723 This demonstrates that the obligations arising in relation to water adequacy 
under the right to water require more than simply a quantity of water sufficient to prevent death 
by dehydration. 
The concept of accessibility is also sub-divided. According to the CESCR’s General 
Comment No. 15, it comprised of ‘four overlapping dimensions.’724 These dimensions are 
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‘physical accessibility,’725 ‘economic accessibility,’726 ‘non-discrimination,’727 and ‘information 
accessibility.’728 Physical accessibility relates to the ability of individuals to obtain water with 
there being a need for water to ‘be provided in the household or its immediate surroundings.’729 
Consequently, General Comment No. 15 requires that water ‘be within safe physical reach for 
all sections of the population.’730 This requirement is justified given that, possibly due to the 
risk of bacterial infections and diarrheal disease increasing in correlation with increasing 
distances from water sources, water waste and issues with being underweight ‘increase as the 
distance to the protected water sources increases.’731 Safe and clean drinking water must also 
‘be available for household use, in public buildings and at the workplace.’732 Supply must also 
be reliable.733 Economic accessibility pertains to affordability734 and requires that individuals 
are not excluded from access to water due to financial constraints. General Comment No. 15 
highlights that not only must the direct costs and charges associated with securing water be 
affordable but that indirect costs and charges must also be affordable.735 Additionally, both 
direct and indirect costs ‘must not compromise or threaten the realization of other Covenant 
rights.’736 In terms of information accessibility ‘accessibility includes the right to seek, receive 
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and impart information concerning water issues.’737 
4.3.6. The Right to Sanitation  
The CESCR’s General Comments have not addressed sanitation on its own738 and the ICESCR 
contains no specific reference to the right to sanitation.739 Despite the lack of a General 
Comment on the right to sanitation, the CESCR ‘has issued a formal statement recognizing that 
similar obligations apply, following an approach taken by the Special Rapporteur in her 2009 
report to the Council.’740 In this statement the CESCR stressed that ‘being fully aware of the 
relevance of sanitation for the enjoyment of an’ adequate standard of living it had ‘regularly 
raised the issue of sanitation in its dialogue with States Parties and made specific reference to 
it in several of its General Comments.’741 Additionally, de Albuquerque contends that the rights 
to life, health, housing, a healthy environment and freedom from inhumane and degrading 
treatment are frequently relied upon in the ‘case law dealing with water and sanitation.’742 
Furthermore, another use of water is for sanitation and these two concepts are often 
conceptualised together743 with Kamga highlighting that the use of water for sanitation is laid 
down by General Comment 15 as a determinant of water sufficiency.744 However, alternative 
methods of sanitation provision exist which require no water745 and strictly coupling the right 
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to water with the right to sanitation would exclude these alternative methods which ‘are being 
promoted and encouraged.’746 This is because such a coupling places the emphasis on the right 
to water over the right to sanitation747 and, if the right to sanitation were interpreted in such a 
way, non-water-based sanitation provision would fall outside the scope of the right.748 Further, 
such an interpretation regards the right to sanitation  as ‘the right to water for sanitation 
purposes’749 which is too limited to be of use in many contexts.750 
Even despite this, the right to sanitation  has continued to be conceptualised alongside 
the right to water751 with the current international legal system perpetuating ‘the strong 
historical linkage between sanitation and water.’752 This is evidenced semantically through the 
use of the phrase ‘the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation.’753 Here the use of 
the singular ‘right’ as opposed to plural ‘rights’ suggests that the right that exists is a singular 
right to ‘water and sanitation’ as opposed to the case being that the right to water and the right 
to sanitation  exist separately.  
However, in contrast to this, some do refer to the right to water and the right to sanitation 
as separate rights.754 In her 2009 report, de Albuquerque noted the ongoing discussion in regard 
to sanitation as a distinct right, which a trend towards recognising was highlighted as 
existing.755 Despite the ongoing nature of this discussion,756 as independent expert, de 
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Albuquerque supported and encouraged this trend based upon the conviction ‘that there are 
unique aspects to sanitation that evoke the inherent dignity of all human beings and which 
make it impossible to address satisfactorily through other human rights.’757  
Dignity can be said to pervade ‘the issue of sanitation’758 with the CESCR reaffirming 
that sanitation is fundamental ‘for leading a life in dignity.’759   This is due to the fact that 
‘personal sanitation is still a highly sensitive issue’760 meaning that it is surrounded by taboo 
and is for most ‘a highly private matter and an uncomfortable topic for public discussion.’761 
This is due to the ‘vulnerability and shame that so many people experience every day when, 
again, they are forced to defecate in the open, in a bucket or a plastic bag’762 with the indignity 
of the situation causing embarrassment.763 On top of this, it is difficult to maintain self-respect, 
which is closely linked to dignity, ‘when being forced to squat down in the open, with no 
respect for privacy, not having the opportunity to clean oneself after defecating and facing the 
constant threat of assault in such a vulnerable moment.’764 This is the situation that those 
lacking access to adequate sanitation face.  
The notion of sanitation as being distinct has been echoed by the CESCR in regard to 
the relationship between water and sanitation in the recognition ‘that sanitation has distinct 
features which warrant its separate treatment from water in some respects.’765 Regardless of 
whether one accepts the argument that the right to sanitation should be considered as distinct 
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from the right to water, ‘it is indisputable that there are human rights obligations related to 
access to sanitation, because sanitation is inextricably linked to the enjoyment of so many other 
human rights.’766 Thus, a right to sanitation  has been recognised767 and is identifiable within 
international human rights law.768  
Several international binding instruments provide for the right to basic sanitation.769 
States have consistently recognised that the right to an adequate standard of living includes 
sanitation770 and the right to sanitation has evolved under the UN’s human rights system into 
‘an explicit obligation.’771 This is because protection of the right to sanitation  ‘can be said to 
be a necessary implication of a range of fundamental rights.’772 For example, sanitation affects 
health773 and consequently, amongst other rights, the right to Health is ‘integrally related’774 to 
includes sanitation.775 Further, a direct consequence of a lack of sanitation facilities is that 
‘diarrhoea is the second biggest cause of death of children under the age of five.’776 Research 
suggests ‘that poor sanitation may be linked to as much as a quarter of all under-five deaths’777 
and the WHO estimates ‘that 88 per cent of diarrhoeal disease is caused by unsafe water and 
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sanitation.’778 Additionally, beyond the individual level, sanitation has an ‘important public 
health dimension’779 in that it can ensure that ‘the environment in which they live is not 
contaminated with faeces.’780 Access to adequate sanitation therefore protects the health of not 
only the individual accessing it but also others.  
Despite this, the right to sanitation  lacks ‘robust technical definitions in international 
law’781 but is ‘commonly understood as the right of everyone to have access to adequate, safe 
sanitation that upholds the dignity of the user and is conducive to the protection of the 
environment and public health.’782 Additionally, the right to sanitation  must be realised both at 
the individual and the collective level as ‘the full protection of the health of the individual 
requires protection of the environment from human waste and this can only be done if everyone 
has, and utilizes, adequate sanitation.’783 Together this suggests that the right to sanitation  
entails access to adequate sanitation and adequacy entails availability, quality and 
accessibility.784 Further, the sanitation facilities provided under such a system must be culturally 
acceptable785 and relating to quality these facilities must also ‘be hygienically and technically 
safe to use, and must include hygiene promotion and education.’786 Combined with the UN 
Independent Experts report, it is therefore clear that the human right to sanitation has an 
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AAAAQ framework.787 Thus, sanitation facilities and services must be available, accessible, 
affordable, acceptable and of sufficient quality. They must also be safe.788  
Building on this, sanitation can be defined as a system of collecting, transporting, 
treating, disposing or reusing ‘human excreta, and associated hygiene.’789 This was the 
definition proposed by the independent expert in her 2009 report790 which was later endorsed 
by the CESCR.791 The term ‘’basic sanitation’ is also used, which is defined as the disposal of 
human excreta to prevent disease and safeguard privacy and dignity.’792 The WHO gives 
‘garbage collection and wastewater disposal’ as examples of this.793 Consequently, the right to 
sanitation is the right to a system fulfilling these purposes. Such a system, and as such sanitation 
facilities, ‘must effectively prevent human and animal, including insect, contact with human 
excreta to avert the spread of disease.’794  
Even so, the state is under no obligation to provide sanitation facilities free of charge 
except ‘when people are genuinely unable to pay for sanitation.’795 This is because free 
unlimited and universal access to water and sanitation ‘could actually harm low-income 
households by depriving governments and service providers of the revenue needed to expand 
and maintain the service.’796 However, and of great relevance to this thesis given the conception 
of destitution as an extreme form of poverty, the state is obliged to provide sanitation services, 
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‘free of charge,’797 in certain conditions ‘such as extreme poverty or natural disasters, when 
people, for reasons beyond their control, are genuinely unable to access sanitation through their 
own means.’798 In such circumstances, perhaps when individuals face an inability to pay, ‘the 
human rights framework indeed requires free services that must be financed through sources 
other than user contributions.’799 States must look towards means of financing such provision 
beyond user contributions and mechanisms such as, inter alia, taxation, transfers and cross-
subsidisation could form part of ‘a broader system for financing water and sanitation 
services.’800 This will therefore require an investment by State Parties. However, investing in 
sanitation can return positive yields with the CESCR citing research, which was recent in 2010, 
as estimating that ‘for every dollar invested in sanitation, there is about a nine-dollar long-term 
benefit in costs averted and productivity gained.’801 
In regard to availability the right to sanitation requires that there be sufficient sanitation 
facilities ‘within, or in the immediate vicinity, of each household, health or educational 
institution, public institutions and places, and the workplace.’802 Thus ‘sanitation facilities must 
be physically accessible for everyone at all times of day and night.’803 An element of this 
physical accessibility is that the facilities be securely located804 as to ‘ensure minimal risks to 
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the physical security of users’805 in order to prevent the physical security of those accessing the 
facilities from being threatened.806 
 Beyond accessibility in the physical sense, sanitation facilities must be economically 
accessible. Thus, they must be affordable. Affordability is a ‘highly contextual’807 concept and 
as such standards of affordability must be determined relatively as opposed to universally.  
Even so, sanitation may be regarded as affordable if accessing it does not ‘compromise the 
ability to pay for other essential necessities.’808 More generally ‘a sanitation system is 
affordable to an individual or institution if they have the necessary financial or other resources 
with which to acquire it, and do not have higher priority uses for these resources.’809 In many 
circumstances, the reason for water and sanitation services being disconnected is a failure to 
pay and this suggests that ‘the affordability of water and sanitation services and disconnections 
are inextricably linked.’810 Such disconnections are, however, ‘only permissible if it can be 
shown that households are able to pay but are not paying.’811 Based upon paragraph 44(a) of 
the CESCR’s General Comment no. 15,812 Heller interprets disconnections for an inability, as 
opposed to unwillingness, to pay as a retrogressive measure constituting ‘a violation of the 
human rights to water and sanitation.’813 
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4.3.7. The Right to Social Security  
The right to social security is an ‘economic and social necessity for development and 
progress’814 which broadly pools social risk ‘to pursue the common good of all’815 and ASL has 
been clearly linked to social security. This is because the CESCR has held that social security 
benefits must be adequate in amount and duration in order that everyone may realise their right 
to an adequate standard of living.816 In this sense, ‘the drafters of the UDHR considered social 
security to be one of the core guarantees for the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living.’817 Evidencing this notion, the CESCR has found benefit cuts to have negatively 
impacted the enjoyment of the right to social security and the right to an ASL.818 In relation to 
destitution specifically, the right to social security is pertinent given the finding that in modern 
welfare states certain groups can face destitution for reasons related to social security in the 
form of adequacy and access.819 
The right ‘has been strongly affirmed in international law.’820 The 2012 International 
Labor Organisation (ILO) Recommendation 202 relating to social protection links Articles 22 
and 25 of the UDHR and Articles 9, 11 and 12 of the ICESCR to the right to social security.821 
Guidance regarding the implementation of this right has been described by Chapman as the 
 
814 International Labour Organization ILO, ‘Social Protection Floors Recommendation: Recommendation 202, 
Geneva, 101st ILC Session (14 Jun 2012)’ preamble. 
815 Virginia P Reno, ‘How Social Security Works’ (2005) 29 Generations 23, 23. 
816 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9) (2007) UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/19’ (n 
504) para 22. 
817 Eide, ‘Adequate Standard of Living’ (n 114) 201.  
818 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’ (2016) E/C.12/GBR/CO/6’ (n 613) para 40. 
819 Fitzpatrick et al. (n 2) 71. 
820 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9) (2007) UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/19’ (n 
504) para 6. 
821 ILO, ‘Social Protection Floors Recommendation: Recommendation 202, Geneva, 101st ILC Session (14 Jun 
2012)’ (n 814) preamble. 
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‘unique task’822 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and defining the right to social 
security has also fallen to this agency.823 ILO Convention 102824 on Social Security (Minimum 
Standards) establishes, as the name suggests, ‘worldwide-agreed minimum standards for all 
nine branches of social security’825 and as such its significance cannot be undervalued. 
Building on this, the right to social security has been affirmed at the regional level. In 
the European context, the primary instrument enshrining the right to social security is the 
European Social Charter (Revised),826 henceforth Revised Charter, of which Articles 12, 13 and 
14 recognise the right. Further still, Article 30 of the Revised Charter ‘stipulates the right to 
protection against poverty and social exclusion.’827 Article 13 (1) of the Revised Charter obliges 
state parties to undertake to ensure that individuals in specific circumstances, such as those 
without or in fact those who are unable to secure adequate resources, ‘be granted adequate 
assistance.’828 Despite this, the right to social security has only received limited attention and 
this is represented by the fact that it was one of the final ICESCR rights to receive its own 
General Comment.829 Graham observes that Riedel attributes this to both the brevity and 
 
822 Lucie Lamarche, ‘The Right to Social Security in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ in Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2002) 87–114, 89. 
823 Vladimir Rys, Reinventing Social Security Worldwide: Back to Essentials (Policy Press 2010) 27. 
824 International Labour Organization ILO, ‘Social Security (Minimum Standards): Convention No. 102’. 
825 International Labour Organization ILO, ‘Legal Advice Regarding Convention 102’ 
<http://www.ilo.org/secsoc/areas-of-work/legal-advice/WCMS_205340/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 4 
February 2020. 
826 Alison Graham, ‘National Debt versus the Right to Social Security: How Should States’ Obligations during a 
Financial Crisis Be Interpreted?’ (Lancaster University 2017) 88 
<http://www.centreforwelfarereform.org/uploads/attachment/577/national-debt-versus-the-right-to-social-
security.pdf> accessed 4 February 2020. 
827 ibid. 
828 Merris Amos, ‘The Second Division in Human Rights Adjudication: Social Rights Claims under the Human 
Rights Act 1998’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 549, 551. 
829 Graham (n 826) 85. 
  
 136 
vagueness of Article 9 ICESCR.830 This lack of attention may perhaps create difficulties in 
determining the content of the right to social security as it has resulted in little being done ‘to 
determine the content of that right in International Law.’831 This is perhaps evidenced  through 
the ILO noting in 2010 that the UN human rights regimes ‘have mostly remained silent as to 
the actual definition of the right to social security and its specific content.832  
I opine, contrary to the view that even following the 2008 General Comment No. 19 on 
the Right to Social Security ‘many ambiguities still surround the content of the right to social 
security,’833  that the General Comment does offer some clarification. In this General Comment 
the CESCR highlights that; benefits can be in cash or in kind;834 that such benefits ‘must be 
adequate in amount and duration in order that everyone may realize his or her rights to family 
protection and assistance, an adequate standard of living and adequate access to health care, as 
contained in articles 10, 11 and 12 of the Covenant’;835 that full respect must be paid to the 
concept of human dignity;836 and that contributory social security benefits should have ‘a 
reasonable relationship between earnings, paid contributions, and the amount of relevant 
benefit.’837  
 
830 Eibe Riedel ‘The Human Right to Social Security: Some Challenges’ in Eibe Riedal (ed.) Social Security as a 
Human Right: Drafting a General Comment on Article 9 ICESCR - Some Challenges (Springer-Verlag 2007) 17-
28, 18: quoted by ibid. 
831 Jennifer Tooze, ‘The Rights to Social Security and Social Assistance: Towards an Analytical Framework’ in 
Mashood Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (OUP 2007) 
331–359, 331. 
832 International Labour Organization ILO, ‘Extending Social Security to All: A Guide through Challenges and 
Options’ 12 <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_146616.pdf> accessed 4 February 2020. 
833 Graham (n 826) 85. 
834 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9) (2007) UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/19’ (n 






Further, the right to social security , complemented by other measures, ‘plays an 
important role in supporting the realization of many of the rights in the Covenant.’838 Despite 
this, there has been ‘limited work in establishing the minimum essential levels of the right to 
social security, and so far, the CESCR has rarely found violations of the minimum essential 
levels even when people are starving.’839  This demonstrates the wide margin of discretion 
which the CESCR affords to States Parties’ with regard to the level of social security provision. 
Additionally, this suggests that, with regard to minimum essential levels of realising the social 
security, the States Parties’ obligations are for a low level of realisation. In respect of this level 
being so low that individuals are starving, this suggests that the minimum essential level of the 
right to social security is not sufficient to realise – in this example – the minimum essential 
levels of the right to food.  
A distinction can be made between social security and social assistance with such a 
classification distinguishing between contribution-based social security, which is regarded as 
earned, and the non-contributory-based social assistance.840 Social assistance is regarded by 
Eide as separate to social security in that ‘assistance is often discretionary and, therefore, 
neither a right nor a duty.’841 ILO convention 102 prescribes nine types of social security.842 
This convention is pertinent in relation to the right to social security as this list, of nine differing 
forms of social security, is repeated in the reporting guidelines for States parties under Article 
9 of the ICESCR,843 ‘reflecting the importance of ILO standard-setting for the understanding 
 
838 ibid 28. 
839 Graham (n 826) 131. 
840 Martin Scheinin, ‘The Right to Social Security’ in Asbjorn Eide et al (ed), Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook (Second Revised Edition, Kluwer International Law 2001) 211–221, 211. 
841 Eide, ‘Adequate Standard of Living’ (n 114) 202.  
842 ILO, ‘Social Security (Minimum Standards): Convention No. 102’ (n 824). 
843 Secretary General of the United Nations, ‘Compilation of Guidelines on The Form and Content of Reports to 
Be Submitted by States Parties to The International Human Rights Treaties (2009) UN.Doc. HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6 
Chapter 2 (Annex) (B)’ para 27. 
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of the obligations under the CESCR.’844 This can, however, be criticised in focusing social 
security too narrowly, as it interprets social security as limited to ‘income-based and situation-
based benefits for workers and their families.’845 Despite this, Article 11 (1) of the ICESCR 
relating to an ASL ‘relates also to social assistance and other needs-based forms of social 
benefits in cash or in kind to anyone without adequate resources.’846 Furthermore, Article 9 
ICESCR specifies that social security includes social insurance and although the Article fails 
to define social security this allows the inference to be drawn that Article 9 relates to both 
contributory and non-contributory social security benefits with the CESCR also explicitly 
specifying ‘that the right to social security includes the right to social assistance.’847 Therefore, 
contrary to the view that social assistance is discretionary and therefore not a right, it is clear 
that a right to social assistance exists within the context of the right to social security. The 
traditional elements assigned to contributory and non-contributory social security are both 
included within the ILO’s commitment to social protection which covers contextually specific 
social security levels securing protection which prevents or alleviates ‘vulnerability and social 
exclusion.’848 This inclusion reaffirms the importance of both contributory and non-
contributory aspects of the right to social security.  
Thus, the term social security is often used in general meaning as an umbrella term 
covering both contribution-based social security benefits and non-contribution-based social 
assistance benefits. Unless specified otherwise, I use the term social security in this general 
meaning.  
 
844 Scheinin (n 840) 214–215. 
845 ibid. 
846 ibid 215. 
847 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9) (2007) UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/19’ (n 
504) para 4 (b). 
848 Graham (n 826) 96. 
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The ILO has determined that basic social security guarantees should consider that ‘basic 
income security should allow life in dignity’849 and the adequacy of social security benefits is 
an important tool in determining the content of the right. This is because declining levels of 
adequacy, in regard to social security provision, exacerbate the difficulties faced in ‘making 
ends meet.’850 Tooze suggests that a rights-based approach to social security benefits should 
focus on the individual as opposed to family units.851 More so social assistance should protect 
against poverty whereas contribution-based benefits should allow reasonable income levels to 
be maintained.852 The contributory versus non-contributory distinction contemplates different 
standards of adequacy for contributory as opposed to non-contributory social security benefits. 
This is further evidence of the belief that contributory benefits are more valid than those of a 
non-contributory nature. Despite Tooze’s distinction, others, such as Graham, have highlighted 
that human rights practitioners have stipulated that the number of benefits, which relates to 
adequacy, ‘must also enable the person to graduate from poverty.’853 
This suggests that the existence of poverty is a determining factor in the assessment of 
the adequacy and availability of social assistance854 and demonstrates the link between 
inadequate social security provision and poverty. The role of poverty, in making this 
assessment, is further demonstrated by Graham’s contention that in order ‘to comply with 
international human rights law, social security must be accessible to all those in need and of an 
adequate level to ensure that people can escape poverty.’855 As poverty was demonstrated to be 
 
849 ILO, ‘Social Protection Floors Recommendation: Recommendation 202, Geneva, 101st ILC Session (14 Jun 
2012)’ (n 814) recommendation 8 (b). 
850 Eileen Evason and Roberta Woods, Poverty, Charity and ‘Doing the Double’ (Avebury 1995) 51. 
851 Tooze (n 831) 343. 
852 ibid. 
853 Graham (n 826) 105. 
854 Tooze (n 831) 346. 
855 Graham (n 826) 122. 
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linked to destitution in chapter two, this suggests that an assessment of the adequacy of social 
security provision can inform an assessment of whether an individual is experiencing 
destitution. Therefore, the adequacy of social security must be considered.  
The adequacy of social security provisions can be adjudged using a combination of four 
methods; minimum standards; cost of living; duration; and the specific level of benefits.856 For 
example, the CESCR has recommended that the United Kingdom should ‘restore the link 
between the rates of State benefits and the costs of living.’857 
Beyond this, and more quantifiably, the European Parliament determines social security 
provision schemes to be adequate if, under such provisions, minimum incomes are ‘at a level 
equivalent to at least 60% of median income in the member state concerned.’858 More so, the 
Tooze highlights that the CESCR has used the minimum wage as the standard of adequacy and 
has also ‘challenged the adequacy of the minimum wage itself, thus recognizing the limitation 
of this method of poverty calculation.’859 This challenge exists as to determine the adequacy of 
social security based upon a minimum wage which is not in itself adequate enough to allow 
individuals to realise their own right to social security would result in inadequate realisation of 
the right to social security despite the social security provisions being determined to be 
adequate.  
The CESCR has stressed the importance of the right to social security in ‘guaranteeing 
human dignity for all persons when they are faced with circumstances that deprive them of 
 
856 Tooze (n 831) 344–345. 
857 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’ (2016) E/C.12/GBR/CO/6’ (n 613) para 41 (b). 
858 Graham (n 826) 106. 
859 Tooze (n 831) 347 offers E/C.12/1996/SR.14, para 25(Guatemala); E/C.12/1997/SR.40, para 14(Azerbaijan); 
E/C.12/1999/SR.9, para 10 (Solomon Islands); E/C.12/1/add 65, para 9 (Ukraine); and E/C.12/1/add 66, paras 23 
and 49 (Nepal) as examples of this. 
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their capacity to fully realize their Covenant rights.’860 Given the major role that social security 
plays in combating poverty861 and its links to the right to an ASL862 it can be considered 
alongside the notion of destitution. Given the place of social security in contributing to the 
realisation of all human rights, as well as its especially intimate links to the already highlighted 
component rights of the destitution definition, I consider the right to social security to also be 
a component right of the rights-based definition of destitution. This is especially so given the 
causal relationship which exists between social security and destitution in the U.K. which is 
addressed in the next chapter.  
4.4. Concluding Remarks: A Rights-Based Destitution Definition 
Utilising the destitution themes highlighted in chapter 2, this chapter has identified the 
component rights of a human rights-based definition of destitution. These component rights 
are the right to an adequate standard of living: the right to clothing, the right to housing, the 
right to food, the right to water, the right to sanitation, and the right to social security. This 
chapter examined the sources and content of each of these rights and in doing so justified the 
status of these rights as component rights.  
Throughout examining the content of these rights, the minimum core obligations and 
the normative content were made clear. This will be of importance in Part Two of this thesis 
when this human rights-based destitution definition is applied to the context of the UK. 
Alongside the findings of the previous chapter, the findings from this chapter allow the 
 
860 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9) (2007) UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/19’ (n 
504) para 1. 
861 Emmanuel Reynaud, ‘The Right to Social Security — Current Challenges in International Perspective’ in Eibe 
Riedel et al (ed), Social Security as a Human Right (Springer-Verlag 2007) paras 1–15, 14; see also CESCR, 
‘General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9) (2007) UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/19’ (n 504) para 3; 
ILO, ‘Social Protection Floors Recommendation: Recommendation 202, Geneva, 101st ILC Session (14 Jun 
2012)’ (n 814) para preamble. 
862 Graham (n 826) 86 Article 25 UDHR is highlighted as demonstrating this link. 
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theoretical and logical human rights-based definition of destitution enunciated at the beginning 
of Part One of this thesis to be given greater precision.  In drawing Part One of this thesis to a 
close, this chapter has clarified the component rights. In clarifying – and giving precision to – 
the two elements of my human rights-based definition of destitution – the component rights 
and the destitution threshold – the third and fourth chapters of this thesis form the basis from 
which I will apply my human-rights based definition of destitution to the context of the UK in 
Part two of this thesis. 
My starting point was that an individual is considered destitute if any one or more of 
their component rights are not realised to the destitution threshold. Thus, under this definition, 
an individual is considered destitute if any one or more of their rights to an adequate standard 
of living, the right to clothing, the right to housing, the right to food, the right to water, the right 
to sanitation, and the right to social security, are not realised to the destitution threshold.  
Combined with the findings of chapter 3, my human rights-based definition of 
destitution considers that an individual will always be destitute if any of these component rights 
is not realised to the minimum core obligation in such a way as to protect individuals from the 
severe indignity and vulnerability inherent to reliance on charitable assistance provision. 
Beyond this first most basic – and universal - level of freedom from indignity and vulnerability 
in the realisation of the component rights; an individual will also be considered destitute under 
the second composite element of the destitution threshold if any one or more of their component 
rights is not realised to a level in such a way that each of the concepts of availability, 
accessibility, acceptability, affordability, and quality are met free from vulnerability and 
























Chapter 5: Austerity: The Context of Destitution in the United 
Kingdom 
5.1. Introduction 
Fitzpatrick et al.’s contention that the leading causes of destitution in the UK are social security 
related863 necessitates an examination of austerity within this thesis. This is because austerity, 
being the context of the UK’s domestic social and economic policies since 2010, has influenced 
social security policies and provision within the UK. These austerity driven policies have been 
described as ‘having drastic impacts on the ability of individuals and families to subsist.’864 The 
theme of subsistence is central to my grounding of destitution within the sphere of human 
rights. Therefore, I justify the examination of austerity in relation to destitution within the 
United Kingdom due to the links which exist between the austerity driven policies which are 
contributing to destitution itself.  
Such an examination must therefore take place in order to properly apply my rights-
based definition of destitution to the context of the United Kingdom. This is especially so given 
that the right to social security constitutes a component right of this definition and, more so, 
the intimate links which exist between the realisation of the right to an adequate standard of 
living – and as such all other component rights – and the right to social security.865 This is 
because many such austerity driven policies have been in the field of social security 
synonymously referred to as welfare or benefits.866 More so, many of these austerity driven 
social security reforms were included in the Welfare Reform Act 2012 over which the Joint 
 
863 Fitzpatrick et al. (n 2) 3. 
864 Samuel Strong, ‘Food Banks, Actually Existing Austerity and the Localisation of Responsibility’ [2018] 
Geoforum 1. 
865 See chapter 2.4.1.; see also chapter 4.2.  
866 The 2010 Conservative Party Manifesto contained policies aimed at reducing public spending and welfare 
dependency by simplifying social security and making work pay. See Oette (n 326) 671–672. 
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Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) has raised several concerns as to the acts compatibility 
with the UK’s human rights obligations.867 
In order to examine the context of austerity – and its implications for destitution – in 
the UK, this chapter will firstly define austerity and its rationale. Following this, arguments 
against austerity will be examined. The following two sections will outline how austerity in the 
UK has manifested itself and what the effects of this have been. This leads to my contention 
that austerity in the UK since 2010 has been inherently destitution inducing. Through 
examining austerity, this chapter will form the basis from which my human rights-based 
definition of destitution will be applied to the context of the UK in the following chapters.  
5.2. Austerity 
Although widespread debate exists as to its definition,868 austerity, as commonly understood in 
the United Kingdom, is most associated with the global financial crisis of the first decade of 
the 2000s with austerity being regarded as a consequence of, response to,869 and attempt to 
alleviate870 the effects of this crisis through reducing the public expenditure871 in order to reduce 
debt.872  
However, attributing the beginnings of austerity to this global financial crisis has been 
described by Ruckert and Labonté as a ‘gross misconception.’873 Instead they posit that ‘the 
 
867 ibid. 
868 Marie Clarke et al., ‘The Impact of Austerity on Irish Higher Education Faculty’ (2018) 75 High Educ 1047, 
1049. 
869 Colm O’Cinneide, ‘Austerity and the Faded Dream of a “Social Europe”’ in Aoife Nolan (ed), Economic and 
Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 169–201, 185. 
870 Paul Widdop and others, ‘Austerity, Policy and Sport Participation in England’ (2018) 10 International Journal 
of Sport Policy and Politics 7, 7. 
871 Oette (n 326) 669. 
872 Graeme Hayes, ‘Regimes of Austerity’ (2017) 16 Social Movement Studies 21, 21. 
873 Arne Ruckert and Ronald Labonté, ‘Health Inequities in the Age of Austerity: The Need for Social Protection 
Policies’ (2017) 187 Social Science & Medicine 306, 307. 
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origins of the current austerity drive can be traced back to the early 1970s’874 whilst Trommer 
suggests that the ‘age of austerity’ can be defined as an era ‘starting roughly in the 1990s.’875 
This variance can be better understood through regarding austerity as originating from – and 
being a manifestation of – ‘almost 40 years of a dominant neoliberal economic orthodoxy.’876 
This can be supported with Gualerzi’s description of austerity within the Eurozone as being a 
‘crucial aspect of neoliberalism’877 as well as the contention that elements of austerity ‘are 
already structurally central to neoliberalism.’878 More specifically, features of neo-liberal 
orthodoxy such ‘deregulation, privatisation, free trade and investment, and the withdrawal of 
the state from many areas of social provision’879 are central tenets of austerity. It follows that 
conceptions of austerity as linking strongly to neoliberalism are well founded. Given this 
analysis, austerity can be regarded as a continuation of and, post-global financial crisis, 
‘intensification of established neoliberal dynamics’880 offering ‘an economic policy akin to 
neoliberalism.’881 In this sense, austerity has been used by states as a tool by which to further 
entrench ‘the neoliberal model.’882 
Blyth’s definition of austerity is often quoted,883 and can serve to consolidate such 
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conceptions of austerity. Blyth regards austerity as ‘a form of voluntary deflation in which the 
economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending to restore 
competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state's budget, debts and 
deficits.’884 Despite drawing on widely used definitions, Blyth’s definition is reflective of the 
experience of more economically developed nations with the suggestion that austerity is 
voluntary only holding true ‘in a handful of cases.’885 Even so, given that the purpose of this 
chapter is to examine destitution in the context of the UK this criticism can be negated. This is 
because austerity in the UK has been characterised as ‘an ideological choice, rather than 
financial necessity.’886 Regarding austerity as a choice887 supports the contention that austerity 
in the UK has been voluntary. It follows that Blyth’s definition of austerity is appropriate in the 
context of the UK and is thus appropriate for this thesis.  
Characterised as cuts to public spending, Oette contends that austerity has resulted in 
financial hardship whilst at the same time adversely impacting ‘persons’ well-being, inter alia, 
contributing to, if not causing, severe health problems and suicides.’888 This contention rests on 
the fact that such cuts to the public expenditure have reduced welfare budgets889 which has 
impacted on the provision of  essentials such as social spending, unemployment assistance and 
housing support.890 This further demonstrates the relevance of austerity to my exploration of 
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5.3. Anti-Austerity Rationale 
Proponents of austerity are able to support their position using ‘strong theoretical arguments 
that austerity measures can achieve the desired results.’891 This is because such polices may 
‘improve the economic and fiscal performance of countries.’892 Despite these strong theoretical 
foundations underpinning austerity policies, the underlying ideology has been ‘widely 
contested’893 and austerity has been widely criticised for a multitude of reasons. So much so, in 
fact, that Pfeiffer et al. have argued as recently as 2017 that there is a growing consensus ‘that 
austerity in Europe was a mistake in both humanitarian and economic terms.’894 One reason for 
this is the argument that governments often have little choice but to run fiscal deficits in order 
to achieve ‘minimum standards of living.’895 Austerity aims at reducing fiscal deficits. It 
follows that, if these deficits are required to achieve minimum standards of living, austerity 
undermines the attainment of these minimum standards of living.  
Vassilopoulou et al. highlight that ‘it is argued by many that the neoliberal doctrine of 
austerity does not work’896 whilst also highlighting that the IMF has made such arguments.897 
The contention that austerity has utterly failed to deal with financial crises is supported by the 
idea of ‘the paradox of austerity’.  That is, it has been argued that austerity policies have, rather 
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than curing the effects of the global financial crisis, instead exacerbated them. Neo-Keynesian 
economists, for example argue that ‘curtailing government spending in a downturn undermines 
economic demand.’898  
A study of 12 European countries between 2006 and 2013 found that austerity increased 
inequality899 and this is in no small part due to the record unemployment rates and mass social 
insecurity it has ‘helped to bring about.’900 Salomon highlights a 2013 IMF paper as challenging 
austerity in ‘finding that ‘fiscal consolidation [austerity] typically raises income inequality, 
raises long-term unemployment and lowers the share of wage income’.’901  
Contrary to commonly held perceptions, reductions in government expenditure do ‘not 
necessarily reduce the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio.’902 This is because measures aimed at 
reducing the fiscal deficit may also reduce the GDP. Therefore, it may be preferable to instead 
increase public expenditure in order to stimulate a proportionally larger growth in GDP.903 This 
would reduce the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio whilst at the same time increasing the fiscal deficit. 
This is as opposed to austerity policies which instead reduce the fiscal deficit and undermine 
economic growth, and thus GDP increases.904 
However, that is not to state that I believe that austerity policies should never be an 
option. The aim of ‘long term fiscal sustainability’905 is an important one. With measures to 
address debts and deficits serving to recognise ‘that the state needs to plan for longer term 
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fiscal sustainability, and to begin to address the issue of the affordability of existing welfare 
commitments in the face of incipient pressure from rapidly ageing populations and rising 
healthcare and social care costs.’906 Thus, ‘failing to put state welfare commitments on a 
sustainable footing now effectively borrows from future generations to fund rights now, which 
shifts vulnerability out into the future.’907 Given the fact that social spending often constitutes 
a large percentage of government budgets,908 this view recognises that austerity policies which 
reduce social spending may be unavoidable in order to achieve sustainability.909 
Such sustainability may rest on ‘lowering debt to output ratios.’910 These ratios, 
however as the preceding sub-section makes clear, can also be lowered by increasing output 
rather than simply lowering debt. Therefore, the notion of sustainability can be turned against 
austerity policies themselves. This is because, despite the recognition that measures may be 
required to ensure fiscal sustainability, the ‘speed and magnitude’911 of austerity policies have 
been self-defeating in that they are ‘likely to have a negative impact on growth; that in turn 
reduces tax receipts and may increase spending pressures.’912 In the long-term, therefore, 
austerity policies may undermine fiscal sustainability.  
Wills and Warwick argue that  
‘the CESCR does not regard austerity to be necessarily incompatible with the 
realization of socioeconomic rights. Rather, it has argued that such measures must be 
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compensated for by approaches which enhance the compatibility of those trends and 
policies with full respect for socioeconomic rights.’913 
Along this vein, I contend that a human rights-based approach to destitution can be used as a 
tool by which to guide austerity policies in such a way as to protect individuals in society from 
the most damaging effects of austerity. 
5.4. Austerity in the United Kingdom 
This thesis recognises the importance of social security – and austerity influenced cuts to social 
security - in relation to destitution in the UK. Given that some areas of social security are 
devolved to the Northern Irish and Scottish devolved governments, it may be questioned as to 
why three different analyses of destitution in the UK have not been undertaken: one for England 
and Wales, one for Northern Ireland, and one for Scotland. However, for a number of reasons, 
this thesis, undertakes a single overarching analysis of destitution in the UK as a whole.  
 The first reason for this overarching approach is that regardless of differences in social 
security provision the UK context specific destitution definition does not alter. That is any 
alternative social security provision does not result in differing understandings of what it means 
to be destitute. Rather, the extent to which such destitution is mitigated may instead vary. 
Secondly, despite being the one region of the UK with ‘devolved social security competencies 
before 2012’ Northern Ireland ‘has been extremely reluctant to diverge substantially from 
approaches in Great Britain.’914  
As such, the focus must be on Scotland. The ‘Scotland Act 2016 devolved various areas 
of social security to Scotland’915 and the Social Security (Scotland) Act 2018 ‘represents both 
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a major step towards the establishment of a devolved system and a legislative statement of 
intent regarding the development of a Scottish model of social security.’916 However, the 
Scottish Government’s devolved social security competencies must be explored. Upon such 
exploration, it becomes clear that - at least for now – these devolved competencies will be of 
limited effect and limited divergence from England and Wales. This is because the ‘Scottish 
Government's priority is ‘safe and secure transfer’ and it does not plan to make major changes 
to benefits at the point they transfer.’917 Thus, this offers little scope for divergence from 
England and Wales and can be used to justify the homogenous analysis of the UK’s system as 
a whole. Given that the transfer of the newly devolved benefits is not expected to be completed 
until 2024 ‘the Scottish Government will need to use agency agreements with the DWP to 
deliver devolved benefits in the interim.’918 
 Alongside this criticism that the devolution of social security competencies to Scotland 
may have no substantial effect on social security administration until after 2024, it may be 
argued that this devolution offers only limited scope for improving the social security system 
in Scotland to better address destitution. This is because devolved competence ‘in relation to 
the main income replacement benefits’ extends ‘only to control of the housing element of and 
payment arrangements for universal credit’ and this ‘in turn limits the scope of devolved 
benefits to contribute to the realisation of the Act’s principle (e) by reducing poverty.’919 
Although some divergence ‘from England and Wales can be expected in the form of 
compensation for claimants affected by the social sector size criteria ("bedroom tax”) through 
a new housing assistance benefit’920 this does little to alter the fact that the level of Universal 
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Credit payments will continue to be determined by Westminster. As will eligibility criteria. 
This lack of control over eligibility criteria results in a lack of ‘control over the sanctions 
imposed for breach of these conditions, arguably the greatest threat to claimants’ ability to meet 
their essential needs in the contemporary social security system. The legislation also prohibits 
the use of devolved benefits to negate the effect of a sanction applied to a reserved benefit’.921 
As such, devolved social security competencies in Scotland ‘remain limited in their 
extent.’922 Consequently, to echo Simpson et al, knowledge that “social security” is being 
devolved without understanding of the nuances is likely to lead some to anticipate changes to 
the main out-of-work benefits that Holyrood cannot deliver at present.’923 Consequently, ‘if 
DWP continues along the retrogressive path of recent years, then from a claimant’s perspective 
the social security system as a whole is unlikely to improve regardless of the evolution of 
devolved benefits.’924 For these reasons, whilst acknowledging the differences in approaches 
between the nations of the UK, this thesis address destitution in the UK homogenously and 
does not undertake individual analyses for the devolved powers. As such, austerity in the UK 
is addressed holistically. 
In the UK austerity measures ‘are often simply called ‘cuts.’’925 Such cuts have been a 
feature of UK policies since 2010926 when, in response to the global financial crisis, the UK’s 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition government ‘announced a programme of 
austerity to be imposed across the country, involving deep cuts to public services that were 
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deemed economically unviable.’927 The UK, alongside other European Union member states, 
had been encouraged to implement austerity measures by the European Union with the 
intention being ‘to restore economic stability across the region.’928 
In relation to destitution, these ‘very severe,’929 ‘deep and punishing’930 cuts targeted the 
public sector, public services and the welfare state. Bell and Cemlyn highlight the link which 
exists between the combined effects of cutting welfare, wages and public services ‘and 
consequent rises in unemployment and deprivation.’931 Although destitution existed in the UK 
long before the austerity imposed since 2010, this point demonstrates the cruciality of 
understanding austerity as the context of destitution currently. 
Before austerity, for many individuals the component rights of my definition were 
realised to the destitution threshold through the state provision of services and benefits. During 
austerity, these same services and benefits have been cut. The cuts which these services have 
suffered have undermined them and have reduced the UK’s welfare state to ‘a much more 
minimalist system of social protection.’932 I contend that these cuts have therefore undermined 
the realisation of the component rights to the destitution threshold and in section 5.6. I will 
extend this analysis to argue that austerity, as designed in the UK since 2010, has been 
inherently destitution inducing.  
In relation to cuts to social welfare provision, austerity has been made more palatable 
 
927 Emma Craddock, ‘Caring About and For the Cuts: A Case Study of the Gendered Dimension of Austerity and 
Anti-Austerity Activism’ (2017) 24 Gender, Work and Organization 69, 69. 
928 Sargent and Kotobi (n 890) 259. 
929 Clarke et al. (n 868) 150. 
930 Kim Allen, ‘Whose Crisis Counts? Intersectionality, Austerity and the Politics of Survival’ (2018) 41 Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 2301, 2301. 
931 Bell and Cemlyn (n 47) 826. 
932 O’Cinneide, ‘Austerity and the Faded Dream of a “Social Europe”’ (n 869) 186. 
  
 155 
for the UK’s populace through a ‘public narrative’933 which has allowed the emergence and 
establishment of a ‘new welfare commonsense.’934 This commonsense holds the cause of the 
crisis to be ‘an overgenerous, bloated and ineffective welfare state rather than the reckless 
behaviour of financial institutions and the political elites that enabled them.’935 Specifically, the 
welfare system was cited as the ‘the principle cause of welfare dependency and public sector 
debt.’936 
This narrative holds welfare dependency to be inherently bad and is reliant upon the 
portrayal of the welfare recipient as a deceptive scrounger, and figure of social disgust, which 
in turn ‘enables the state to retreat from providing basic levels of welfare support with reliance 
on charity becoming the norm for many.’937 This new commonsense has not only shifted the 
‘blame’ for creating the need for austerity but has also been used to blame the impoverished 
for their own condition. Through portraying the welfare recipient as a deceptive scrounger, it 
is suggested that those in receipt of welfare can, if they so wish, improve their own condition 
through their own choices. This has led to an ideological shift in relation to welfare 
conditionality. Although welfare conditionality in the UK predates the period of austerity since 
the global financial crisis,938 an element of this austerity has been a ‘‘punitive turn’ in 
conditionality governing benefit receipt.’939 Thus, since 2010 conditionality has been extended, 
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personalised (according to individual circumstances and needs) and intensified.940 Labelled 
‘welfare austerity’, this ‘fundamental restructuring’ of the UK’s welfare system has altered the 
relationship between citizen and state to one of more constrained welfare provision.941 
This restructuring has centred around two mechanisms. Fitness for Work testing and 
Sanctions. Significant changes to the social security provision catered towards disabled people 
have occurred since the introduction of Employment and Support Allowance in 2008.942 Fitness 
for work testing is used to determine whether or not an individual should be categorised as, or 
should remain categorised as, being exempt from some aspects of welfare conditionality. This 
testing has taken the form of ‘fundamentally flawed’943 work capability assessments. The role 
of these assessments was to reduce the numbers of people determined by the state as being 
incapable of paid employment by redefining these people as being fit for work.944 Thus, a more 
restrictive approach was adopted with respect to determining individuals as incapable of work 
and this in turn increased ‘the expectation that the majority of disabled people will make an 
effort to (re)enter paid work and this is enforced through toughened benefit sanctions.’945  
It can be inferred that mistakes have been made in classifying individuals as fit for work 
in some cases. For example, ‘2,380 people have been found to have died as a result of being 
found fit for work which, in some circumstances, would have seen individuals lose benefits.’946 
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Of the forty-nine such deaths investigated by the DWP twenty-percent of the deceased ‘had 
their benefits sanctioned at some stage.’947 Additionally, Mills highlights calculations that ‘80 
people per month are dying in the UK after being found ‘fit to work’.’948 Although the DWP 
asserts that, as the causes of death were not recorded in collecting this data, ‘‘no causal effect 
between the benefit and the number of people who died should be assumed’949 it is suggested 
that these figures demonstrate that errors may be made in determining individuals as fit for 
work. When such errors do occur, as these figures demonstrate, the effects may be devastating 
for those subjected to them. These effects are amplified by the fact that individuals who are 
wrongly deemed as fit for work may be unable to meet the conditions imposed upon them by 
the increased conditionality resulting from such a determination. Failing to meet such 
conditions may result in individuals becoming subject to the second mechanism. Sanctions. 
Imposed when individuals fail to meet the conditions imposed upon them, sanctions 
constitute a suspension of social security payments950 and in the context of austerity are ‘being 
used much more widely and frequently than ever before.’951 These sanctions are used as a tool 
by which to force those individuals subject to them into wage-labour.952 This is with the aim of 
reducing social security expenditure. However, in practice, such sanctions do not result in 
individuals immediately, if at all, entering wage-labour.  As such, at least for the period of the 
sanction or sooner if the individuals enter wage-labour, there will be a period of time in which 
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sanctions often effectively leave those subject to them ‘without disposable income.’953 Due to 
this reduction in disposable income, many of those subject to sanctions had to reduce their food 
consumption whilst some ‘had been left to scrounge for food from skips or bins, or had had to 
resort to begging to feed themselves.’954 
Additionally, those subject to sanctions often had to rely on charitable sources of food 
provision, such as foodbanks.955 Demonstrated by the rising number of foodbanks within the 
UK since the global financial crisis and especially so ‘since the introduction of austerity 
policies from 2011 onwards,’956 a clear correlation exists between austerity and the use of 
foodbanks. Combined with fact that increased food bank usage has been correlated to increased 
rates of benefit sanctioning and other elements of austerity,957 it is contended that food banks 
evidence the pertinence of austerity to an analysis of destitution within the UK. This is because 
foodbanks demonstrated how increased conditionality as a result of austerity policies have 
fostered increasingly precarious modes of living which in turn have contributed to significant 
uncertainty.958 In relying on charitable donations, often from the local area,959 food banks clearly 
evidence the existence of my third destitution theme: vulnerability – in this instanced evidenced 
through a reliance on discretionary transfers namely charitable assistance.  
The pertinence of this example rests on the fact that one of my component rights, the 
right to food, is commonly only realised in the UK via the use of foodbanks. That is via a 
charitable source. The implications of this in the sphere of human rights have been addressed 
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in greater detail above,960 however for the purposes of this section foodbanks serve to 
demonstrate the relevance of austerity to destitution. This contention rests on the fact that all 
three of the destitution themes which I have highlighted are evidenced in the usage of 
foodbanks. Combined with the fact that foodbanks are intimately connected to the right to food, 
a component right of my rights-based definition of destitution, it is argued that foodbanks 
inherently relate to destitution. It follows that, if foodbanks are a direct response to the 
outcomes of austerity driven policies, austerity driven policies and austerity more generally 
inherently relate to destitution. 
5.5. Effects of Austerity  
In 2014, it was observed by the Social Security Advisory Committee that there exists a lack of 
clarity concerning the cumulative effect of austerity influenced welfare reform. This lack of 
clarity is said to stem from the treatment of individual policies in isolation with respect to 
impact assessments961 and in 2013 there had ‘been no systematic attempts to understand the 
cumulative impacts of all of the Government’s reforms on claimants, their households and the 
communities in which they live.’962 
Wilson et al provide an overview of the reforms to benefits announced since the 
coalition government took office in 2010. These include changes to tax credits; changes to 
housing benefit for private renters; changes to deductions taken from Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Benefit; restricting contributory employment and support allowance to one year; 
replacing the disability living allowance; abolishing council tax benefit; introducing the 
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‘bedroom tax’; introducing a household benefit cap; limiting the increase of benefits; and the 
introduction of universal credit.963 Furthermore, welfare reforms have been disproportionately 
felt by some groups more than others partly because a number of reforms simultaneously affect 
some groups more than others, ‘making the cumulative financial loss greater.’964 
It is clear from this overview that these reforms cannot be treated in isolation. 
Consequently, the government’s failure to examine the cumulative impacts of these policies 
may be regarded as a failure to adequately assess the true impact of any policy. This is because 
the impacts of policies are not experienced in isolation from each other.  Consequently, the 
Social Security Advisory Committee has observed that ‘it is likely, however, that the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts’ and that as such impact assessments should ‘evaluate the 
overall impact of this reform programme.’ 965  
In a 2017 Report, the Child Poverty Action Group provide a comprehensive overview 
of the cumulative impact of the austerity measures announced in 2010, 2012, and 2015.966 The 
cumulative effect of welfare reforms following The Welfare Reform and Work Bill 2015-16 
has been estimated to result in ‘a real terms cut of 8% between 2012 and 2019’967 for those in 
receipt of benefits. In addition to this, studies have predicted that ‘seven million low-income 
households will see their incomes lower by on average £31 per week by 2020 in cash terms, as 
a consequence of cumulative welfare changes – equivalent to a reduction in welfare spending 
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of more than £11 billion per year.’968 The impacts of this can be seen in the finding of a 
cumulative impact assessment by Liverpool City Council which found that the cumulative 
effects of previous and new welfare reforms ‘are likely to increase the number of citizens 
requiring support from the scheme.’969 Troublingly, concerns have also been raised that the 
perceived advantages of universal credit are undermined by earlier welfare reforms.970 
In analysing these cumulative impacts, Edmiston observes that ‘cumulatively, welfare 
austerity has made the material and symbolic benefits of social citizenship ‘increasingly 
conditional, exclusive and selective.’’971 Additionally, Wilson and Foster observe that the 
cumulative impacts of the most significant changes to the welfare system are ‘growing year on 
year.’972 As such, given the clear interrelationship between the many austerity influenced 
welfare reforms which have occurred in the last decade, this thesis addresses the austerity 
project holistically with some focus on specific policies used to illustrate general points. 
The analysis above demonstrates the inherent links between austerity policies and rising 
destitution levels in the context of the UK. Austerity has impoverished not only those 
dependent on welfare but also working families.973 This point serves to evidence the claim that 
austerity has broadened the scope of those at risk of destitution by bringing the threat of 
deprivation and destitution to a broader population within the ‘recently relatively affluent 
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world.’974 More so, this demonstrates the paradox of welfare conditionality.  This is because 
this conditionality aims to encourage individuals into wage-labour despite the fact that such 
labour does not allow individuals to avoid impoverishment. Combined with weakening social 
protection, and as such increasing impoverishment, austerity has transformed the global 
financial crisis into a crisis of health and social wellbeing. Therefore, austerity has had 
implications outside of the economic sphere and a side-effect of austerity – as a treatment for 
the financial crisis – has been to negatively impact health and social wellbeing.   
This crisis has been argued to harm the most vulnerable and disadvantaged in society.975 
This is because the cuts have disproportionality affected poor,976 ‘lower income, working-
age,’977 ‘sick and disabled’978 people. This is not only true within countries but is also the case 
in the global sense.979 In the context of the UK, ‘research confirms that the most deprived areas 
and communities have been hardest hit by cuts.’980 This aids in understanding the fact that by 
2017 only the top 1% of UK households had returned to pre global financial crisis levels with 
the rest of UK households finding ‘it still more difficult to make ends meet.’981 
Thus, as wealthier households have benefitted disproportionality from austerity 
policies,982 austerity affects the already vulnerable more so than it does other groups. This is 
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because these groups have been the ones most directly affected by austerity cuts whilst at the 
same time these groups have had to take on ‘new and novel responsibilities’ in order to get 
by.983 Thus the level of benefits, and the social protection this provides, have been cut whilst at 
the same time the services which might once have mitigated the effects of such cuts have also 
seen funding reduced.984 Consequently, individuals are unable to access the services they would 
ordinarily rely on to mitigate the effects of  low income985 ‘at the point when they have needed 
them the most.’986 More so, the adverse effects of austerity policies have been 
disproportionately burdened by women.987 This in part due to the increased vulnerability to the 
detrimental effects of cuts to social services faced by women ‘due to multiple forms of 
entrenched discrimination.’988 This is because women are more concentrated in public sector 
jobs, are hit the hardest by cuts they rely upon, and are left to fill the gaps which the cuts 
create.989 
Austerity has inherent implications for people’s health which are both direct and 
indirect in nature.990 Austerity measures cause, or at the least contribute towards, reduced food 
consumption, homelessness ‘and stress-related illnesses, particularly anxiety, depression and 
suicide.’991 These stress related illnesses can not only be compounded by social anxieties 
fuelled by an inability to return to pre-austerity standards of living992 but also by the judgmental 
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attitude shown towards the impoverished as a result of the ‘benefit scrounger’ narrative.993 As 
such ‘welfare cuts can in many instances be shown to have contributed to, or aggravated, 
adverse health consequences’994 whilst at the same time negatively affecting ‘the use of 
healthcare services.’995 
This not only affects people’s physical health but also has implications for their mental 
health which in turn can further diminish their physical health. Increased conditionality has 
been linked to adverse mental health implications996 and austerity induced economic hardships 
have been evidenced to have ‘accumulated or acted as a ‘final straw’ to trigger self-harm.’997 
More so, a strong correlation exists between economic crises, austerity and suicide.998 With, 
albeit disputed, links being drawn between welfare conditionality and several suicides.999 For 
example, 66.4% of Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) recipients had had suicidal 
thoughts whilst 43.2% of ESA recipients had attempted suicide as opposed to 21.7% and 6.7% 
respectively in the general population.1000 However, ‘death in relation to austerity doesn’t occur 
solely through suicide.’1001 The above paragraphs demonstrate that austerity diminishes the 
initial health of individuals’ whilst at the same time diminishing health care provision. These 
twin contentions can be used in supporting the argument that austerity has contributed to excess 
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mortality with findings suggesting that austerity in England has been linked to 120,000 excess 
deaths between 2010 and 2017.1002  
Building upon such reasoning, Grover has argued that changes to social security 
provision in the UK since 2010 has constituted social murder1003 and along a similar vein I have, 
elsewhere, explored the potential for such austerity influenced policies to be considered as 
crimes against humanity.1004 This is especially so given the findings of the CRPD that the UK’s 
impact assessments ‘prior to the implementation of several measures of its welfare reform 
expressly foresaw an adverse impact on persons with disabilities’1005 and the CRPD’s view that 
‘there is reliable evidence that the threshold of grave or systematic violations of the rights of 
persons with disabilities has been met in the State party.’1006 
5.6. Austerity in the United Kingdom Since 2010 as Inherently Destitution Inducing  
These policies - and in fact the austerity project in the UK since 2010 as a whole – were 
envisioned to be supplemented by the idea of the ‘Big Society’. The big society was envisioned 
to fill the void left by the retreating state. As part of the Conservative Party’s election platform 
in the 2010 General Election, the idea of the Big society ‘became a central plank’1007 and 
‘guiding principle’1008 of the coalition government’s policies following that election. Ishkanian 
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argues that the Big Society project should be understood ‘as a neoliberal type of policy’1009 
underpinned, Kisby argues, by the implicit idea ‘that the state is bad and almost anything else—
the free market, charities, volunteers—is better.’1010 A conjoined-twin to the austerity 
undertaken in 2010, the Big Society was an attempt to ‘roll- back the state and encourage 
citizens to take responsibility, via community and voluntary groups, for provision of public 
services at a local level.’1011 Thus, the delivery of public services by ‘charities and the voluntary 
sector’1012 was to be promoted. 
 One justification for this was that it would shift power to a more local level allowing 
individuals and communities ‘to take decisions and solve problems themselves.’1013 Thus, the 
state has been replaced as the provider of some services and the local level replacement of state 
provision ‘by volunteer-led groups with reduced funding has been termed ‘austerity 
localism.’’1014 This placed ‘great emphasis’1015 on ‘charitable tradition’1016 and necessitated 
‘nurturing people’s altruism, generosity of time and spirit.’1017 As such, the idea of the Big 
Society was, amongst other factors, ‘based on extensive use of voluntary sector provision’1018 
which was to develop a greater role than it had previously had.1019 This resulted in third sector 
organisations taking ‘on a growing share of services previously delivered through statutory 
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agencies.’1020 This has been deemed, by some, to have offered to recast the ‘relationship 
between public sector and ‘third sector’ of voluntary, community and neighbourhood 
organizations’1021 in order to change the balance between the public and the private sectors.1022 
However, for others this represents a reliance on ‘volunteerism to hide the failed state.’1023 
 This reliance on volunteerism and charity, which I term charitable assistance, can be 
criticised in it fails to prioritise actual service need which, Evans contends, risks a postcode 
lottery and ‘wide local variations in volume, focus and quality of support services’1024 
determined by the ‘availability and generosity of local residents.’1025 As well as this, this relied 
upon the assumption that third sector and civil society organisations could ‘recruit and motivate 
volunteers.’1026 However, some communities would lack individuals with the interests, time, 
motivation, and capacity to allow for adequate services to be provided.  
Although the idea of the Big Society was prominent between 2010 and 2015 it ‘did not 
succeed or endure and was barely mentioned in the 2015 general election.’1027  Despite this, I 
contend that it succeeded in recasting the relationship between the provision of public services 
and charitable assistance providers. This lasting recasting has resulted in, what I contend to be, 
societal structures which are inherently destitution inducing. This is because, inherent to 
traditional conceptions of destitution, as explored in chapter 2.2. and chapter 3.4., is a need to 
rely on charitable assistance. Central to the idea of the Big Society is to replace the provision 
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of public services with charitable assistance. Thus, as the Big Society was designed to foster a 
use of charitable assistance – where once the state provided – it is, I contend, inherently 
destitution inducing under the traditional definition, the JRF definition, and my human rights-
based definition of destitution. This notion can be further illustrated with the contention that ‘it 
is difficult to dispute Webster’s conclusion that the sanctions regime is “designed to reduce 
people … to complete destitution” given that single adult jobseekers without dependants could 
be left with zero income after housing costs for periods of up to three years for repeat 
failures’.1028 
Not only this, but a reliance on charitable assistance to realise human rights is, I have 
argued above, not compatible with human rights standards.1029 This is because it takes away 
the entitlement element of the right and removes the possibility for individuals to make a 
legitimate claim if the charity provider fails to provide adequately.  In the following chapter I 
will elaborate upon this point in my analysis of the normative content of the component rights 
in the UK.1030 Consequently, even if it is not accepted that a reliance on charitable assistance 
is indicative of destitution more broadly understood, it follows that a reliance on charitable 
assistance is not compatible with my human rights-based destitution definition. I therefore 
contend that austerity, as envisioned, designed, and implemented in the UK since 2010, has 
been inherently destitution inducing under my definition for those who have come to rely - as 
a consequence of austerity twinned with Big Society policies - on charitable assistance to 
access the physical substance of the component rights.  
5.7. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has traced the last decade of austerity within the UK including its justifications 
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and its effects. More so, I have explicitly argued that austerity in the UK since 2010, by being 
designed to foster a reliance on charitable assistance, has been inherently destitution-inducing. 
The implications of this are numerous. However, given that this thesis defines destitution from 
a human rights-based perspective the most pertinent of these is that this recasts destitution in 
the UK as a failure to realise ESCRs caused by government policy. It therefore follows that 
alternative government policies can work to address destitution. Considering this reasoning 
alongside the work of Griffiths and Kippin, who argue that even when the need for austerity is 
accepted ‘several options are available—as the differing responses to post-austerity policy 
around the globe show,’1031 it can be contended that this destitution definition can be used to 
inform future austerity policies. 
Thus, it can be reasonably imputed from the analysis within this chapter that austerity 
has a range of implications for destitution within the UK; both for the realisation of the 
component rights and for the attainment of the destitution threshold. Having set the context 
from which these elements must be understood within the UK, in chapter 6 I will evaluate 
destitution in the UK. This is achieved by determining what the destitution experience entails 
in the UK. Following this, in chapter 7, I offer recommendations for addressing destitution in 
the UK. 
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Chapter 6:  Destitution in the United Kingdom from a Human 
Rights Perspective 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter will apply the human rights-based definition of destitution outlined in part one of 
this thesis to the context of the United Kingdom (UK). In order to do this the twin elements of 
this definition must be contextualised into the UK. Given that I have contended that the 
highlighted component rights are universally applicable in defining destitution from a human 
rights-based perspective, the focus of this chapter will be the second element of my definition: 
the destitution threshold. Given that what amounts to destitution varies between the context of 
states, under my definition, it is the destitution threshold which differentiates what constitutes 
destitution between contexts. Although the component rights are universally applicable, it is 
the level of realisation of these component rights which determine an individual to be destitute. 
Thus, this chapter will consider and assess the means and levels of realisation of the component 
rights in the UK. 
Clearly, therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to determine the context specific 
destitution threshold of each individual component right within the context of the United 
Kingdom. As was made clear in chapter 3.2., an individual will be deemed destitute under my 
human rights-based definition of destitution if one or more of the component rights is not met 
to the destitution threshold. Consequently, there is no need to consider the component rights as 
having a composite nature within my definition. However, as the analysis below will make 
expressly clear, it is often the case that, in the UK the realisation of any one component right 
to the level of destitution threshold is, in practice, dependent on at least one of the other 
component rights also being met to the level of the destitution threshold. In the UK, if one 
component right is not met up to the level of the destitution threshold it is almost certainly the 
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case that the same is true of other component rights. Although this is often the case in other 
states, the focus of this thesis is the UK and, in the context of the UK, there exists a strong 
interrelationship between the realisation of the component rights. For example, the Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living cannot be realised to the appropriate levels to avoid destitution 
whilst at the same time its constituent parts, the rights to housing, water, sanitation, food, and 
clothing remain unrealised to those same levels. Not only this but, in the UK, socially 
acceptable access to water and sanitation is intimately linked to housing. Water, in turn, is 
required to clean and prepare food, to clean clothes, and to clean the home whilst the home in 
turn provides a place to store clothing and food and also a place to prepare food safely and 
securely. 
As will be recapped in the following section, it was established in chapter 3 that the 
destitution threshold is made up of the minimum core obligation supplemented with a second 
standard of obligation.1032 Given the supplementary nature of this second standard, the 
destitution threshold will always be at least equal to, if not greater than, and never less than the 
minimum core obligation. The minimum core obligation, as I have demonstrated in chapter 3, 
is representative of the destitution theme of survival needs. However, I have argued that the 
minimum standards with respect to freedom from vulnerability and indignity require that the 
correlative minimum core content of the component rights is realised without reliance on 
charitable assistance. Thus, the supplementary – contextually specific - standard of obligation 
must go beyond this minimum requirement with respect to vulnerability and indignity to be 
informed by a contextually appropriate understanding of vulnerability and indignity.1033 
As survival needs are universal in nature, an analysis of the normative content of the 
component rights can aid in determining what constitutes dignified realisation free from 
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vulnerability. In determining the standard of realisation which constitutes the destitution 
threshold for each component right, it is therefore crucial to consider the extent to which the 
substance of each component right is available, affordable, accessible, acceptable, and of 
sufficient quality. The consideration of the normative content alongside the destitution themes 
of indignity and vulnerability can be justified for two main reasons. Firstly, because it is by 
using these destitution themes that the analysis will remain specific to destitution. Secondly, as 
will be argued below, the destitution themes of dignity and vulnerability overlap with aspects 
of the normative content in a multitude of ways.  
This chapter will firstly establish that the supplementary standard aspect of the 
destitution threshold is, in the UK, greater than zero. That means, therefore, that in the equation 
given in figure 4 the UK’s destitution threshold – that is the level of rights realisation to be 
achieved without reliance on charitable assistance - is more than the minimum core obligation. 
Following this, the normative content will be explored with a section assigned to each of the 
five elements of AAAAQ. For each aspect of the normative content, the section will explore 
what that means in the UK context by reference to the (non)realisation of various component 
rights. Following this, the destitution threshold for each component right will be established 
before this chapter concludes by establishing a working-human-rights-based definition of 
destitution which is applicable to the UK context. 
6.2. The Level of Realisation Required to Meet the Destitution Threshold in the UK as 
Greater than the Minimum Core 
The minimum core obligation was given detailed attention in chapter 3 of this thesis. In the 
section addressing criticisms of the ‘Minimum Core Obligation Approach’ it was highlighted 
that the approach may not be appropriate in the context of economically developed nations and 
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I reaffirm this argument here.1034 It is important to be clear and explicit in this regard. If, in the 
United Kingdom, an individual’s component rights are realised only to the level of the 
minimum core obligation that individual is destitute under my definition. More so, an 
individual is destitute if the component rights are realised only by a reliance on charitable 
assistance. 
Therefore, using the model set out in chapter 4 which is represented by figure 4, the 
universal element of the destitution threshold must be supplemented in order to determine the 
UK’s destitution threshold. The remainder of this chapter will work towards completing this 
supplementation. This will be achieved by contextualising the destitution themes in analysing 
the means and levels of realisation of the component rights. The themes of survival needs, 
vulnerability, and indignity are representative of the destitution experience. As such they can 
guide the determination of the UK’s destitution threshold.   
For my purposes, survival needs constitute the level of realisation of each of the 
component rights required in order to ensure human survival. In considering only the 
component rights I argue that these survival needs are universal in nature. Given that the 
minimum core obligation is representative of survival needs, the theme of survival needs is 
encapsulated into the human rights-based destitution threshold from the outset. This is given 
the place of the minimum core obligation as the base from which the destitution threshold is 
determined.  The second requirement of the universal destitution threshold baseline is that there 
is no reliance on charitable assistance. Based upon my examination of existing conceptions of 
destitution it is clear that this is a defining feature of destitution. The requirement that there is 
no reliance on charitable assistance to realise the component rights is, I argue, representative 
of a minimum universal standard with regard to the destitution themes of vulnerability and 
 




This notion of considering a minimum standard with respect to vulnerability and dignity 
as part of the universal destitution threshold baseline can be supported in considering Graham’s 
conception of the minimum essential level of the realisation of the right to social security 
allowing for ‘survival with dignity.’1035 Thus, under my rights-based definition of destitution, 
the universal destitution threshold – that is the minimum threshold below which an individual 
is considered destitute – is comprised of two requirements: firstly, realisation of the minimum 
core obligation and, secondly, the requirement that there is no reliance on charitable assistance 
to realise the component rights. This first element is representative of survival needs and the 
most minimal standards with respect to the destitution themes of vulnerability and dignity. This 
baseline destitution threshold must, however, be supplemented in order to ensure contextual 
relevance. This is because, beyond the most minimal standards with respect to vulnerability 
and indignity, which pertain to avoiding a reliance on charitable assistance, vulnerability and 
indignity may have different manifestations in different contexts.  
As such the supplementary level of obligation, as the aspect of the destitution threshold 
which allows the destitution threshold to be contextualised, must be informed by the remaining 
destitution themes: vulnerability and indignity. These three themes were explored in greater 
detail in chapter 2 and an in-depth exploration need not be repeated here. Concisely, however, 
each of these themes can be summarised for my purposes here. Survival needs are those needs 
which must be met in order to subsist and, as my analysis in part one made clear, for my 
purposes these survival needs are the physical substance of the component rights of my 
definition. The theme of vulnerability encapsulates the notion of precariousness yet also goes 
beyond this to include implications for physical security. Indignity, as I stressed in part one, is 
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a contested concept. However, the destitution theme of indignity has a plethora of faces with 
implications for autonomy, connotations of stigma, and precariousness. As is clear from this, 
the context-sensitive themes of vulnerability and indignity can be broadly interpreted. As such, 
they give great scope for ensuring that context specificity is central to my human rights-based 
definition of destitution. This is because both vulnerability and dignity may mean different 
things in different contexts. The broadness of these concepts can, however, be narrowed when 
these rights are considered jointly alongside, firstly, the AAAAQ framework and, secondly, the 
de facto realisation of the component rights in context.  
6.3. The Normative Content of the Component Rights in the UK 
6.3.1. Availability 
In terms of the normative content of the component rights, availability means that the substance 
of the right is available for use and/or consumption. For example, in relation to food aid, 
availability relates to the ability of food aid providers to source food which may be impacted 
by a range of logistical barriers.1036 It follows that availability relates to the ability to source 
the resource, in this example food, which is the substance of the right, in this instance the right 
to food. In relation to the component rights, this means that there is food, water, sanitation, 
housing, and clothing of sufficient quality which, although it may not be any combination of 
accessible, affordable, or acceptable, exists.  
In the context of the UK, it is plain that the physical substance of the component rights 
does indeed have the potential to be made available. There exist empty homes, food in 
abundance, a well-established water and sanitation network, clothing aplenty, and a system of 
social security.   Together, the potential availability of these resources has the potential to 
ensure that every individual has an adequate standard of living.  However, this potential is not 
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realised, and individuals go without sufficient access to these necessities. Thus, it is clear that 
despite the physical substance of the component rights existing and as such being potentially 
available other barriers exist to the realisation of the component rights to sufficient levels and 
as such these resources are not always available to individuals to allow the enjoyment of rights. 
One such barrier is affordability which may result in individuals relying upon charitable 
assistance such as food aid. Even if my contention that an individual is destitute if they rely on 
charitable assistance in attaining the physical substance of a component right is refuted, a 
reliance on charitable assistance can still be criticised from a human rights-based perspective 
in considering the normative framework. For example, food aid providers, who will be utilised 
as an example throughout this chapter, face issues of availability as they are constrained by the 
structure of the food system in making food available.1037 This is because, linking to the 
discussion of vulnerability above1038 there may come a point when food aid providers are 
unable to acquire food and this has been noted as occurring at food banks in a number of 
developed nations.1039 If such providers are unable to acquire new food, and the old food they 
have available is dispensed there will come a point when these providers have no food left to 
distribute. Thus, under right to food standards ‘the availability of food within these systems is 
not sustainable.’1040  The same reasoning can be applied to the realisation of any of the 
component rights which rests upon charitable assistance. Consequently, despite resources being 
available in the structure of the system as a whole, potential barriers to accessing food for both 
individuals as well as charitable assistance providers exist. This poses an issue as if a resource 
becomes unavailable to charitable assistance providers that same resource consequently 
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becomes unavailable to those who are reliant upon the charitable assistance system to attain 
those resources. 
This is indicative of the interrelationship between the various aspects of the AAAAQ 
framework. Using the example of social housing, I contend that a lack of availability can lead 
to a lack of affordability. In regard to housing, at the same time as there being an abundance 
there also exists an insufficient supply of ‘social housing to house those who desperately need 
it.’1041 As social housing is more affordable than ‘increasingly expensive private rented 
accommodation’1042 it follows that a lack (non-availability) of more affordable social housing 
results in housing being less affordable. 
6.3.2. Affordability 
In the UK there is a reliance on the market in order to provide access to the resources required 
to ensure the realisation of the component rights. For example, Lambie-Mumford states that 
‘in the UK, approaches to ensuring everyone has access to healthy food has been left to the 
operation of markets, consumer choice and a social welfare system which is meant to enable 
those lacking employment to be able to purchase food.’1043 This demonstrates the importance 
of the right to social security and its links to the realisation of the right to food and, I argue 
other, component rights. More so, this has resulted in a policy void in respect to food insecurity 
within the UK.  This policy void exists because realisation of the right to food has been left to 
market forces.1044 Riches and Silvasti contend that this constitutes a displacement of the right 
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to food by a need to buy food in the market.1045 This supposed displacement can be aligned 
within the AAAAQ framework provided that sufficient and acceptable food remains affordable 
and as such accessible. However, ‘more and more people who are living in advanced industrial 
societies simply cannot afford to buy their food normally in the marketplace.’1046 This has 
implications for the affordability and accessibility of food.1047 
This reasoning can be extrapolated and applied to the remaining component rights – 
with the exclusion of the right to social security – to state that the realisation of the component 
rights in the UK has been left to market forces with the role of social security being envisioned 
to ensure that people have the financial means to engage with the market. This necessarily 
grants prominence to the concept of affordability. An individual with sufficient financial means 
can afford to access housing, clothing, food, water and sanitation which is both acceptable and 
of sufficient quality. This is because they will use their financial means to buy food and clothing 
as well as rent or purchase a home which in turn will allow access to: water and sanitation; the 
means to store and prepare food; and the means to store and clean clothing. However, an 
individual without such financial means, for whatever reason, will be unable to afford to 
acquire these resources through the market. Thus, (un)affordability acts as a barrier to 
accessing the resources required to realise the component rights. It follows that one aspect of 
the destitution threshold in the UK is that the resources required to realise the component rights, 
that is the physical substance of the rights, are affordable. 
Affordability is multi-faceted. This is because affordability necessitates an analysis of 
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an individual’s income alongside the cost of accessing, for my purposes, the resources which 
align to the various component rights. Although I have already highlighted that income-based 
determinations of poverty, and consequently destitution, are not appropriate in determining a 
human-rights based definition of destitution: affordability is fundamentally about income. As 
such the Joseph Rowntree Foundation minimum income standard approach offers an existing 
model by which to determine that which is affordable in the UK. More so, despite being 
relevant to the poverty, and consequently the destitution, discourse the minimum income 
standard ‘does not claim to be a poverty threshold.’1048 The minimum income standard is 
instead portrayed as the standard of living deemed to be acceptable by members of the 
public.1049 This is because some individuals may attain an acceptable standard of living despite 
being below the minimum income standard whilst others, for example those who face 
additional needs due to ‘living in a remote location or having a disability’, may not be able to 
attain an acceptable standard of living despite having an income level above the minimum 
income standard.1050 This standard of living goes beyond food, clothes, and shelter to also 
include ensuring that individuals have what they need to ‘have the opportunities and choices 
necessary to participate in society.’1051 The minimum income standard is the level of income 
required to cover needs and necessities as opposed to wants and luxuries and as such it is 
informed by identifying things that everybody should be able to afford.1052 
Although similar to a shopping basket approach, by which an income figure is arrived 
at by adding up the cost of a basket of essential goods, the minimum income standard is more 
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generous than such a shopping basket approach.1053 Padley and Hirsch find that a single person 
requires £17,900 whereas a couple with children require £20,400 each in pre-tax annual income 
in order to attain the minimum income standard. These figures are ‘substantially’ above the 
official poverty line in the UK.1054 
This suggests that there is a disconnect between what the UK government regards as 
poverty and what the UK public regard as being an acceptable standard of living. This 
contention can be supported by comparing these figures to wages and benefits in order to assess 
the adequacy of these respectively.1055As is made clear by figure 5.1, the minimum wage in the 
UK provides an income which is, I contend substantially, below that of the minimum income 
standard. 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the national minimum wage, even for those aged 25 and 
over who are entitled to a higher rate of pay, does not reach the minimum income standard. 
This is evidenced further by Dowler’s suggestion that ‘social security benefits and the National 
Minimum Wage are falling further behind actual costs of food and other necessities as well as 
average income.’1056 As such despite how carefully individuals manage their finances, 
‘research has regularly shown that those on benefits or the statutory minimum wage have 
insufficient money to buy the food they need for health.’1057 These observations demonstrate 
that work does not guarantee freedom from poverty.1058 More so, it is observed that the 
minimum income standard figures are from 2017 whereas the minimum hourly wage figure 
 
1053 Sam Royston, Broken Benefits (Policy Press 2017) 27. 
1054 Padley and Hirsch (n 122) 10.  
1055 ibid 1. 
1056 Elizabeth Dowler, ‘Food Banks and Food Justice in “Austerity Britain”’ in Graham Riches and Tiina Silvasti 
(eds), First World Hunger revisited: Food charity or the Right to Food? (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 160–175, 
165. 
1057 Kayleigh Garthwaite, Hunger Pains: Life Inside Foodbank Britain (Policy Press 2016) 123. 
1058 Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: Visit to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (n 5) para 18. 
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are from 2019. As the minimum wage has increased between 2017 and 2019 this suggests that 
the gap between the minimum income standard and the income derived from employment on 
minimum wage is even greater than presented here.  
Figure 5.1: Comparing the Minimum Wage with the Minimum Income Standard 
(MIS)1059 
Age Range 25 and over 21 to 24 18 to 20 Under 18 Apprentice 
Minimum Hourly Wage: 
April 2019  
 
£8.21 £7.70 £6.15 £4.35 £3.90 
Annual Wage:  
Minimum Hourly wage x 
40 x 52 
 
£17,076.80 £16,016 £12,792 £9,048 £8,112 
Deviance from the MIS 
for a Single Person 
(£17,400) 
 
-£823.20 -£1,884 -£5,108 -£8,852 -£9,788 
Deviance from the MIS 
for a Same Age Couple 
with Children (£20,400 











1059 The hourly rates of pay change every April. These Figures are from April 2019 and are taken from the UK 
Government website. The annual wage row is of my own working and has been calculated by multiplying the 
hourly rate by 40 (hours per week) and then multiplying this by 52 (the number of weeks in the year). The deviance 
has been calculated by subtracting the MIS from the annual wage. UK Government ‘National Minimum Wage 




Figure 5.2. Comparing Benefit Entitlement for a Singleton Over the Age of 251060 with the 
Minimum Wage and the Minimum Income Standard (MIS)1061 
Income level Weekly Monthly  Annual 
Universal Credit Standard Allowance 
(UCSA)1062 
 
£94.59 £409.89 £4918.68 
Housing Costs Allowance (HCA) 1063   
 
£90.90 £393.90 £4726.80 
Total allowance = UCSA + HCA 
 
£185.49 £803.79 £9645.48 
Deviance from Minimum wage of Total 
Allowance 
 
-£142.91 -£619.28 -£7431.32 
Deviance from MIS of Total Allowance 
 
-£149.12 -£646.17 -£7754 
 
Despite the fact that wages at the lower end of the employment market are, upon this 
 
1060 Given that single individuals over the age of 25 have the lowest deviance from the Minimum Income Standard 
(see figure 5.1) I have elected to use this category of individuals when comparing the date in figure 5.1 with 
benefit entitlements. The data in figure 5.2 shows that even this group who fare relatively better in the comparison 
between minimum wage and the minimum income standard do not receive an income from benefits which is in 
anyway comparable to the incomes in figure 5.1. This suggests that the other categories of individuals from figure 
5.1. fare equally less well.  
1061 Numbers in bold are those taken from the government webpages. The other values are of my own working 
and are determined by either i) dividing the annual figure by 52 (for a weekly figure) or by 12 (for a monthly 
figure) or ii) multiplying the weekly figure by 52 or the monthly figure by 12 
1062 This UCSA monthly allowance is taken from the government website. ‘Universal Credit’ (GOV.UK) 
<https://www.gov.uk/universal-credit/what-youll-get> accessed 21 April 2020. 
1063 Individuals in receipt of Universal Credit may be eligible for Housing Support Allowance ‘Housing Costs and 
Universal Credit’ (GOV.UK) <https://www.gov.uk/housing-and-universal-credit/renting-from-private-landlord> 
accessed 21 April 2020; The housing support entitlement is determined by reference to Local Housing Allowance 
(LHA) Rates. The level of this rate varies by location. For indicative use, I have chosen to use LHA rates from 
my hometown. As of 21/04/2020 the LHA for my postcode, which is in the Oldham and Rochdale Broad Rental 
Market Area (BRMA), is £90.90 per week if the claimant is entitled to 1 bedroom or is £66.39 per week if the 
claimant is entitled to shared accommodation. As this data is presented indicatively, I will use the higher figure 
of £90.90 per week. Direct Gov, ‘Local Housing Allowance Rates Calculator’ <https://lha-
direct.voa.gov.uk/search.aspx> accessed 21 April 2020; In 2016, my hometown Oldham was found to be the Most 
Deprived town in England by the Office of National Statistics. Combined with the fact that the focus of this thesis 
is destitution and given that this data is presented indicatively, I believe that my use of the Oldham figure is 
justified. ‘“Most Deprived” Towns and Cities Named’ BBC News (18 March 2016) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-35842488> accessed 21 April 2020. 
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analysis, clearly insufficient, the coalition government which came to power in 2010 ‘linked 
benefit adequacy with wages; repeatedly stating that people should be better off in work than 
on benefits.’1064 Grover highlights that the centrality of such sentiments rests upon ‘perceived 
consequences of people receiving financial relief at a level comparable with wages for the 
poorest paid labourers.’1065 In order to avoid these perceived consequences there is a reliance 
upon the misguided notion that ‘people must be kept in poverty if they are workless to ensure 
that they are incentivised to take wage work when it is available.’1066 Thus social security policy 
has not been designed with the question of how much is enough in mind and this question has 
been a secondary consideration.1067  
As such, welfare payments have risen at a rate below inflation.1068 This means that 
welfare payments are well below the minimum income standard.1069 Thus, the social security 
system has been deliberately designed to ensure that those who are able to work – but do not 
for whatever reason – are worse off than those in minimum wage. On account of this, given 
that the minimum wage does not meet the minimum income standard, the adequacy of benefits 
must also be called into question. This is because the level of benefit provision has been 
designed to be at a lower level of income than can be achieved in minimum wage work. If 
minimum wage work does not allow for people to meet the minimum income standard, it 
follows that benefit provision does not meet the minimum income standard. This directly links 
 
1064 Graham (n 826) 173. 
1065 Chris Grover, ‘Employment and Support Allowance, the “Summer Budget” and Less Eligible Disabled 
People’ (2015) 30 Disability & Society 1573, 1574.  
1066 ibid 1576. 
1067 Walker (n 193) 56. 
1068 Oette (n 326) 673. 
1069 Padley and Hirsch (n 122) 1 highlight that of those on out of work benefits ‘a single, working-age person, 




to my analysis of austerity in the UK since 2010 as being destitution inducing.1070  
Clearly, therefore, the right to social security is of particular pertinence here as this right 
is supposed to protect people from losing access to such necessities due to issues of 
unaffordability. However, I contend that the current social security system in the UK fails to 
ensure that individuals can afford to access the resources required to ensure that their 
component rights are realised to the destitution threshold. This is because social security has 
been targeted for austerity savings in a number of ways. For example, a four-year freeze 
preventing the rise of benefits has been a social security related measure. This freeze is 
expected to be the ‘biggest policy driver behind the expected rise in poverty’ between the 
November 2017 Budget and 2020/21.’1071 This has been labelled a hidden cut1072 to social 
security as although the amount of cash in recipients’ pockets will stay the same the amount 
they will be able to afford with that amount of money has reduced.1073  
From this I contend that welfare payments in the UK are not at a high enough level to 
ensure that the component rights are affordable to individuals in receipt of welfare. Despite the 
fact that one reason of ‘providing benefits is the prevention of poverty,’1074 out of work benefits 
are ‘typically well below the relative poverty line.’1075 Thus, social security payments in the 
UK, especially out of work benefits, rarely protect individuals in receipt of them from poverty 
and hardship causing a lack of financial resources which prevents ‘individuals from being able 
 
1070 See chapter 5.6. 
1071 JRF, ‘Briefing for November 2017 Budget: Incomes Not Keeping up with Prices’ (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation 2017) 2 <https://www.jrf.org.uk/file/50627/download?token=NeLxLf0n&filetype=briefing> 
accessed 6 February 2020. 
1072 Royston (n 1053) 103. 
1073 ibid 111. 
1074 Paul Spicker, How Social Security Works (Policy Press 2016) 6. 
1075 Royston (n 1053) 28. 
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to participate fully in mainstream society.’1076 
As well as this, welfare conditionality has taken a ‘punitive turn.’1077 This has, in the 
UK, resulted in an increased use of sanctions1078 – that is a full or partial suspension of benefit 
payments – which has been described as having the most dramatic impact under austerity.1079 
Despite the fact that out-of-work benefits are well below this minimum income standard, the 
increased use of sanctions has further cut the amount of income individuals receive from 
benefits and thus increased the challenge of unaffordability.1080 Even hardship payments which 
are available during periods of sanction are ‘typically paid at 60% of the rate of their’ benefit 
entitlement.1081 This further exacerbates already stretched incomes.  
More so, under Universal Credit, these hardship payments are paid as a loan which is 
repaid via deductions from future universal credit payments.1082 If Universal Credit rates are 
already insufficient to meet the minimum income standard, and if the level of these payments 
is reduced to repay a hardship loan, it follows that the adequacy of benefit payments is 
undermined rendering these payments furtherly insufficient. Consequently, sanctions often 
effectively leave individuals ‘without disposable income’1083 and studies have highlighted that 
this may lead people to ‘borrow from unscrupulous lenders, enhancing vulnerability and 
stress’1084 whilst also cutting down on food or resorting to less than ideal approaches to 
 
1076 Ruth Patrick, For Whose Benefit? The Everyday Realities of Welfare Reform (Policy Press 2017) 203. 
1077 For an overview of this punitive turn which is indicated by increased use of sanctions see Grover, ‘Violent 
Proletarianisation: Social Murder, the Reserve Army of Labour and Social Security “Austerity” in Britain’ (n 939) 
4–5. 
1078 Edmiston (n 936) 263. 
1079 Oette (n 326) 676. 
1080 Royston (n 1053) 230. 
1081 ibid 225. 
1082 ibid. 
1083 Oette (n 326) 689. 
1084 ibid 690. 
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acquiring food.1085 Not only are some of those on low incomes unable to afford sufficient food, 
but additionally, De Schutter highlights that, due to the fact that other expenses such as rent are 
incompressible, food expenditure may be the first area in which those on low incomes seek to 
make savings.1086 This notion of prioritising expenditure out-goings has been typified in the 
‘heat or eat’ dilemma: that is having to choose between spending money on eating food or 
heating the home.1087 
A lack of income from which to afford adequate food supports the view that ‘income 
poverty is the main reason for food poverty.’1088 However, chronic low income alone has been 
found not to be the primary reason for seeking assistance from foodbanks.1089 Rather this low 
income makes individuals vulnerable to fluctuations in income and income crises1090 and this 
links strongly to the destitution theme of vulnerability. The leading causes of referrals to the 
Trussell Trust in 2015 were ‘benefit delays (30.93 %); low income (20.29 %); benefit changes 
(16.97 %); debt (7.85 %); and refusal of a crisis loan (4.29%)1091 and this aligns with the view 
that income shocks are a greater cause of foodbank use than low income alone. Benefit delays 
are especially worrying as an applicant to universal credit often has nowhere else to turn and 
 
1085 Including searching bins and skips for food see ibid; see also BBC News, ‘Hungry Children “eating from 
School Bins” in Morecambe’ 10th January 2019’ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-
46827360> accessed 29 August 2019; see also –A couple who were informed that they would not receive any 
benefits for a year were arrested and charged with theft after taking discarded food from Tesco bins Anonymous, 
‘Judge Takes Pity on Tesco Food Bin Thieves’ The Telegraph (12 May 2015) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/11600376/Judge-takes-pity-on-Tesco-food-bin-
thieves.html> accessed 29 August 2019. 
1086 Olivier De Schutter, ‘Foreword’ in Graham Riches and Tiina Silvasti (eds), First World Hunger revisited: 
Food charity or the Right to Food? (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) ix–xi, x. 
1087 Garthwaite (n 1057) 121. 
1088 Silvasti and Riches (n 1039) 206. 
1089 Rachel Loopstra and Doireann Lalor, ‘Financial Insecurity, Food Insecurity, and Disability: The Profile of 
People Receiving Emergency Food Assistance from The Trussell Trust Foodbank Network in Britain’ (The 
Trussell Trust 2017) 2 <https://trusselltrust.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2017/06/OU_Report_final_01_08_online.pdf> accessed 18 June 2019. 
1090 ibid. 
1091 Just Fair (n 509) 95. 
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as such, if universal credit fails them or they have to wait to receive their first payment, they 
have no choice but to turn to food aid.1092 This further supports my analysis that austerity 
influenced social security policies in the UK since 2010 are destitution inducing. This is 
because it is the design of the structures through which people access benefits which is causing 
individuals to use charitable assistance and thus experience destitution. Whether the primary 
cause is low income or in fact income shock the issue of (un)affordability is at the forefront 
and this has implications for the affordability of food. For example, Taylor and Loopstra’s 2012 
research project found that 28% of adults reduced their own food consumption to ensure others 
in their household could eat whilst at the same time ‘4% of children lived in families who could 
not afford to feed them properly.’1093 
As well as this, (un)affordability has been highlighted as a particular pertinent issue in 
regard to accessing adequate housing.1094 These observations have been made specifically in 
relation to those in receipt of housing benefit given that ‘for many tenants there was a large 
gap between the amount they received in housing benefit and the rent required on any property, 
whatever the quality.’1095 This further evidences my above contention that’s social security 
rates are not high enough to ensure that individuals can afford to access their component rights. 
Hohmann cites 67% of local authorities in England having reported ‘that welfare cuts since 
2010 had increased homelessness in their area.’1096 This highlights the pertinence of social 
security to ensuring that the poorest in our society are able to access adequate housing. More 
so, previous links have been drawn between reductions in housing benefit within the UK and 
 
1092 HRW (n 1047) 85. 
1093 Anna Taylor and Rachel Loopstra, ‘Too Poor to Eat: Food Insecurity in the UK’ (The Food Foundation 2016) 
7 <https://foodfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/FoodInsecurityBriefing-May-2016-FINAL.pdf> 
accessed 18 June 2019. 
1094 Clark et al. (n 1041) 36. 
1095 ibid. 
1096 Hohmann (n 530) 13. 
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vulnerability to eviction and homelessness.1097 Combined with these ‘deep cuts to social 
welfare benefits’1098 a lack of availability (or supply of housing), unaffordability caused by 
high and increasing costs, a ‘lack of security of tenure, and homes of such poor quality that 
they are unfit for habitation’1099 have come together to contribute to a housing crisis in which 
‘exceptionally high numbers of people are homeless, or vulnerable to homelessness.’1100 
Described as a fundamental failing1101 in welfare support, cuts to the Local Housing 
Allowance (LHA) have seen LHA fall to rates which are ‘insufficient to enable low-income 
households to find alternative accommodation if they lost their home, causing 
homelessness.’1102 Being impoverished therefore leaves individuals at risk of eviction and, due 
to the difficulties faced in finding new accommodation, in turn homelessness.1103 
As well as the examples of food and housing given in the preceding paragraphs, 
(un)affordability has implications for clothing. For example, Members of the Scottish 
Parliament have, in recent years, raised concerns that school uniform costs are too high with 
rising costs leaving ‘far too many families struggling to cope’1104 and ‘pupils from low-income 
families are being penalised or excluded’1105 as failure to purchase the appropriate or correct 
uniform can see children excluded from lessons. For example, a student whose trousers did not 
 
1097 O’Connell, ‘Let Them Eat Cake:  Socio-Economic Rights in an Age of Austerity’ (n 976) 64. 
1098 Hohmann (n 530) 3. 
1099 ibid. 
1100 ibid. 
1101 Clark et al. (n 1041) 4. 
1102 ibid. 
1103 ibid. 
1104 BBC News, ‘Schools Told “Cut Excessive Uniform Costs”’ (12 July 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-




touch the top of her shoes was excluded from class and ‘placed in another room’1106 and 6% of 
children whose parents responded to one study had been sent home from school for wearing 
incorrect uniform.1107 Royston and Jacques estimate that this amounts to almost half a million 
children having been sent home ‘because of wearing incorrect uniform.’1108  
As well as impacting the child’s education, which has rights implications in itself, the 
cost of uniforms has resulted in parents being forced to choose between feeding their children 
and buying them the clothing required.’1109 People are going hungry in order to afford the cost 
of purchasing school uniforms.1110 A 2018 study found that 17% of parents cut back spending 
on ‘food or other basic essentials’ in order to meet school uniform costs.1111 3% took on debt 
and 10% borrowed money from someone else.1112 Royston and Jacques estimate that in 2018 
330,000 more families had to cut back on food and other basic essentials due to uniform costs 
than in 2015.1113 Thus, the problem is only worsening. The DfE itself notes that 18% ‘of 
parents/carers reported that they had suffered financial hardship as a result of purchasing their 
child’s school uniform.’1114 
 
1106 BBC News, ‘Pupil with “too Short” Trousers Taken out of Class in Nottinghamshire’ (5 September 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-49592200> accessed 16 September 2019. 
1107 Sam Royston and Rebecca Jacques, ‘The Wrong Blazer 2018: Time for Action on School Uniform Costs’ 
(The Children’s Society 2018) 6 <https://www.childrenssociety.org.uk/sites/default/files/the-wrong-blazer-
report-full-compressed_0.pdf> accessed 6 September 2020. 
1108 ibid 7. 
1109 BBC News, ‘Schools Told “Cut Excessive Uniform Costs”’ (n 1104). 
1110 Royston and Jacques (n 1107) 6; BBC News, ‘Schools Told “Cut Excessive Uniform Costs”’ (n 1104); BBC 
News, ‘New Guidance Promised on Branded School Uniforms’ (5 September 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-49591950> accessed 6 September 2019. 
1111 Royston and Jacques (n 1107) 6. 
1112 ibid. 
1113 ibid 7. 
1114 Elizabeth Davies, ‘Cost of School Uniform 2015’ (Department for Education 2015) 11 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/436576/RR4
74_Cost_of_school_uniform.pdf> accessed 6 September 2019. 
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Such financial hardship was, however, less likely if the school allowed all items of the 
uniform to be purchased anywhere.1115 This is because such policies allow parents to ‘shop 
around’. Some schools receive a financial incentive by entering into single supplier contracts 
which allow only one retailer to provide items branded with their logos.1116 As well as this, 
requirements that students have a particular type of uniform such as trousers with a certain 
piping or embroidered badges also increase the costs associated with uniforms. In one school 
students were excluded from lessons as their ‘trousers did not have purple piping.’1117 In this 
example, one parent was quoted as stating they were ‘not paying [for] ridiculous, overpriced 
trousers that have got a bit of purple trim on the top.’1118 Costing between £20-£22 the official 
trousers, distinguished by the purple lining, were twice as expensive as non-official trousers. 
More generally, a UK government inquiry heard that blazers, trousers, and socks can be three-
times more expensive ‘when embroidered with school logos.’1119  
A 2015 Department for Education research report found that the average total 
expenditure on school uniform between September 2014 and February 2015 was £212.88.1120 
However, this varied by both gender and school age. The average cost of uniform during this 
period for males was £192.14 in primary school and £231.01 in secondary school.1121 Female 
uniform costs were, on average, more expensive at £201.04 and £239.93 for primary school 
and secondary school respectively.1122 It is important to keep in mind that these figures may not 
accurately represent the true academic-yearly cost of school uniform in that the study captured 
 
1115 ibid. 
1116 BBC News, ‘New Guidance Promised on Branded School Uniforms’ (n 1110). 
1117 BBC News, ‘Stoke-on-Trent School Puts “wrong Trousers” Pupils in Isolation’ (5 September 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-stoke-staffordshire-45420905> accessed 5 September 2019. 
1118 ibid. 
1119 BBC News, ‘New Guidance Promised on Branded School Uniforms’ (n 1110). 





the expenditure between September and February as opposed to the full British academic year 
which is September to July. More so, it is worth noting that the majority of this expenditure 
would likely be concentrated in a short window between mid-July and September – the back-
to-school sales period – as this is when larger retailers stock a wider selection of back-to-school 
supplies. Thus, in that this expense will be concentrated in a particularly small window it may 
constitute an income shock especially for those on already inadequate incomes who are unable 
to set money aside – on account of having little to no disposable income after the cost of 
necessities - throughout the year. 
6.3.3. Accessibility 
As I have shown above1123 social security ought to act as a safeguard to prevent 
(un)affordability acting as a barrier to the attainment and realisation of the component rights. 
However, social security itself raises issues of accessibility. Accessibility in terms of social 
security may be considered alongside the concept of welfare conditionality. This is because 
conditionality may act as a barrier to access by presenting obstacles such as ‘registering and 
applying for jobs.’1124 Barriers of accessibility include a requirement to ‘job hunt’ using 
specific online portals which in turn require internet access and a device capable of accessing 
the internet. As well as this, Armstrong highlights that, as Universal Credit applications can 
only be made online this new social security policy is inaccessible to the poorest 20%.1125 
Additionally, the preceding section has demonstrated the potential that 
(un)affordability has to act as a barrier to accessing the component rights. However, economic 
 
1123 See chapter 4.3.7. 
1124 Yvonne Hartman and Sandy Darab, ‘The Hidden Costs of Injured Dignity: An Exploration of One Effect of 
Workfare Policies’ in Robert Garbutt (ed), Activating Human Rights and Peace: Universal Responsibility 
Conference 2008 Conference Proceedings (Centre for Peace and Social Justice 2010) 260–269, 265. 
1125 Armstrong (n 156) 142–143. 
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(un)accessibility – that is (un)affordability – does not necessarily act as a barrier to individuals 
accessing the substance of the rights. This is because individuals have resorted to a number of 
mechanisms in response to the seemingly impossible balancing of multiple expenses which 
their limited incomes simply cannot afford. 
 One such mechanism has been charitable assistance. Prominent examples of this 
include school uniform banks and food banks.  In relation to school uniforms, uniform banks, 
which have been described as being similar to foodbanks,1126 have emerged. One such uniform 
bank has been described as being overwhelmed by demand.1127 The Edinburgh school uniform 
bank ‘was set up in response to reports that school children were asking Santa for basic school 
uniform items and underwear for Christmas.’1128 Through collecting donations of money and 
clothes this organisation puts ‘together ‘Back to School’ packs for children from families in 
need.’1129 This organisation has seen applications for help rise from 233 to 472: an increase of 
102.58% between 2017 and 2018.1130 School uniform banks can operate under a referral 
system, for example the Cumbernauld and Kilsyth Care School Uniform Bank provides a 
mixture of new and second-hand items free of charge to families in need.1131 Those making 
referrals for the Edinburgh Uniform Bank include head teachers and social workers for such 
reasons as domestic violence, low income, and benefit delays.1132 As well as this, some parents 
have taken to swapping uniform with other parents – including through the use of social media 
 
1126 BBC News, ‘Cannock Free School “uniform Bank” Overwhelmed by Demand’ (8 August 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-stoke-staffordshire-45116723> accessed 6 September 2020. 
1127 ibid. 
1128 Joanne Macaulay, ‘School Uniform Costs: Children “Asking Santa for Basic Items”’ (BBC News, 1 August 
2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-49072123> accessed 6 September 2019. 
1129 ibid. 
1130 Angie Brown, ‘Sharp Rise in School Uniform Grants in Edinburgh’ (BBC News) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-48511816> accessed 6 September 2019. 
1131 Anonymous, ‘School Uniform Grants Still Unequal’ (BBC News, 11 August 2017) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-40889900> accessed 6 September 2019. 
1132 Brown, ‘06/06/2019’ (n 1130). 
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groups1133 and ‘research by the BBC found over 34,000 members of 100 groups on Facebook 
that have been set up to swap uniforms online.’1134 This demonstrates how (un)affordability 
will not always act as a barrier to accessibility 
The same is true in regard to food. Increasingly individuals ‘are coming to depend on 
food aid’1135 and Livingstone highlights that charities have come to provide the means to 
address food poverty.1136 Food aid may take a number of forms. In the context of the UK 
charities have been identified as the primary providers of food aid with foodbanks being 
especially highlighted as ‘prolific providers of emergency food aid across the UK.’1137 
However, the concept of accessibility is undermined when access to food is only 
acquired through food aid. This is because the structures and procedures of food aid providers 
may also limit accessibility.1138 For example, the Trussell Trust, which is the largest food aid 
provider in the UK, operates a referral system.1139 Food aid recipients must be referred by a 
gatekeeper who provides a voucher to be exchanged for food aid.1140 These gatekeepers are 
usually front line professionals and are referred to as ‘voucher holders.’1141 Given that such 
professionals are often state welfare professionals this is indicative that food aid provision is 
increasingly embedded within the UK’s welfare system with these vouchers being regarded as 
 
1133 Rebecca Wearn and Rob England, ‘School Uniform: Can It Be Bought More Cheaply?’ (BBC News, 13 
August 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-49090913> accessed 6 September 2019. 
1134 Anonymous, ‘Back-to-School Uniform Swap-Shop Is Dorset Mum’s Mission’ (BBC News, 21 August 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-england-dorset-49397392/back-to-school-uniform-swap-shop-is-dorset-
mum-s-mission> accessed 6 September 2019. 
1135 Riches and Silvasti (n 1045) 4. 
1136 Nicola Livingstone, ‘The Hunger Games: Food Poverty and Politics in the UK’ (2015) 39 Capital & Class 
188, 189. 
1137 ibid. 
1138 Silvasti and Riches (n 1039) 203; Lambie-Mumford (n 1037) 92. 
1139 Livingstone (n 1136) 190; Garthwaite (n 1057) 37. 
1140 Lambie-Mumford (n 1037) 89–90. 
1141 Garthwaite (n 1057) 43. 
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‘an important addition to the toolkit of professionals within, in some cases, state-funded 
services.’1142  
More pertinently for this analysis, the use of such a voucher system may act to prevent 
access to food aid. This is because the gatekeeper may not, in their judgment, choose to refer 
an individual. This argument may be extrapolated to apply to the realisation of any of the 
component rights which relies on charitable assistance including, inter alia, uniforms banks 
which also operate referral systems.  As well as this, specifically in relation to food aid, the 
Trussell Trust operates a three-voucher policy aimed at preventing dependency.1143 This is 
indicative of the time-limited nature of the support provided by foodbanks.1144 Although in 
some circumstances this policy is waived, this policy prevents individuals receiving food aid 
from the Trussell Trust more than three times in any six-month period.1145 This limits the 
amount of assistance an individual may receive in regard to food aid and is indicative of the 
vulnerability faced by those utilising foodbanks in order to access food. 
A final criticism of charitable assistance from an accessibility perspective can be made 
from a discrimination perspective. This is because charitable assistance providers do not have 
the same obligations of non-discrimination as the State. Take, as an example, the practice of 
‘souperism’ by which only those who were willing to convert from Catholicism to 
Protestantism were provided with food by protestant soup kitchens in the 19th Century.1146 Thus, 
the potential exists for individuals to be denied access to such services based on discrimination. 
Not only do issues of accessibility manifest themselves in regard to referrals but the 
 
1142 Lambie-Mumford (n 1043) 16. 
1143 Livingstone (n 1136) 190; HRW (n 1047) 26. 
1144 HRW (n 1047) 26. 
1145 Lambie-Mumford (n 1037) 90; Livingstone (n 1136) 190. 
1146 Tom Shiel, ‘Mass Remembers “Soup for Convertees” during Famine’ Independent.ie (2011) 
<https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/mass-remembers-soup-for-convertees-during-famine-26772848.html> 
accessed 18 February 2020. 
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nature of such aid providers means that they may be geographically or temporally inaccessible. 
This refers to the notion of ‘food deserts’ which are areas ‘poorly served by food store’.1147 This 
notion can be extended beyond food stores to also include food aid providers. For example, an 
individual may not have their own car and, if their income is so low that they have been 
referred, may not be able to afford public transport in order to travel to the aid provider. This 
means that although they have the potential to access the aid, they are unable to do so due to 
other factors such as being geographically separated from the aid provider’s base. The opening 
times of the aid provider may also act as a barrier to accessibility. This is because if an 
individual is in need of such charitable assistance despite being employed the charitable 
assistance provider may not be open – and as such accessible - outside of that individual’s 
working hours. These geographical and temporal examples demonstrate that aid providers may 
not always be accessible.  
However, even when aid providers are accessible that is no guarantee that the aid itself 
is accessible. This is because if the resource in which the aid provider deals becomes 
unavailable to aid providers, it follows that aid recipients will no longer be able to access via 
aid providers. Thus, insecurity of availability for the aid provider, as outlined above,1148 also 
creates insecurity of accessibility for the aid recipient.  
As well as this charitable assistance providers may have their activities disrupted which 
in turn prevents those reliant upon such aid from accessing the content of the right in question. 
For example, The Bread and Butter Things surplus food supermarket, a charity which ‘works 
on a system where members pay £7 for a bag of fresh food that would have otherwise gone to 
 
1147 Scott Corfe, ‘What Are the Barriers to Healthy Eating in the UK’ (Social Market Foundation 2018) 5 
<http://www.smf.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/What-are-the-barriers-to-eating-healthy-in-the-UK.pdf> 
accessed 18 June 2019. 
1148 See section 6.3.3.  
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landfill,’1149 had two of their four vans stolen. This resulted in the cancellation of planned 
sessions which in turn prevented 250 families from being served on one day alone.1150 Thus 
families who had planned to access food using this mechanism were unable to do so and, more 
so, were left in a situation in which they were unable to ‘get that amount of food for the same 
amount of money at a supermarket.’1151 On account of these factors, the receipt of food aid – 
and I argue other charitable assistance - is not guaranteed and ‘is unprotected for those who do 
gain access’1152 who in turn are vulnerable to losing access. This links, strongly, to the analysis 
of the big society as destitution inducing in chapter 5.6 and the discussion of charitable 
provision, in chapter 2.2, upon which this built.  
6.3.4. Acceptability  
What is clear from the above analysis is that even when (un)affordability acts as a barrier to 
purchasing essentials these essentials can be accessed in other ways. Namely through charitable 
assistance. However, as I have demonstrated above reliance on such provision raises a number 
of issues especially in relation to vulnerability to loss of access. Not only this, but charitable 
assistance raises a number of issues in relation to acceptability. Firstly, the extent to which the 
aid provided is acceptable and, secondly, the extent to which the use of charitable assistance is 
acceptable.  
In relation to whether the aid provided is acceptable it can be argued that reliance on 
charitable assistance makes individuals vulnerable to having their needs and preferences 
overlooked. Specifically, in relation to the right to food, individuals in receipt of food aid ‘have 
 
1149 Adam Maidment, ‘Thieves Steal Two Vans from Surplus Supermarket Service before Dumping Them in 
Street’ (Manchester Evening News, 26 September 2019) 
<ttps://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/thieves-steal-two-vans-surplus-
16971389> accessed 26 September 2019. 
1150 ibid. 
1151 ibid. 
1152 Lambie-Mumford (n 1037) 93. 
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to accept charity food in spite of their actual needs and preferences.1153 This may raise issues of 
quality which will be explored in the following section.1154 This reasoning can be extended 
beyond this food-based example to contend that those who rely on charitable assistance to meet 
their essential needs have little choice but to accept that which is offered to them. This 
disregards that which is acceptable to the individual. This also necessarily results in individuals 
losing ‘part of their freedom of choice and inherent human dignity’1155 and I question the extent 
to which, on account of this, charitable assistance is acceptable.  
More strongly however, the work of Lambie-Mumford, who dedicates an entire chapter 
of her 2017 book on the rise of food charity in the UK1156 to exploring ‘the question of whether 
receiving food from emergency food providers is an acceptable process of obtaining food, by 
right to food standards,’1157 can be used to argue that charitable assistance provision is not an 
acceptable means of realising the component rights. In relation to acceptability Lambie-
Mumford highlights ‘otherness’ as being ‘highly problematic when exploring notions of 
‘acceptability’ in a right to food context.’1158 This otherness rests on the fact that unlike those 
who acquire food through the marketplace, those in receipt of food aid are no longer purchasers 
and selectors of food. Instead, they are recipients ‘stripped of their agency and choice (a key 
value in the contemporary food system in the UK).’1159 Utilising the theme of social 
(un)acceptability, Lambie-Mumford’s chapter’s findings suggest that under right to food 
standards ‘emergency food provision is not an acceptable means of food acquisition.’1160 
 
1153 Riches and Silvasti (n 1045) 9. 
1154 See section 6.3.5.  
1155 Riches and Silvasti (n 1045) 9. 
1156 Lambie-Mumford (n 1037) ch 4. 
1157 ibid 57. 
1158 ibid 58. 
1159 ibid 73. 
1160 ibid 58. 
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This links to the destitution theme of indignity and can be expounded upon with 
reference to stigma. Middleton et al. analysed a range of food bank studies finding that food 
bank users had their pride challenged by the experience and that using foodbanks ‘made them 
feel inadequate as providers for their families, causing feelings of embarrassment  and  
shame.’1161 This shame and felt - or internal – stigma ‘appears to be a very real barrier to people 
accessing food banks, and can also be expected to exert a negative impact on psycho-social 
health over and above the impact on physical health caused by poor nutrition.’1162 Stigma, and 
other negative feelings, also have implications for dignity with a number of food bank users 
feeling that foodbank use negatively impacted their dignity.1163 This serves to evidence, further, 
that a reliance on charitable assistance – by engaging the destitution theme of indignity – is 
central to the destitution experience in the United Kingdom. 
On top of all of this, a reliance upon charitable assistance to meet people’s essential 
needs is a deflection, by the state, of its responsibilities in regard to the realisation of the right 
to food1164 with there being concern that foodbanks ‘are, in practice, becoming a substitute for 
an adequate social security system.’1165 According to Alston, such charitable food aid provision 
‘is not an adequate substitute for a Government fulfilling its obligations. Food banks cannot do 
the Government’s job.’1166 This can be considered alongside De Schutter’s contention that 
‘nowhere should governments be allowed to escape their obligations because private charities 
 
1161 Georgia Middleton et al., ‘The Experiences and Perceptions of Food Banks amongst Users in High-Income 
Countries: An International Scoping Review’ (2018) 120 Appetite 698, 701. 
1162 ibid 706. 
1163 ibid 702. 
1164 Sue Booth, ‘Food Banks in Australia: Discouraging the Right to Food’ in Graham Riches and Tiina Silvasti 
(eds), First World Hunger revisited: Food charity or the Right to Food? (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 15–28, 15–
16. 
1165 Just Fair (n 509) 97. 
1166 Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: Visit to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (n 5) para 1.  
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make up for their failures. When people come to depend on charity for basic foodstuffs, it is a 
signal that their right to food has not been sufficiently respected, protected and fulfilled.’1167 
Booth contends that more structural solutions must be sought to address food poverty and that 
currently this has not occurred as charitable food responses have dominated the response to 
food poverty.1168 This is because charity, in this regard, merely perpetuates the failings of the 
state. For example, concerns have been raised that, by transferring the responsibility of food 
insecurity to charitable assistance, ‘food banks may actually contribute to the problem of food 
insecurity, rather than solve it.’1169 
As such, the arguments throughout this section on acceptability can be used to contend 
that if an individual is only able to realise one or more of their component rights using 
charitable assistance then they are destitute under my definition. This can be supported using 
the example of food aid in that a number of authors have linked the use of foodbanks to 
destitution with Loopstra and Lalor suggesting that people using foodbanks ‘experience severe 
food insecurity and forms of destitution.’1170 More specifically, Garthwaite has contended that 
‘the increased use of foodbanks in particular, is indicative of destitution.’1171 
6.3.5. Quality 
Reliance on charitable assistance also has implications for the quality of rights realisation in 
that the quality of charitable assistance is below that of accessing resources through the market. 
Pertaining to accessing food via charitable assistance a range of issues are raised in regard to 
quality. Foodbank users have negative perceptions of both the quality and quantity of the food 
 
1167 De Schutter (n 1086) x. 
1168 Booth (n 1164) 16. 
1169 Middleton et al. (n 1161) 699. 
1170 Loopstra and Lalor (n 1089) 46. 
1171 Garthwaite (n 1057) 7. 
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they receive.1172 Tying together the discussion of the acceptability of food1173 as well as to the 
discussions regarding the availability of food above,1174 limited food choice at foodbanks 
results in food bank users having  ‘to take food that they would not regularly eat, did not know 
how to prepare or was inappropriate in terms of cultural or health needs.’1175 This limited 
choice also results in food  that is ‘unhealthy,’ ‘expired,’ ‘mouldy,’ ‘rotten,’ ‘disgusting,’ – in 
sum of ‘sub-optimal’1176 quality - being received.1177 This provision of unsuitable food, which 
Middleton et al highlighted as a reoccurring theme across a range of foodbank studies, has been 
described as a ‘consistent violation of dignity.’1178 Thus, a reliance on charitable assistance to 
attain the physical substance of the component rights has been demonstrated, once again, to 
have implications for the destitution theme of indignity. 
Beyond charitable assistance, unaffordability has its own implications for quality. This 
is because individuals may not be able to access the substance of the component rights of the 
quality required by their additional needs due to issues of unaffordability. An example of this 
is in relation to the quality of housing. Some categories of individuals in receipt of housing 
benefit are limited as to the amount of housing benefit they may claim. For example, those 
aged ‘under 35 with no dependants are only able to claim for the cost of a room in a shared 
house, regardless of whether such accommodation is available or appropriate, for example for 
vulnerable individuals.’1179 Thus, options of the quality required especially by those with 
additional needs are made unaffordable by social security policy. This is because, in this 
 
1172 Middleton et al. (n 1161) 702. 
1173 See section 6.3.4.  
1174 See section 6.3.1.  
1175 Middleton et al. (n 1161) 702. 
1176 ibid 706. 
1177 ibid 702. 
1178 ibid 707. 
1179 Hohmann (n 530) 14. 
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example, such individuals must either choose to live in housing which is not of sufficient 
quality to meet their additional needs or, instead, themselves make up the difference between 
the cost of such inappropriate housing and other more appropriate (and likely more expensive) 
accommodation. Affordability may act as a barrier to this second option thus consigning such 
individuals to housing which is not of a quality to meet their needs. 
Another example relates to the unaffordability of school uniforms. A 2018 study found 
that 11% of children had no choice but to wear ill-fitting uniform whilst 7% wore unclean 
uniform1180 and ‘according to the charity In Kind Direct, one in five parents say they cannot 
afford to wash their children's clothes as often as they would like.’1181 Such sentiments made 
national headlines in 2017 when Siobhan Collingwood, the headmistress of a Morecambe 
primary school, stated that the school’s laundry room was being used ‘pretty much daily’ by 
families who ‘haven’t got a washing machine at home’ or who didn’t have ‘enough money to 
pay for the meter.’1182 Not only does ill-fitting and unclean clothing have the potential to 
negatively impact physical health1183 but also the head of One Parent Families Scotland has 
stated that ‘The cost of school uniforms is leaving many children in low income families at risk 
of bullying and embarrassment because they are sent to school in ill-fitting clothes or in clothes 
which don't meet the dress code.’1184 This demonstrates that ill-fitting and unclean uniforms 
create stigma. At the same time this serves to demonstrate that issues of affordability and issues 
 
1180 Royston and Jacques (n 1107) 6. 
1181 Tom Hepworth, ‘Mobile Laundry Helps School Wash Children’s Uniforms’ (BBC News, 8 February 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-england-dorset-47144398/mobile-laundry-helps-school-wash-children-s-
uniforms> accessed 6 September 2019. 
1182 James Tozer, ‘Schools Are Washing Poor Pupils Clothes and Taking Parents to Food Banks, Claims 
Headteacher Accused of Anti-Tory Crusade’ (Mail Online, 14 December 2017) 
<ttps://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5177581/School-washing-pupils-clothes-says-primary-
headteacher.html> accessed 6 September 2020. 
1183 See chapter 4.3.2.  
1184 Anonymous, ‘Charities Call for Action on School Clothing Grants’ (BBC News, 8 August 2016) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-37002533> accessed 6 September 2019. 
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emanating from a reliance on charitable assistance are undermining the quality of uniforms.  In 
applying this example to the component rights homogenously, I contend that this demonstrates 
that the quality of the component right realisation has the very real potential to be below 
acceptable standards due to issues of affordability. 
6.4. The Destitution Threshold of Each Component Right in the UK 
6.4.1. The Right to Housing 
At a minimum, the minimum core obligation of basic shelter should act as a baseline in 
determining whether an individual is destitute on account of the level of realisation of their 
right to housing. If an individual does not have basic shelter, then they are destitute. However, 
it is clear that the right to housing, and its related minimum core obligations, goes beyond basic 
shelter alone. The notion of adequacy is of pertinence in determining the destitution for the 
right to housing in the UK. 
In the UK context, the Housing Act 1957 defines a standard of fitness and lists matters 
to be taken into account when determining whether a house may be unfit for human habitation. 
This can therefore be used as a guide to determine adequacy. These matters are repair; stability; 
freedom from damp; natural lighting; ventilation; water supply; drainage and sanitary 
conveniences; and facilities for storage, preparation and cooking of food and for the disposal 
of waste water.1185 The Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 adds internal arrangement to this list1186 
and the Homes (Fitness for Human Habitation) Act 2018 amended the 1985 Act.1187 A house 
‘shall be deemed to be unfit for human habitation if and only if it is so far defective in one or 
more of the said matters that it is not reasonably suitable for occupation in that condition.’1188 
 
1185 Housing Act 1957 s 4 (1). 
1186 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s 10 (1). 
1187 Homes (Fitness for Human Habitation) Act 2018 s 1 (1). 
1188 Housing Act s 4 (1). 
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As is clear from this, the assessment of the adequacy of housing in the UK context and 
as such the UK’s destitution threshold for the component right to housing, includes an 
assessment of water supply, drainage and sanitary conveniences, and facilities for storage, 
preparation and cooking of food and for the disposal of wastewater. This assessment therefore 
engages a consideration of the right to water and the right to sanitation. Given that an individual 
is destitute under my definition if one or more of the component rights are not realised to the 
destitution threshold it follows that an individual whose realisation of the component right to 
housing does not meet the destitution threshold is destitute. I argue that in the UK a house 
would fail to meet the destitution threshold of the right to housing if it does not provide 
appropriate realisation of the rights to water and sanitation. Consequently, the analysis of the 
realisation of the rights to water and sanitation must take place within the context of the analysis 
of the realisation of the right to housing. It follows that the realisation of these three component 
rights, within the UK, is tied together. Consequently, an individual who does not have access 
to housing to the level required to surpass the destitution threshold– even if they access to water 
and sanitation – is destitute under my definition. More so, in order to surpass the destitution 
threshold for the right to water and the right to sanitation in the UK, at the very minimum, it is 
required that these rights are realised through the home.  
As was explored in greater detail in chapter 4.3.3 the right to housing should be seen as 
a right to adequate housing which should be adequately private, adequately spacious, 
adequately secure, adequately lit and adequately ventilated, with ‘adequate basic infrastructure 
and adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities ‑ all at a reasonable cost.’1189  In 
the UK context the JRF destitution definition considers – in relation to housing – heating and 
 
1189 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant)’ (1991) 
E/1992/23’ (n 509) para 7. 
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lighting to be essentials.1190 More so, I contend that, given the interrelated nature of the 
component rights, adequate housing in the UK includes the means to store and prepare food. 
These factors go some way to aiding my analysis of what constitutes adequate housing in the 
UK. Such housing allows physical access to utilities. However, physical access to utilities alone 
is not enough. This is because economic accessibility may act as a barrier to individuals using 
gas or electricity. For example, Garthwaite highlights how some individuals using foodbanks 
are unable to prepare the food with which they are provided as they cannot afford the cost of 
the utilities required to prepare the food.1191  
This example shows how the notion of reasonable cost goes beyond simply the cost of 
housing to also include ensuring that the cost of ensuring the house has access to basic facilities 
is also reasonable. This engages the concept of affordability which is plainly an issue in regard 
to housing in the UK and research has found ‘that the contraction of the welfare state, including 
housing benefits, means that over 600,000 low-income households in Britain are in difficulty 
meeting their housing costs.’1192   
One such change to housing benefits has been the bedroom tax. ‘The controversial 
‘bedroom tax’ or ‘spare room subsidy sees housing benefit cut for households considered to be 
‘under occupying’ social housing.’1193 Designed to free up larger (that is under-occupied) 
social housing this policy has raised a number of issues in terms of adequacy of housing. For 
example, some of those who have been affected by this policy are unable to find smaller 
housing in their local area in order to avoid the ‘tax.’1194 Combined with the fact that individuals 
 
1190 Fitzpatrick et al. (n 2) 2. 
1191 Garthwaite (n 1057) 49–51. 
1192 Donald Houston et al., ‘Gaps In The Housing Safety Net’ (Shelter 2014) 50 
<https://england.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/960315/Final_report.pdf> accessed 7 February 2020. 




may be unwilling to move away from their local areas due to personal factors such as ‘such as 
links with schools, family, local community and employment’1195 the tax has in effect failed to 
achieve its aims and instead has simply increased the amount of money individuals have to 
find from elsewhere in order to cover their rent.  
This has implications for how much money people have left over to access the 
substance of the other component rights and also suggests that there is not enough housing of 
the appropriate size available. More so, the ‘tax’ applied does not exempt spare rooms for 
overnight carers for children and ‘in cases where parents are separated, even where parents 
have joint custody only one household is entitled to a room for the child.’1196 These examples 
demonstrate how some who need a spare bedroom are penalised by this policy and, if such 
individuals were to move to smaller housing to avoid this tax, this policy therefore has the 
potential to result in individuals living in properties which are inadequate for their needs. This 
is but one more example of the extent to which a failure of social security policy to account for 
human rights negatively impacts the realisation of the destitution threshold.  
6.4.2. The Right to Water 
On account of the analysis in chapter 4.3.5. it is contended that the minimum core obligation 
pertaining to the right to water correlates to the availability of 20-25 l/p/d. Therefore, if an 
individual does not have access to 20-25 litres of adequate water per day then they are destitute. 
Even so, the AAAAQ framework can serve as a useful guide to go beyond this and identify the 
destitution indicators. Thus availability, accessibility, acceptability, affordability derived from 
economic accessibility and quality assessments will contribute to the assessment of whether an 






The amount of water required must be sufficient to allow the destitution thresholds of 
the various component rights to be met. The most natural link here is the right to sanitation. 
However, as was made clear in chapter 4.3.5., water is also important for the realisation of the 
right to food as it is required in both preparation and cooking. Clothing, also, requires water to 
be kept clean whether that be through the use of a washing machine or washing by hand. Other 
factors such as cleaning the home, which has implications for the right to housing, and personal 
hygiene which forms a part of an adequate standard of living. In the UK, however, an individual 
should always (with the exception of temporary disruptions to supply) be able to access a 
quantity of water sufficient to meet these needs provided that they are able to access water 
through the home.  
Water is available through the national supply systems and water provided through this 
system is of the appropriate quality. Thus, the concepts of accessibility, affordability, and 
acceptability of the means of access are central to determining the destitution threshold for the 
right to water in the UK. In the first instance, and based on the reasoning in the previous section, 
I contend that an individual is destitute in the UK if they cannot access water through the home. 
Thus, those who are homeless, or those whose homes do not provide access to water (except 
in the case of temporary disruption) have their component right to water realised to a level 
below that of the destitution threshold and as such are destitute.  
This is not only a question of the acceptability of access, and the unacceptability of 
homelessness, but also a question of the act of accessing in itself. Accessibility through the 
home is protected in the UK in that water cannot be disconnected from ‘any dwelling which is 
occupied by a person as his only or principal home’… ‘for reasons of non-payment of 
charges/bills.’1197 Thus, even though the water service industry in the UK is privatised, statutory 
 
1197 Water Industries Act 1991 Schedule 4A as amended by of the Water Industry Act 1999 s.1 . 
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provisions ensure that affordability does not prevent access to water by making it illegal to 
disconnect the water supply to some types of property.1198 Although this is a positive 
observation, this is also indicative of the strong links between the realisation of the right to 
water and the realisation of the right to housing in the context of the UK.  Given, as I have 
addressed in section 6.4.1. above, that an individual without access to housing is destitute under 
my definition it follows that an individual who is able to access water but is unable to access 
water through housing is destitute under my definition. 
However, despite the fact that (un)affordability is prevented from acting as a barrier to 
accessing water in the home this does not mean that the (un)affordability of water does not 
have wider implications. Ofwat, the economic regulator of the water sector in England and 
Wales, has been noted to have set targets to water companies including ‘helping 1.5m 
customers who are struggling to pay their bills.’1199 I contend that the fact that individuals are 
struggling to pay for the essential that is water is indicative of wider issues of unaffordability. 
This is because this suggests that incomes are not high enough to pay for life’s essentials and 
this links to the discussion on affordability in section 6.3.2. Affordability.  
6.4.3. The Right to Sanitation  
Combined with the core content of the right to water, it is clear that the minimum core 
obligation of the right to sanitation relates to preventing, treating and controlling diseases. This 
is because a core obligation under General Comment 15 on the Right to water is ‘to take 
measures to prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in particular ensuring access to 
adequate sanitation.’1200 Like the right to water, I contend that the destitution threshold for the 
 
1198 Fitzmaurice (n 678) 556. 
1199 Gill Plimmer, ‘Ofwat Imposes Tough Requirements on Water Companies’ (Financial Times, 18 July 2019) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/ff83aeec-a933-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04> accessed 26 September 2019. 
1200 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2002) UN.Doc. E/C.12/2002/11’ (n 504) para 37 (i). 
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right to sanitation in the UK, at the most basic level, requires that sanitation is accessible in the 
home.  
This is because an individual who cannot access sanitation through housing faces a 
number of issues with regard to the normative content of the right. This was addressed in 
greater detail in chapter 4.3.6. In the UK an individual who relies on sanitation provided outside 
the home may face a number of barriers to use and access. For example, public toilets – if they 
are available - often have opening and closing hours. This engages the concepts of availability 
and accessibility. The concept of acceptability and quality also arise from this.  
There should be, within the home, a toilet which is able to dispose of waste into the 
sewerage network or other appropriate facilities such as septic tanks which removes the risk of 
illness and disease caused by inadequate sanitation facilities. If an individual does not have 
access to housing but does have access to sanitation, they are destitute. Thus, in the UK in 
regard to the component right of sanitation, destitution goes beyond merely accessing the 
substantive content of the right to also include an analysis of the means of access.  
6.4.4. The Right to Food 
Based on the analysis of the right to food in chapter 4.3.4., it is clear that the minimum core 
obligation of the right to food goes beyond merely consuming enough calories to survive. At 
the most basic level, I contend that the minimum core obligation of the right to food is a diet 
that prevents malnourishment.1201 This can be supported through reference to the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food who stated that the CESCR’s General Comment on the Right 
to Health ‘placed a core obligation on states to ‘ensure access to the minimum essential food 
which is nutritionally adequate and safe.’’1202 
 
1201 See chapter 4.3.4. (n 646) 
1202 Italicised for my own emphasis Hilal Elver, ‘Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food’ 
(United Nations 2016) UNDocA/71/282 para 58. 
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However, malnutrition includes obesity.1203 Obesity can often evidence poor diet and it 
is clear that issues of affordability can contribute to this with it being cheaper to purchase the 
same number of calories in unhealthy food than it is to purchase those calories in healthy 
food.1204 Obesity, as a form of malnutrition, clearly has implications for the right to food and 
the right to health. However, to state that all those who are obese are also destitute would be 
too broad a generalisation. Thus, with the exception of obesity related malnutrition and 
malnutrition linked to eating disorders, it is contended that an individual who is malnourished 
would be considered destitute under my definition.  
Garthwaite highlights that ‘in 2015 dangerously poor diets led to the shocking return 
of rickets and gout – diseases of the Victorian age that affect bones and joints – according to 
the UK Faculty of Public Health.’1205 More so, rare cases have been recorded of ‘people visiting 
their GP with ‘sicknesses caused by not eating.’’1206 This is indicative of malnutrition: a diet 
inadequate to maintain human health. This indicative nature can be supported using Just Fair’s 
observation that ‘a growth in the number of malnutrition-related hospital admissions’1207 has 
prompted ‘experts to warn of a public health emergency.’1208 The scale of such admissions is 
small being recorded at 7,366 in the year leading to July 2015.1209 However, it is the rise in 
hospital admissions related to malnutrition which are concerning. According to an Office of 
National Statistics Blog which cites NHS statistics, ‘the figures for admissions with 
 
1203 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’ (2016) E/C.12/GBR/CO/6’ (n 613) para 53. 
1204 Nicholas VR Jones et al., ‘The Growing Price Gap between More and Less Healthy Foods: Analysis of a 
Novel Longitudinal UK Dataset’ [2014] PLOS ONE 9(10) <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0109343>. 
1205 Garthwaite (n 1057) 115. 
1206 ibid. 
1207 Just Fair (n 509) 119. 
1208 ibid. 
1209 Garthwaite (n 1057) 4. 
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malnutrition as a secondary diagnosis were 2702 in 2007-08 and 8417 in 2016-17.’1210 This 
represents a threefold rise in such admissions over a time period correlating to the 
implementation of austerity. However, other factors may be at play and eating disorders may 
also play no small role in this figure.   
Even so, these figures represent only those admitted to hospital as a result of 
malnutrition. In reality the number of malnourished people in the UK at any one time is much 
higher. According to NHS guidance ‘malnutrition is common in the UK, affecting more than 
three million people … at any one time.’1211 In 2014, data showed that ‘8.4 million people in 
the UK faced not having enough food to eat.’1212 More recently in 2016 the CESCR has raised 
concern about ‘increasing levels of food insecurity, malnutrition…and the lack of adequate 
measures to reduce the reliance on foodbanks’1213 in the UK. This suggests that levels of 
malnutrition are rising in the UK.  
 However, that is not to say that three million people are destitute under the right to 
food aspect of my human-rights based definition of destitution. This is because not all of those 
considered medically malnourished are so due to a lack of capabilities to secure adequate 
nutritious food. As was highlighted above malnutrition can also include obesity, and this is one 
example of malnutrition which is not always caused by failures in the realisation of the right to 
food. Other examples may include people choosing to eat a diet which restrict the types of food 
one can eat and doing so in such a way as to inadequately consume the nutrients to stave off 
 
1210 Myer Glickman, ‘Deaths Involving Malnutrition Have Been on the Rise. NHS Neglect Is Not to Blame’ (2018) 
<ttps://blog.ons.gov.uk/2018/02/14/deaths-involving-malnutrition-have-been-on-the-rise-but-nhs-neglect-is-not-
to-blame/> accessed 22 June 2019. 
1211 Siobhan Lendzionowski et al., ‘Guidance – Commissioning Excellent Nutrition and Hydration 2015-2018’ 
(NHS England, 2015) <https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/nut-hyd-guid.pdf> accessed 22 
June 2019. 
1212 Taylor and Loopstra (n 1093) 9. 
1213 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’ (2016) E/C.12/GBR/CO/6’ (n 613) para 53. 
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malnutrition.  As such it may be difficult to determine the exact numbers of individuals who 
are malnourished by way of destitution. Even so, as the preceding analysis throughout this right 
to food section has made clear the use of foodbanks is an indicator of destitution for which 
numbers can be more definitively and confidently reached.  
Even so, the minimum core obligation of the right to food goes beyond the avoidance 
of malnourishment alone. The CESCR also considers the core content of the right to imply that 
food is both available ‘in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of 
individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture’1214 and 
accessible ‘in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere with the enjoyment of other 
human rights.’1215  
Similarly, to levels of malnutrition there has been a marked increase in foodbank usage 
correlating to the implementation and continuation of austerity.1216 This has been labelled a 
‘foodbank explosion.’1217 The Trussell Trust is the main provider of foodbanks in the UK.1218 
Given the scale of this organisation and the fact that it collects and publishes data the analysis 
in this sub-section will focus on the Trussell trust in order to analyse foodbank trends in the 
UK. This excludes other providers of foodbanks from the analysis. However, the purpose is 
not to show exactly how many people are destitute under my human rights-based definition in 
the UK but to instead explore the conditions leading to such destitution under the right to food. 
This is with the purposes of informing recommendations in chapter 7.  
As I contended in section 6.3. above, when individuals must rely on charitable 
 
1214 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art.11) (1999) UN.Doc. E/C.12/1995/5’ 
(n 503) para 8. 
1215 ibid. 
1216 Livingstone (n 1136) 189. 
1217 Garthwaite (n 1057) 2. 
1218 HRW (n 1047) 1.  
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assistance to realise their right to any of the component rights the level of their realisation is 
below that of the destitution threshold. This can be supported further with Royston’s suggestion 
that ‘outright destitution’ includes being unable to keep ‘food on the table’1219 and this notion 
is also a feature of Loopstra et al’s work labelling food insecurity one form of destitution.1220 
As I demonstrated in chapter 2.4.3., insecurity of access – that is precariousness – is 
one aspect of the destitution theme of vulnerability. As such, food bank usage can aid as a guide 
for contributing to determining an estimate of the number of people who are destitute in the 
UK under my human rights-based definition of destitution.  
Between 2009-2017, the Trussell Trust has increased the number of foodbanks it 
operates from 30 to 420 made up of 1,350 distribution centres.1221 Accounting for non-Trussell 
Trust operated foodbanks brings the number of foodbanks in the UK to over 2,000.1222 The 
rocketing number of foodbanks in the UK evidences that ‘a broad base of people in the UK do 
not currently have their potential human rights, as listed in ICESCR, fulfilled.’1223 Since Bell 
and Cemlyn’s 2014 paper which contained these words the problem has only grown in size 
with greater numbers of people relying on foodbanks to obtain food. Such individuals are 
destitute under my definition and as such this necessarily implies that destitution under the 
component right of the right to food is growing in the UK.  
In the decade leading up to 2018 the number of emergency food parcels dispensed by 
 
1219 Royston (n 1053) 313. 
1220 Rachel Loopstra et al., ‘Family Hunger in Times of Austerity: Families Using Food Banks across Britain’ 
(Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute Interdisciplinary Centre of the Social Sciences 2018) 11 
<http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SPERI-Brief-32-Family-hunger-in-times-of-
austerity.pdf> accessed 18 June 2019. 
1221 Loopstra and Lalor (n 1089) 2. 
1222 Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: Visit to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (n 5) para 22. 
1223 Bell and Cemlyn (n 47) 829. 
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the Trust increased by 5,146% from 26,000 to 1.33 million.1224 After accounting for those who 
received such food parcels more than once, in 2014/2015 it is ‘estimated that about 500,000 
different people in the UK received food assistance.’1225 This would suggest that half a million 
people were destitute under the right to food aspect of my definition alone during that period. 
However, the number may in fact be higher. This is because, as was highlighted in section 
6.3.3. above, limits exist with accessing food from the Trust. This may mean that some of those 
who need food aid to realise the substantive content of the right to food do not receive such 
aid. More so, this figure only accounts for food parcels delivered by the Trussell Trust. Thus, 
this figure may be far higher. 
The causes of increased foodbank usage – people’s reason’s for turning to foodbanks – 
can be used to assess the extent to which this figure is indicative of those experiencing 
destitution under the right to food component. Austerity-influenced social policies have come 
to be regarded as a key driver in foodbank usage.1226 Pertaining to hunger, the HRW believes 
that these policies have ‘made a new and growing problem worse’1227 and has  stated that in 
practice benefit sanctions often result in individuals going without food.1228 As well as this the 
Work and Pensions Secretary has now acknowledged the link between increased demand for 
foodbanks and the implementation of Universal Credit1229 which is a policy reforming social 
security. HRW contends that the UK government ignored warnings that growing hunger was 
correlated to the roll-out of universal credit.1230 
 
1224 HRW (n 1047) 1. 
1225 Taylor and Loopstra (n 1093) 6. 
1226 Lambie-Mumford (n 1043) 9; Rachel Loopstra et al., ‘Austerity, Sanctions, and the Rise of Food Banks in the 
UK’ [2015] BMJ 2 <https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/350/bmj.h1775.full.pdf> accessed 20 June 2019. 
1227 HRW (n 1047) 104. 
1228 ibid 76. 
1229 Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: Visit to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (n 5) para 47. 
1230 HRW (n 1047) 84. 
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However, the individual and cumulative impact of earlier policies have also led to 
increased foodbank demand. Benefit payment caps, the spare room subsidy, and restricting 
access to sickness benefits have also driven increased demand.1231 Alongside these policies, 
Garthwaite also highlights benefit delays and sanctions in contending that these austerity-
influenced policies are cited by almost 50% of those using foodbanks as their reason for being 
there.1232 Thus it is clear that there exists a correlation between the rise in foodbank use and 
changes to the welfare state.1233 This can be supported in that, whilst making up 9% of the 
working age population, one study has found that out-of-work benefit recipients make up 
69.6% within its sample and ‘this highlights how out-of-work benefit claimants are over-
represented among food bank users by seven times.’1234 This can be linked to my contention in 
chapter 5.6. that austerity since 2010 – especially in regard to social security policies – has 
been inherently destitution inducing. 
6.4.5. The Right to Clothing  
Despite the fact that the minimum core obligation of the right to clothing has not been 
determined expressly, the normative content can serve as a guide in assessing the adequacy of 
clothing. The JRF determines that for the purposes of avoiding destitution, clothing and 
footwear should be appropriate for the weather.1235 This aligns with my own analysis of the 
normative framework of the Right to Clothing above.1236 In the UK, there exists no 
comprehensive data set which captures the information required to determine the extent to 
 
1231 Lambie-Mumford (n 1037) 124. 
1232 Garthwaite (n 1057) 8. 
1233 Lambie-Mumford (n 1037) 28. 
1234 Loopstra and Lalor (n 1089) 24. 
1235 Glen Bramley et al., ‘“Destitution in the UK” - Technical Report’ (2016) 5 
<https://pureapps2.hw.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/10667077/DESTITUTION_TECHNICAL_REPORT_FINAL.
pdf> accessed 7 February 2020. 
1236 See chapter 4.3.2.  
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which people’s clothing fulfils these criteria. However, one area in which research has been 
undertaken in regard to clothing by both the UK Government1237 and Civil Society is that of 
school uniforms. Therefore, although a consideration of school uniforms will not necessarily 
capture the full extent of destitution relating to the right to clothing in the UK, an analysis of 
the extent to which parents are able to provide their children with school uniforms that are 
correct, clean, and properly-fitting in the UK will be useful to my analysis of destitution. 
Royston and Jacques estimate that ‘around 2 million children across England go to school 
wearing incorrect, unclean or ill-fitting uniform.’1238  
Given the insufficiency of literature with regard to the right to clothing, any discussion 
of the right to clothing beyond the context of school uniforms is naturally speculative in nature. 
However, this speculation is informed by the discussion of the normative content so far. The 
implications which may be imputed from the finding that around 2-million children in England 
alone go to school wearing incorrect, ill-fitting or unclean uniform are severalfold. The former 
two of these findings suggest that issues of affordability exist with regard to accessing 
uniforms. The latter finding – pertaining to unclean uniform – suggests that although 
individuals are able to afford uniform, they may not be able to afford the cost of conventionally 
cleaning uniforms for example not owning a washing machine or having funds to pay for the 
electricity of running a machine.1239  
However, wider inferences may be drawn from this. This is because it can be strongly 
imputed that if a family unit is unable to afford the cost of washing school uniforms it is also 
unable to afford the cost of washing the clothing of other members of the family unit. The same 
may be said of ill-fitting clothing. Thus, with the exception of those who are wearing incorrect 
 
1237 Davies (n 1114). 
1238 Royston and Jacques (n 1107) 7. 
1239 See (n 1181-1182) 
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uniform, it can be speculated that each of those two-million children is representative of a larger 
number of individuals within the family unit who are affected by similar issues.  As I made 
clear in chapter 4.3.2. unclean and ill-fitting clothing can have damaging effects upon the health 
of individuals and, more so, causes clothing to fail to meet the destitution threshold.  
6.4.6. The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living  
The analysis throughout section 6.3. and section 6.4. demonstrates the extremely strong links 
between the five aspects of the AAAAQ framework in the UK context. The relationship 
between availability, affordability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality is interwoven and 
circular. Each aspect of this AAAAQ framework is affected by and affects the others.  It is clear 
that the current situation in the UK is one in which the normative content of the component 
rights is undermined in a multitude of ways. Regardless of whether individuals can attain the 
physical substance of their component rights, I have contended in section 6.3. that the 
destitution threshold is not surpassed unless this physical substance is attained in a way which 
conforms to the AAAAQ framework. Consequently, the fact that realisation of this normative 
(AAAAQ) content of the component rights is undermined is indicative of destitution. This is 
because of the intimate links which I have demonstrated between the failure to realise the 
normative content (AAAAQ) and the concepts of indignity and vulnerability.  The analysis of 
the component rights to housing, water, sanitation, food, and clothing above demonstrates the 
interdependence and interrelationship between the various component rights.  
What is evident from this analysis is that a failure to realise any aspect of the normative 
content of one component right has implications for the realisation of other component rights. 
Thus, rights deprivations are multiplied. The situation described throughout these two chapters 
demonstrates that the right to an adequate standard of living is not being met to the appropriate 
level for a great many individuals in the UK. A failure to realise any one or more of the 
component rights to the destitution threshold represents a failure to meet the destitution 
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threshold of the right to an adequate standard of living. In such instances, the right to social 
security is envisioned to allow individuals to realise their rights. However, in the UK this is 
simply not the case. 
6.4.7. The Right to Social Security  
The core obligations pertaining to the right to social security have been clearly defined by the 
CESCR. These relate to access and adequacy of the right to social security. The right to social 
security ought to act as a failsafe which, if the realisation of other rights is lacking, comes into 
to action to allow individuals to realise their other rights. Consequently, the level of social 
security provision that equates to the destitution threshold will vary between states. At a 
minimum however, social security provision should provide adequate benefits to protect 
articles 10, 11, and 12 of ICESCR.1240 In the UK context the minimum income standard1241 can 
act as a guide for determining the adequacy of benefits. As is clear from the analysis of this 
income standard above, benefits in the UK are not adequate enough to allow each of the 
component rights to be met to the destitution threshold. Destitution arises in the UK ‘when 
particular groups have social security entitlements that are, temporarily or permanently, 
inadequate for meeting their essential needs, or from their failing to access these entitlements 
for a variety of reasons.’1242 
Universal Credit, was introduced under the Welfare Reform Act 2012,1243 and the long 
wait for the first payment has been highlighted as a feature of universal credit which puts people 
 
1240 Malcolm Langford, ‘The Right to Social Security and Implications for Law, Policy and Practice’ in Eibe 
Riedel et al (ed), Social Security as a Human Right (Springer-Verlag 2007) 29–53, 33. 
1241 See chapter 6.3.2. 
1242 Fitzpatrick et al. (n 2) 71. 
1243 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’ (2016) E/C.12/GBR/CO/6’ (n 613) para 96. 
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at ‘risk of destitution and eviction.’1244 Destitution has also been highlighted as being used as 
punishment via sanctions1245 which has attracted concern from the CESCR.1246 The whole raft 
of benefit changes since 2010, especially the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Work Act 2016 
which are highlighted by the CESCR, has resulted in concerned ‘about the adverse impact of 
these changes and cuts on the enjoyment of the rights to social security and to an adequate 
standard of living.’1247 This demonstrates the links between social security and realising the 
right to an adequate standard of living.1248 Given that if the right to an adequate standard of 
living is realised an individual cannot be destitute under my definition, it follows that social 
security can be firmly linked to the prevention of destitution which in turn is indicative of the 
potential for alternative social security policies to address destitution.1249 This links heavily to 
my contention that changes to social security influenced by austerity since 2010 have been 
destitution inducing as was addressed in chapter 5.6. 
6.5. Concluding Remarks: Human Rights Defined Destitution in the UK 
This chapter purports that austerity, as implemented in the UK and examined in chapter 5, is 
inherently destitution inducing. This contention is based upon the premise that, as the 
government envisioned and expected the space created by the retreating state to be filled by 
the ‘big society’, this austerity has fostered a reliance upon ‘social transfers like public and 
 





eKz> accessed 7 February 2020. 
1245 Royston (n 1053) 313. 
1246 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’ (2016) E/C.12/GBR/CO/6’ (n 613) para 40. 
1247 ibid. 
1248 See chapter 4.3.7.  
1249 See chapter 7.3.1.  
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private charities, alms and welfare programmes.’1250 A reliance upon such transfers is, as was 
demonstrated in chapter 2, central to the traditional definition of destitution. Albeit framed as 
an inability to afford for themselves, this is also a shared feature of the JRF definition of 
destitution. In terms of my human rights-based definition of destitution this reliance has a range 
of implications for the realisation of the normative content of the component rights. That is a 
reliance upon the ‘big society’, as opposed to legally guaranteed and enforceable claims versus 
the state, has implications in regard to the availability, accessibility, affordability, acceptability, 
and quality of the realisation of each of the component rights. From a failure to ensure the 
normative content of the component rights, the destitution themes of indignity, and 
vulnerability are, I argue, inherent to the social policy that is the ‘big society’.  
 Affordability is a prominent barrier to the realisation of the component rights to the 
destitution threshold in the UK. Even when it does not act as a barrier to access, an inability to 
afford fosters a reliance upon charitable assistance and/or results in inadequate realisation of 
the component rights. The analysis of the right to food and the right to clothing, and in 
particular food banks and clothes banks, above are perhaps the most cogent and explicit 
example of this. 
 Reliance upon charitable assistance may be regarded as a consequence of a state failure 
to meet its obligations regarding the normative content of affordability of the component rights. 
More so, this is indicative of failings with regard to the realisation of the right to social security 
which – if it surpassed the destitution threshold – should ensure that individuals could realise 
their other component rights. Not only this, but this reliance on social transfers in turn has 
implications for the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of realisation. 
Pertaining to availability, this is because, as has been demonstrated above, those providing 
 
1250 Gangopadhyay et al. (n 94) 241. 
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charitable assistance may come to lack the resources to continue delivering such transfers. In 
regard to accessibility, these providers may operate a gatekeeping system; be geographically 
or spatially difficult to access; and/or only be accessible at times with are inaccessible to some 
people. Acceptability and quality are also issues to be considered in this vein. An individual 
who relies upon charitable assistance has little option but to accept what is given to them 
regardless of personal, or even public, preference.  
Thus, even though a reliance on charitable assistance may well allow survival needs to be 
met such a reliance does not realise survival rights. This is because it provides only the physical 
substance of the right in question and does not provide realisation of the substantive content of 
the right. When survival needs are, by nature of being met by charitable assistance, met in an 
undignified manner this leaves those reliant upon such transfers open to indignity and 
vulnerability. Consequently, based upon the analysis in this chapter, the scale of destitution in 
the UK is indicative that the UK is failing to comply with some of its obligations under 
ICESCR. This contention may be supported with reference to the CESCR’s latest concluding 
observations for the UK as well as Alston’s report on extreme poverty and human rights in the 




1251 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’ (2016) E/C.12/GBR/CO/6’ (n 613); Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights: Visit to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (n 5). 
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Chapter 7: Addressing Destitution in the United Kingdom using 
Human Rights 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter builds upon the work throughout this thesis to offer human rights-based solutions 
to destitution for the UK context. Part One of this thesis promulgated my human rights-based 
definition of destitution and thus far in Part Two this definition has been applied to the UK 
context. Chapter 6 applied this in identifying how the human rights-based destitution manifests 
itself: the symptoms.  
This chapter will address the potential cure for destitution in the UK. The following 
section, section 7.2., will highlight the advantages which are generally associated with utilising 
a Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA). This cure has a number of elements. Section 7.3. 
will address the alleviation of destitution in the short term. Continuing the medical metaphor, 
this equates to reactionary treatment – applying a bandage or administering medication. The 
recommendations in this section are split into two parts. The first focuses on the role social 
security policy must play in addressing destitution and the second focuses on addressing 
practical barriers to the realisation of the component rights to a level above that of the 
destitution threshold. 
Section 7.4. goes beyond this to address the eradication of destitution in the UK. That 
is the immunisation of our society against destitution – preventing destitution from occurring 
in the first place. This immunisation will be based upon more long term and structural 
recommendations. These recommendations will focus on the socio-economic duty; human 
rights budgetary planning; the justiciability of ESCRs; and access to justice. 
Both sections 7.3 and 7.4 are based upon the implicit assumption that the non-
realisation of the component rights to the destitution threshold is inherently wrong and must be 
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addressed. I contend that if the recommendations made in this chapter were to be implemented 
then destitution would only ever rarely, and in the most exceptional circumstances, be 
experienced in the UK. 
7.2. The General Advantages of Utilising a Human Rights Based Approach and the 
Implications of these for Tackling Destitution 
Hunt and MacNaughton highlight that human rights indicators can be used to recognise ‘when 
national and international policy adjustments are required.’1252 If my HRBA to defining 
destitution, and findings of widespread destitution in the UK under this definition are accepted, 
it follows that this reasoning can be used to argue that policy adjustments are required. This 
necessitates regarding the prevalence of destitution as a human rights indicator. More 
specifically, the prevalence of destitution suggests that the component rights are not being 
realised to the appropriate levels. 
At the core of Human Rights Based Approaches (HRBAs) are a number of 
internationally recognised and interconnected principles.1253 These are ‘express application of 
the international human rights framework;’ ‘empowerment;’ ‘participation;’ ‘non-
discrimination and prioritization of vulnerable groups; and’ ‘accountability.’1254 Other 
principles include transparency, human dignity, and the rule of law.1255 
This highlights the importance of dignity within the human rights discourse which in 
turn aligns with my understanding of destitution and its underlying themes one of which – I 
argue - is dignity.  
 
1252 Hunt and MacNaughton (n 415) 305. 
1253 Patrick Twomey, ‘Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development: Towards Accountability’ in Mashood 
Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (OUP 2007) 45–69, 49. 
1254 ibid 49. 
1255 Just Fair (n 509) 76 This report highlights the ‘human rights principles of participation, accountability, non-
discrimination, transparency, human dignity, empowerment and rule of law’ which are ‘commonly referred to as 
the “PANTHER” framework.’  
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As was highlighted in the introduction to this thesis, HRBAs bring with them a number 
of benefits. That section, however, was framed in terms of justifying utilising a HRBA in 
relation to destitution. This section goes beyond this to highlight the benefits of a HRBA in 
addressing destitution. A HRBA is ‘based upon two key premises:’1256 that all individuals are 
rights holders and that for each right there exists a corresponding duty on states.1257 This notion 
of corresponding duty affirms that ‘the state is the primary agency for the enforcement of 
people’s rights.’1258 Sepúlveda Carmona contends that under a HRBA recovery, in the context 
of austerity in response to financial crisis, ‘must start with the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged, who are rights-holders rather than burdensome or passive recipients of 
charity.’1259 This links explicitly to my examination of destitution in the UK in which I argue 
that a reliance on charitable assistance to attain the physical substance of the component rights 
is inherent to the experience of destitution in the UK.1260 
 In the introduction to this thesis, I contended that, if a right to be free from destitution 
could indeed be established, the benefit of this would be to impose a duty upon states to address 
destitution.1261 Although I do not contend that an explicit right to be free from destitution exists, 
I argue that – as was highlighted in regard to poverty above - if explicitly enshrined human 
rights are realised to the appropriate levels then destitution would not occur. To state explicitly, 
if the component rights are realised to the destitution threshold then destitution cannot exist 
under my definition.  
HRBAs, inherent to which are participatory processes, empower ‘the poor both to assert 
 
1256 Lister (n 29) 112. 
1257 ibid. 
1258 Mander (n 135) 246. 
1259 Sepúlveda Carmona (n 979) 42. 
1260 See Chapter 6 
1261 See Chapter 1.2 
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their human rights and hold accountable those legally responsible for their delivery.’1262 In 
essence, therefore, ‘they are enforceable.’1263 The UNDP also highlights that a HRBA can link 
‘the human development approach to the idea that others have duties to facilitate and enhance 
human development.’1264 Thus, HRBAs transform certain needs into rights which, given the 
‘vertical relationship of human rights law i.e. between the state and the individual,’1265 mean 
that those rights are ‘applicable to everyone within that state, including vulnerable groups such 
as refugees.’1266 More so, in the context of the UK, where the only current statutory protection 
against destitution applies only to those subject to the Asylum and Immigration Act, a HRBA 
to destitution widens protection to include the population more generally. 
In relation to human development, Sengupta contends that the value added of a HRBA 
is ‘the search for accountability leading up to culpability.’1267 Furthering this point, HRBAs 
allows for a ‘substantially different approach to deprivation by transforming economic 
problems into possible rights violations, that is to say into discrimination or structures that 
prevent people from exercising rights.’1268 HRBAs necessarily involve identifying chronic and 
systematic denials of human rights and ‘an analysis of the sources and causes of such 
denials.’1269 Thus, HRBAs, unlike other approaches to poverty and destitution, shift the focus 
to one of altering the conditions that result in deprivation.1270 Thus, HRBAs offer the chance 
of structural change. This is a key feature of a HRBA. Such an approach recognises the 
 
1262 Twomey (n 1253) 49. 
1263 Paul Spicker, What’s Wrong with Social Security Benefits (Policy Press 2017) 112. 
1264 UNDP, Human Development Report 2000 (n 21) 31.  
1265 Cahill-Ripley (n 666) 390.  
1266 ibid. 
1267 Sengupta (n 16) 837. 
1268 Manuel Couret Branco and Pedro Damião Henriques, ‘The Political Economy of the Human Right to Water’ 
(2010) 42 Review of Radical Political Economics 142, 151. 
1269 Mander (n 135) 242. 
1270 Cahill-Ripley and Skogly (n 19) 114. 
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‘structural causes of people’s impoverishment, of the fact that their condition is the outcome 
of the active denial of their rights and entitlements by social, economic and political structures 
and process.’1271 This recognition would take the existence of destitution to evidence the 
existence of structures and processes which fail to realise ESCRs.  
7.3. Using Human Rights to Alleviate Destitution in the Short Term  
As was made clear throughout the previous chapter an individual is destitute if the normative 
content of one or more of the component rights is not realised to the level of the destitution 
threshold. The nature of ESCRs is such that there is no prescribed means of realising them as 
a multitude of options have the potential to contribute the same goal: the realisation of the 
rights. Consequently, due to temporal and spatial limitations this chapter is unable to address 
all possible avenues of realisation. Instead, the recommendations of this chapter will focus on, 
firstly, the role social security can play and, secondly, addressing issues which are specific to 
the UK context.  
7.3.1. Using the Right to Social Security to Ensure the Immediate Realisation of the 
Component Rights to the Destitution Threshold 
Given the strong interrelationship between the right to social security and the right to an 
adequate standard of living and given the status of the component rights (with the exception of 
the right to social security) as forming constituent elements of the holistic right to an adequate 
standard of living, I contend that in the short term it is changes to social security policy which 
are the best placed mechanism to address destitution in the UK. As I made clear above, the 
right to social security is designed so that it need only be engaged as a failsafe if other ESCRs 
are not realised. It follows that the right to social security, if properly implemented, would 
allow individuals to attain the substance of the component rights in a dignified way free from 
 
1271 Mander (n 135) 239. 
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vulnerability. This is because, if an individual could not realise their component rights, they 
would have recourse to the right to social security, which would then grant them the capability 
to realise their component rights. 
However, currently in the UK the social security systems are not designed with such a 
goal in mind. The ‘punitive turn’, which was addressed in greater detail above,1272 has seen 
welfare conditionality extended and intensified and the rationale underpinning social security 
in the UK seriously altered. This has resulted in a range of policies, which undermine the 
capability of those reliant on social security to be able to afford to realise the physical substance 
of their component rights without additionally relying on charitable assistance. The level at 
which social security payments are set, the amount of time during which the freeze preventing 
raises in levels of social security  being extended, sanctions, and advanced hardship loans 
(which must later be paid back reducing future payments) are all examples of this.1273 Together 
these policies combine, partially or wholly, and undermine the ability of the social security 
provision in the UK to achieve the purposes of the right to social security: to ensure an adequate 
standard of living.1274 
On account of this, I contend, that social security provision in the UK must be 
dramatically altered in order to address destitution. Although this would not address the 
structural issues, which are causally linked to destitution,1275 this would allow the right to social 
security to achieve its purpose of ensuring an adequate standard of living and thus shield 
individuals from – and act as a safety net between individuals and – destitution. 
 
1272 See chapter 5.4. 
1273 See section chapter 6.3.2.   
1274 For a more in-depth analysis of the purposes of the right to social security see chapter 4.3.7.  
1275 The following section will address a range of recommendations aimed at addressing structural issues: see 




Thus, the first recommendation would be to eliminate the deviance between the national 
minimum wage and the minimum income standard.1276 This is because the government has 
aimed to keep social security levels below that of the minimum wage in order to encourage 
work. Thus, if workers are ensured a minimum income standard, this will reduce and mitigate 
the need for workers to have their wage-income supplemented by social security to attain this 
standard. As opposed to ex post government policy aimed at redistribution, this may be 
regarded as a form of predistribution aimed at making work pay better, not by transfer 
payments and wage-supplements but, by ensuring that work pays enough for individuals in the 
UK to avoid destitution.1277  
Additionally, raising the minimum wage would allow for social security levels to be 
brought closer to the minimum income standard without undermining the policy aim of 
ensuring that individuals who are able to are better off in work. In the interim, aligning with 
this policy aim may make increases in social security more palatable following a decade of 
portraying benefit recipients as undeserving. Following this initial step, social security levels 
should be raised to the level of the minimum income standard and the policy aim of ensuring 
that individuals are better off in work should be replaced with a new policy aim by which social 
security decisions are informed by the obligation to ensure an adequate standard of living. 
Although other actions would need to be taken, in order to implement these recommendations, 
there must be an agreeable way of determining the minimum income standard. This must be a 
politically independent mechanism which regularly and continuously updates this standard, 
 
1276 See figures 5.1. and 5.2. in chapter 6.3.2. 
1277 For an overview of redistribution vs predistribution see Chris Grover, ‘From Wage Supplements to a “Living 
Wage”? A Commentary on the Problems of Predistribution in Britain’s Summer Budget of 2015’ (2016) 36 
Critical Social Policy 693, 695. Whilst recognising Grover’s criticism of predistribution that it does ‘little to 
challenge the exploitative and economically unequal social relations upon which capitalism is premised’, I 
contend that this criticism can be mitigated when considered as part of the package of recommendations made 
within this chapter. 
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and the government must commit to at least matching the figure that it determines. Relating to 
this, as recommended by Royston and Jacques, the ‘benefit freeze’ must be ended.1278 This is 
necessary in order for the recommendations relating to a minimum income standard to be 
achieved as the notion of a ‘benefit freeze’ is antithetical to my recommendation that the level 
of social security benefit provision be tied to a continuously and regularly updated minimum 
income standard.  
More so, there should be no circumstance in which the government can reduce social 
security payments to a level below that of the minimum income standard. This recommendation 
is based upon my contentions that: the minimum income standard is required to avoid 
destitution; and that destitution undermines the dignity of the individual, is a denial of ESCRs, 
and may prevent an individual meeting their survival needs. Thus, to deliberately lower social 
security benefits below the minimum income standard is to deliberately expose individuals to 
the risk of destitution. Thus, it follows that sanctions, advanced loans which reduce later 
payments,1279 and the five-week wait for the first Universal Credit payment are policies and 
practices which must be terminated. This is because these policies leave individuals with 
reduced – if any – social security provision for defined periods of time. Not only do these 
policies take individuals under the minimum income standard for that defined period but also, 
these policies have longer lasting effects on people’s abilities to meet the minimum income 
standard. This is due to the fact that individuals undertake survival strategies such as loans 
which in turn must be paid from future income. In turn this reduces the amount of future income 
which is left in order to meet the minimum income standard. 
Combined, these recommendations would ensure that social security provision in the 
 
1278 Royston and Jacques (n 1107) 9. 
1279 Which in turn is intimately tied to the five-week wait for payment under the new Universal Credit System: 
see chapter 6.4.7. 
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UK can meet the standards of the Right to Social Security. If these standards are met – and in 
turn social security in the UK ensures an adequate standard of living – then it follows that it 
would only be in very rare instances that individuals face destitution.  
7.3.2. Addressing Practical Barriers to The Realisation of The Component Rights to The 
Destitution Threshold in the United Kingdom 
Changes to the provision of social security benefits alone will not suffice and one reason for 
this is the perverse influence of housing costs. The effect of housing costs can be imputed given 
the range of methodologies, which seek to arrive at a minimum income figure, or poverty 
threshold, or in the case of the JRF destitution report destitution level, based on household 
income after housing costs. Thus, it is recommended that the state works to reduce the cost of 
housing as this would increase an individual’s disposable income. One approach to achieving 
this aim would be to increase the amount of social housing. This is because social housing is 
priced below that of private renting which in turns acts as a check against the cost of private 
renting and buying increasing to unaffordable levels. For example, the average rent in the 
private rental sector ‘is almost double the average rent for houses in the social housing 
sector’.1280 The importance of social housing in regard to affordability is evidenced given that 
the reduced income for some sectors of society – such as those who have been 
disproportionately impacted by austerity1281 - makes ‘affordable housing even more 
necessary.’1282 This increased need has been tied to ‘increased investment in social housing in 
order to protect the rights of the most vulnerable.’1283 Such investment not only acts as a ‘safety 
 
1280 Hohmann (n 530) 32. 
1281 See section 5.5. Effects of Austerity 




net for vulnerable households’1284 but also has an ‘economic stimulus.’1285 More so, increased 
levels of social housing interacts with the free market to reduce the cost of private renting. This 
in turn may reduce living costs and consequently the minimum income standard. Thus, 
government expenditure on social security benefits per individual in receipt of such benefits 
may be reduced. In this sense, an investment in social housing offers the potential for long term 
returns in the form of reduced future expenditure. 
Beyond this, given that I have contended that a reliance on charitable assistance to meet 
the substance of the component rights is a manifestation of destitution in the UK, it follows 
that so long as charitable assistance providers dispense aid then destitution will continue to 
exist. That is not however to argue that these providers should be closed immediately. This is 
because there would undoubtedly be a period of transition whilst recommendations are 
implemented during which the need for the service currently provided by charitable assistance 
remains. Although the ultimate aim should be for the demand for the service provided by 
charitable assistance to cease to exist – resulting in such providers ceasing to operate - in the 
first instance, the relationship which exists between the rights-holder, charitable assistance, and 
the government must be recast. This interim measure would address many of the criticisms I 
have levied against charitable aid provision above.1286  
This recasting may take the form of the government ‘nationalising’ existing charitable 
assistance. By this I mean the government taking over responsibility for overall funding, 
running costs, staffing, supply chain management, and gatekeeping. Such a recasting would 
remove the ‘charitable’ from charitable assistance and as such could be labelled assistance. 
This would address the destitution theme of vulnerability manifested as precariousness of 
 
1284 ibid 217. 
1285 ibid. 




provision, which is inherent to charitable assistance. In this sense, this would constitute a 
broadening of social security provision to include specific provision for each of the component 
rights and would result in the relationship during this provision being between the rights-holder 
and the state. Due to this recast relationship and the recasting of such provision as part of social 
security entitlements, individuals would have a legal right to challenge – through the tribunal 
system albeit not necessarily on human rights grounds - the availability, affordability, 
accessibility, acceptability, and quality of aid provision. This offers the potential for provision 
which better aligns with human rights standards and, crucially, given that I view this as a 
broadening of social security provision I contend that individuals relying on governmental aid 
provision to meet the destitution threshold of their component rights are not destitute. Unlike 
those relying on charitable assistance.  
Such an approach may draw inspiration from the Scottish Government’s response to 
the unaffordability of school uniforms, which involved implementing a school uniform grant. 
Not only does this grant provide a model of how the state can work to provide the realisation 
of the component rights on a general level but also this grant addresses a number of issues, 
which I highlighted specifically in regard to the right to clothing and destitution above.1287 As 
of the 2018-2019 academic year the Scottish Government implemented a minimum level of 
£100 for this grant, although eligibility will still be determined by local authorities.1288 
Edinburgh council, for example, has seen a sharp rise of 32% of such grants.1289 However, 
£100 does not cover the full cost of uniform with the average cost varying from approximately 
£190-£240 depending on age and gender.1290 Consequently, as well as there being a need to 
 
1287 See section 6.3.2. Affordability 
1288 Anonymous, ‘School Clothing Grant Minimum Set at £100’ (BBC News, 25 May 2018) 100 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-44257672> accessed 6 September 2019. 
1289 Angie Brown, ‘Sharp Rise in School Uniform Grants in Edinburgh’ (BBC News, 4 June 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-48511816> accessed 6 September 2019. 
1290 See section 6.3.2. 
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expand this scheme geographically there is also a need to ensure that the level of the grant 
aligns with the costs of uniforms. This second need can be met in one of two ways – or via a 
hybrid approach. Firstly, by raising the minimum level of the grant or secondly better 
regulating the costs of school uniforms. Policies which would contribute to achieving this 
second goal include banning schools from entering into financially incentivised ‘single supplier 
contracts’,1291 standardising some aspects of school uniforms by banning non-standard trousers 
such as those with a purple lining given as an example in the discussion above,1292 and ensuring 
that alternative options are available in regard to parts of the uniform pre-embroidered with 
school logos which have been found to be three-times more expensive.1293 
 The recommendations in this sub-section and the one preceding it are strongly linked 
around the theme of social security. Whereas section 7.2. argued for social security payments 
to be increased, section 7.3. argued for the sphere of social security to be broadened by 
increasing social housing, nationalising charitable assistance, and utilising grants to ensure the 
realisation of the component rights to the appropriate levels. However, as was made clear in 
the introduction to this chapter, these recommendations are aimed at treating destitution and 
must be supplemented by longer term and structural changes if we are to ensure that destitution 
cannot occur in the UK. 
7.4. Eradicating Destitution in the Long term: Addressing the Structures of Destitution 
utilising Human Rights 
7.4.1 The Socio-Economic Duty 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10 addresses inequality and includes targets to, inter 
alia, ‘adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies’ aimed at 
 
1291 See (n 1116)  
1292 See (n 1117)  
1293 See (n 1119)  
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progressively achieving greater equality.1294 The UK is expected to achieve the SDGs, including 
goal 10 ‘whereby governments pledged to ensure equal opportunity and to reduce inequalities 
of outcome between and within countries.’1295 For the purposes of this thesis, which focuses on 
destitution in the UK, this requires inequality to be reduced within the UK. Currently, however, 
‘the UK does not rank highly when it comes to the commitment to reduce inequality.’1296 
The inequality which exists in the UK is a result of a discourse which prioritises economic 
growth over many other policy objectives. Neo-liberal theory holds that ‘the elimination of 
poverty (both domestically and worldwide) can best be secured through free markets and free 
trade.’1297 This is based on the evidence that ‘economic freedom fosters growth-enhancing 
incentives.’1298 This aligns with the view that ‘the cure for poverty is economic growth’1299 and 
further still the view of the UK that economic growth provides opportunity.1300 This discourse 
is premised upon the view that economic growth is central to ‘social, economic, political and 
environmental progress.’1301 This further rests on the contention that such growth will benefit 
all1302 through reducing disparities and increasing living standards.1303 This contention has been 
 
1294 United Nations Development Programme UNDP, ‘Goal 10 Reduce Inequalities’ (UNDP, 2015) 10 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-10-reduced-
inequalities.html#targets> accessed 28 November 2019. 
1295 Koldo Casla, ‘The Socio-Economic Duty: A Human Rights Remedy against Austerity and Inequality’ (The 
Baring Foundation, 2017) <https://baringfoundation.org.uk/blog-post/the-socio-economic-duty-a-human-rights-
remedy-against-austerity-and-inequality/> accessed 25 November 2019. 
1296 ibid. 
1297 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP 2005) 64–65. 
1298 Axel Dreher et al., Martin Gassebner and Lars-HR Siemers, ‘Globalization, Economic Freedom, and Human 
Rights’ (2012) 56 Journal of Conflict Resolution 516, 524. 
1299 Marks (n 137) 572. 
1300 Julian Le Grand et al., ‘The United Kingdom: More and Economic than a Social Europe’ in Jon Kvist and 
Juho Saari (eds), The Europeanisation of Social Protection (Policy Press 2007) 41–60, 41. 
1301 Joachim H Spangenberg, ‘The Growth Discourse, Growth Policy and Sustainable Development: Two Thought 
Experiments’ (2010) 18 Journal of Cleaner Production 561, 561. 
1302 David Kinley, Civilising Globalisation (CUP 2009) 43. 
1303 Eleanor M Fox, ‘Globalization and Human Rights: Looking out for the Welfare of the Worst Off’ (2002) 35 
N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 201, 209. 
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labelled the ‘trickle down’1304 or the ‘rising tide lifts all boats’1305 theory. Such sentiments 
implicitly endorse the view that a lack of such growth impedes the realisation of the ESCRs 
enshrined within the ICESCR.1306 This is because growth can generate jobs and other resources 
which in turn can increase an individual’s incomes and reduce living costs. This allows for 
those at the bottom to benefit from growth at the top. Thus, growth can, theoretically, leave 
individuals better off.  
However, free-trade and a lack of government intervention1307 benefits some more than 
it does others1308 and as such even if growth does lead to ESCRs realisation ‘neo-liberalisation 
has broadly failed to stimulate worldwide growth.’1309 Under the Washington Consensus ‘the 
pursuit of growth can only lead to the concentration of wealth.’1310 This is because growth, and 
other positive effects of globalisation have been unequally distributed1311 with larger initial 
fortunes growing at rates ‘significantly higher than the average growth rate of wealth.’1312 This 
links neo-liberalism to inequality, which is growing,1313 as the gains from globalisation are 
 
1304 Harvey (n 1297) 65. 
1305 Kinley (n 1302) 43. 
1306 Ariranga G Pillay, ‘Letter from CESCR Chairperson to All States Party to the ICESCR’ (United Nations 
2012) UN. Doc CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW. 
1307 Emma Seery and Ana Caistor Arendar, ‘Executive Summary: Even It up: Time to End Extreme Inequality’ 
(Oxfam 2014) 11 <https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/333012/cr-even-it-up-
extreme-inequality-291014-summ-en.pdf;jsessionid=17BC91669378B73387556F2999CAC660?sequence=44> 
accessed 10 December 2019. 
1308 Fox (n 1303) 209. 
1309 Harvey (n 1297) 154. Italicised for my own emphasis. Although the growth may not have taken place 
worldwide the process of neo-liberalisation can be regarded as increasing growth for some states. 
1310 Claire Kumar, ‘Africa Rising? Inequalities and the Essential Role of Fair Taxation’ (Christian Aid 2014) 14 
<http://www.christianaid.org.uk/programme-policy-practice/sites/default/files/2017-05/Africa-tax-and-
inequality-report-Feb2014.pdf> accessed 10 December 2019. 
1311 Fons Coomans, ‘The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’’ (2011) 11 Human 
Rights Law Review 1, 2. 
1312 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press 2014) 431. 
1313 Seery and Arendar (n 1307) 4. 
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poorly distributed.1314 This inequality may be deemed irrelevant, regarding ESCRs realisation, 
if everyone has these rights realised. However, this is not the case with inequality acting as a 
barrier to tackling poverty1315 and consequently to the realisation of rights. More so, no 
empirical evidence supports the claims that prioritising economic growth, and the ensuing 
inequality, contributes to an improvement in living standards for the most deprived.1316 
Combined with the contention that ‘rising inequalities are a missed opportunity to end 
poverty,’1317 the strong interrelationship between poverty and destitution allows the suggestion 
to be made that tackling inequality may contribute to tackling destitution in the UK. It is widely 
accepted that poverty is a form of inequality1318 and given the strong linkages between poverty 
and destitution it follows that destitution is also a form of inequality. Furthermore, the context 
of destitution in the UK, as was addressed in chapter 5 is austerity. In that chapter I contended 
that austerity in the UK since 2010 has been inherently destitution inducing and has as such 
increased destitution. The relationship between austerity and inequality parallels this. This is 
because the reductions in government spending which austerity entails increased 
unemployment, worsened the recession, and expanded the recession’s length through cutting 
key social programs at a time when individuals need them most. Given that the relationships 
between ‘austerity and destitution’ and ‘austerity and inequality’ follow a similar trend it can 
be contended that these three concepts are linked. This can be supported by the contention that 
destitution as a sub-set of poverty is a form of inequality. I therefore contend that measures to 
 
1314 Fox (n 1303) 210. 
1315 Seery and Arendar (n 1307) 4. 
1316 Alfred De Zayas, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable 
International Order’ (United Nations 2016) UNDoc A/71/286 para 13. 
1317 Koldo Casla, ‘The Socio-Economic Duty: A Powerful Idea Hidden in Plain Sight in the Equality Act’ (OxHRH 
Blog, 15 May 2019) <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-socio-economic-duty-a-powerful-idea-hidden-in-plain-sight-
in-the-equality-act> accessed 25 November 2019. 
1318 Paul Spicker, Poverty and Social Security (Routledge 1993) 47. 
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address inequality in the UK have the potential to also address destitution.  
In this respect the socio-economic duty may be of relevance to addressing destitution 
using human rights in the UK. The Equality Act 2010 includes ‘a positive duty on public bodies 
in relation to socio-economic disadvantage.’1319 Section 1 of this act requires relevant 
authorities to,  ‘when making decisions of a strategic nature about how to exercise its functions, 
have due regard to the desirability of exercising them in a way that is designed to reduce the 
inequalities of outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage.’1320 Fredman 
highlights that the Guidance which accompanies the Equality Act ‘describes socio-economic 
disadvantage as the state of being disadvantaged in life by one or more of a range of external 
factors.’1321 Although poverty, and consequently destitution, is the most important factor, socio-
economic disadvantage can be more broadly understood to include ‘the complex interplay of 
factors such as health, housing, education and family background, and the resulting lack of 
ambitions and expectations, that so often combine to keep people in poverty and limit their 
chances of upward social mobility.’1322  
At first glance this may appear to have little if any correlation to human rights. 
However, the factors outlined correlate to the substance of a number of human rights including 
the rights to health, housing, and education. More so, in an article exploring the potential of 
the socio-economic duty written following the Equality Act, Fredman highlights that such a 
duty aligns with the view of the CESCR.1323 This is because in General Comment No.20, the 
CESCR states that ‘individuals and groups of individuals must not be arbitrarily treated on 
 
1319 Sandra Fredman, ‘Positive Duties and Socio-Economic Disadvantage: Bringing Disadvantage onto the 
Equality Agenda’ (2010) 3 E.H.R.L.R 290, 290. 
1320 Equality Act 2010 s 1. 
1321 Fredman (n 1319) 296. 
1322 ibid. 
1323 ibid 294. 
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account of belonging to a certain economic or social group or strata within society.’1324 More 
so, in its 2016 Concluding Observations for the UK, the CESCR recommended ‘that the State 
party bring into force the relevant provisions of the Equality Act that refer to the public 
authorities’ duty on socio- economic disadvantage … in order to enhance and guarantee full 
and effective protection against discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights.’1325 Consequently, section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 has been described as 
providing a model ‘for enhancing the status of ICESCR in domestic law.’1326 Thus, it has been 
argued that the socio-economic duty ‘would contribute to tackling existing disadvantages and 
inequalities, and protecting socio-economic rights for all people in the UK.’1327 This 
demonstrates how the socio-economic duty has the potential to act as a human rights-based 
mechanism to tackle socio-economic inequality and as a consequence of this human rights-
based destitution.  
Even so, the socio-economic duty as a tool for tackling socio-economic inequality can be 
criticised in that ‘the duty specifically excludes “inequalities experienced by a person as a result 
of being … subject to immigration control.”’1328 This is the opposite of the destitution 
provisions under the Asylum and Immigration Act which were addressed above.1329 If we were 
to regard destitution as the ultimate socio-economic inequality then it follows that statutory 
provisions already exist which are capable of addressing this inequality for those subject to 
 
1324 Committee on Economic and Social Rights CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 2, Para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights)’ (United Nations 2009) UN.Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, para 35. 
1325 Equality and Human Rights Commission EHRC, ‘Progress on Socio-Economic Rights in Great Britain: 
Update Report on Great Britain’s Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (2018) 20 <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/progress-on-socio-economic-rights-
in-great-britain.pdf> accessed 2 December 2019. 
1326 ibid 25. 
1327 ibid 21. 
1328 Fredman (n 1319) 298. 
1329 See chapter 2.2. 
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immigration control. It therefore follows that, in relation to destitution, the criticism that the 
socio-economic duty does not apply to those subjected to immigration controls may be 
nullified. Rather, the socio-economic duty may be regarded as an alternative statutory means 
of offering the general population the same protection against destitution as offered under the 
Asylum and Immigration Act. 
Casla argues that the socio-economic duty ‘offers a powerful lever’1330 to reduce 
inequality and as such ‘can make a big difference.’1331  However, I concur with Fredman that 
despite being a significant step the socio-economic duty is ‘only a small step in the right 
direction’.1332 I reach this conclusion based upon a number of factors. Firstly, the socio-
economic duty is not yet in effect and as such ‘is technically not binding for public authorities 
in England.’1333 This is because, it was written into the Equality Act 2010 that, to take effect 
‘this provision requires a formal decision by the Government to activate it, or as is known 
technically, to commence it.’1334 No such decision has been taken and consequently ‘successive 
governments have failed to bring the socioeconomic equality duty into force.’1335 Thus, all talk 
of the socio-economic duty can address only its potential.  
As well as this, even if it were to be commenced, a number of criticisms of this duty exist 
which, I believe, undermine its potential to contribute to the realisation of the component rights 
to the destitution threshold. For example, section 3 of the equality act expressly bars a ‘cause 
of action at private law’1336 for ‘a failure in respect of a performance of a duty under section 
 
1330 Casla (n 1317). 
1331 Casla (n 1295). 
1332 Fredman (n 1319) 304. 
1333 Casla (n 1317). 
1334 Casla (n 1295). 
1335 ibid. 
1336 Equality Act s 3. 
  
 239 
1.’1337 Thus, there is no ‘individual right of complaint of discrimination on the grounds of 
socio-economic disadvantage.’1338 This limits the potential effectiveness of the socio-economic 
duty. 
This links to the nature of this duty as merely requiring ‘a body only to pay due regard 
to the desirability of exercising its functions in a way that is designed to reduce the inequalities 
of outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage.’1339 Thus it is a ‘less intense’ duty 
as it focuses on desirability as opposed to need.1340 Thus, given that proportionality plays a role 
in determining as to whether due regard has been paid, even if the socio-economic duty were 
to apply it may be overlooked in favour of attaining other goals. This is because the decision-
making body ‘might decide that other priorities outweigh those associated with reducing 
inequalities of outcome, but if it does, it needs to be able to justify this decision as proportionate 
in the light of existing evidence.’1341 This links to the nature of the duty to pay due regard in 
which the decision maker’s duty is ‘not a duty to achieve a result’ but rather ‘a duty to have 
due regard to the need to achieve these goals."1342 
Even so, I contend that these criticisms of the socio-economic duty are outweighed by 
the benefits of another more crucial role that this duty can play. That is to direct and influence 
central government policy. Fredman correctly recognises that it is central, as opposed to local 
government, whose ‘strategic decisions are likely to have a particularly significant impact on 
socio-economic disadvantage.’1343 This shows not only the cruciality of central government 
 
1337 ibid. 
1338 Fredman (n 1319) 303. 
1339 ibid 300. 
1340 ibid. 
1341 ibid 304. 
1342 ibid 301 the term need is used here as this quote was specifically in relation to racial discrimination which is 
framed in terms of need as opposed to desirability.  
1343 ibid 297. 
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policies to tackling socio-economic disadvantage and, as a consequence of tackling this, 
tackling destitution but also the potential for the socio-economic duty to act as a catalyst for 
human rights policy planning in the UK. The Equality and Human Rights Commission contend 
that the negative impact of austerity driven social security cuts ‘could have been analysed and 
mitigated if decision-makers had paid due regard to the desirability of reducing socio-economic 
disadvantage when exercising their functions.’1344 Consequently, the UK’s central government 
should follow the lead of Scotland which has already enacted Fairer Scotland Duty, which is 
the name given to the socio-economic duty in Scotland’.1345 The role that human rights policy 
planning can play in tackling destitution will be explored in the following section.  
7.4.2. Human Rights Planning in the Budget 
Building upon this discussion of the socio-economic duty, I contend that Human Rights Impact 
Assessments (HRIAs) are a mechanism by which the socio-economic duty can be brought to 
life in the UK in such a way as to bolster the realisation of ESCRs. Such budget analysis 
concerns analysing ‘the process and outcomes of public finances in terms of substantive human 
rights obligations.’1346 In the UK, in order to ensure compliance with the Equality Act 2010, 
Equality Impact Assessments (EQIAs) are undertaken by public authorities to inform decision 
making. Currently, as was discussed in the previous sub-section, the socio-economic duty is 
not in effect and as such this duty does not form the focus of such assessments. This is because 
HRIAs in the UK tend ‘to focus exclusively on the rights contained in the Human Rights Act 
and the Equality Act’ as ‘public authorities are subject to relatively strong and enforceable 
legal obligations with respect to these legal instruments.’1347 Harrison and Stephenson contend 
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1345 The Equality Trust, ‘Socio-Economic Duty’ <https://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/socio-economic-duty> 
accessed 11 November 2020. 
1346 Nolan and others (n 98) 18. 




that these HRIAs ‘could also benefit greatly from explicit consideration of economic, social 
and cultural rights’1348  given the prevalence of ESCR issues within their research.  
Currently, these instruments are ‘inadequate mechanisms for addressing the underlying 
social, economic and cultural rights issues which are raised by many public spending 
measures.’1349 However, if the socio-economic duty is ‘commenced’ socio-economic inequality 
– and consequently ESCRs – will more explicitly form a part of HRIAs in the UK. This is 
because public authorities would be required to pay due regard to these issues when making 
strategic decisions. Thus, the existing ‘legal standards contained in equality and human rights 
legislation can be the basis for important examination of public spending decisions, particularly 
in the context of widespread public spending cuts.’1350 
Thus, the socio-economic duty offers the prospect of ESCRs being integrated into 
human rights-based budgetary planning within the UK. HRIA ‘is a recognised term that is used 
to indicate a process of measuring actual or potential human rights impacts of a policy, project 
or other form of intervention.’1351 In relation to ESCRs, the ultimate aim of such assessments is 
to ‘determine the impact of budgetary decisions on the implementation and enjoyment of 
ESR.’1352 Such assessments may be taken ex post or ex ante.1353 For my purposes, I focus on the 
ex-ante  – that is before the implementation of policy – use of HRIAs as a tool for informing 
 
Human Rights and Equality Seriously’ in Aoife Nolan et al. (ed), Human Rights and Public Finance (Hart 
Publishing 2013) 219–241, 238. 
1348 ibid. 
1349 ibid. 
1350 ibid 219.  
1351 ibid 222.  
1352 Aoife Nolan, ‘Putting ESR-Based Budget Analysis into Practice: Addressing the Conceptual Challenges’ in 
Aoife Nolan, Rory O’Connell and Colin Harvey (eds), Human Rights and Public Finance (Hart Publishing 2013) 
41–57, 43. 
1353 Harrison and Stephenson (n 1347) 222. 
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and altering policy decisions to better align with ESCRs realisation and consequently the 
combatting of human rights-based destitution. 
Such analysis is crucial given that ‘compliance with human rights is never done in a 
vacuum’1354 and as such ‘an appropriate package of economic, social, human, and financial 
policies consistent with the aims and goals of human rights’1355 must be found. Despite the fact 
that ‘traditionally the budget has been viewed as a technical instrument of public finance 
management’1356 it is clear that ‘the budget’ explicitly relates to a decision as to the 
implementation of such a package. This is because, ‘from a policy perspective, the budget is 
the financial mirror of government policy.’1357 The budget is therefore irrevocably interlinked 
to the policy position adopted by the government. I contend that, given this linkage, if HRIAs 
are undertaken in designing the budget the implications of this manifest themselves in the 
implementation of government policy. Specifically, in relation to this thesis, if a government 
undertakes a HRIA which destitution-proofs (from a human rights-based perspective) its 
budget then it follows that government policy aligning with this budget will also combat 
destitution. 
Rooney and Harvey propose four conditions which a state must adopt in regard to 
mainstreaming HRIAs. The first two of these, which are ‘amenable to formal enactment 
through legislation,’1358 are a procedural requirement to undertake HRIAs whilst soliciting ‘the 
 
1354 Alfredo Sfeir-Younis, ‘Economic and Human Rights – Towards Empowered Development’ in Wenche Barth 
Eide and Uwe Kracht (eds), Food and Human Rights In Development: Volume II (Intersentia 2007) 25–62, 33. 
1355 ibid. 
1356 Sheila Quinn, ‘Equality Proofing the Budget: Lessons from the Experiences of Gender Budgeting?’ in Nolan 
et al. (ed), Human Rights and Public Finance (Hart Publishing 2013) 163–192, 163. 
1357 ibid 164. 
1358 Eoin Rooney and Colin Harvey, ‘Eoin Rooney and Colin Harvey ‘Better on the Margins? A Critique of 
Mainstreaming Economic and Social Rights’ in Aoife Nolan et al. (ed), Human Rights and the Public Finance 
(Hart Publishing 2013) 123–135, 125. 
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views of affected groups as part of its decision-making processes1359 and actually carrying out 
these exercises.  The latter two of these conditions have little direct pertinence to legal 
mechanisms and instead pertain to ‘compliance with the “spirit” of mainstreaming.’1360 These 
are to administer HRIAs in good faith and to ‘use the information gathered to select options 
that maximise the enjoyment of ESR.’1361 This offers a model for the integration of HRIAs 
within UK government budgetary planning.  
HRIAs which account for the (non)realisation of ESCRs offer ‘a more comprehensive 
assessment of all financing alternatives.’1362 As opposed to immediately settling on the hurdle 
of unaffordability such assessments will force a consideration of further sources of resources 
for the realisation of ESCRs. For example, ‘(a) reallocations of existing resources, but also 
through (b) resource generation via fiscal and tax policy (including battling tax evasion), (c) 
monetary policy and financial regulation, (d) deficit financing, debt restructuring, and (e) 
development assistance.’1363 In the context of the UK, the second of these options stands out.  
However, concerns have been raised that HRIAs may become, and indeed in their 
existing form in the UK have become, ‘tick-box’1364 exercises with their being ‘minimal 
consultation, limited understanding of key human rights and equality principles and little real 
impact on decision-making.’1365 Academic expertise has the potential to play an important role 
in this regard with it being argued that such expertise ‘could and should be harnessed in order 
to assist in the development of robust assessment processes that are based on sound evidence 
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1362 Sally-Anne Way et al., ‘Economic and Social Rights in the “Great Recession”’ in Eibe Riedel et al (ed), 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (OUP 2014) 86–110, 93–94. 
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and proper analysis.’1366 
7.4.3. Making Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Justiciable in the UK 
Even if the socio-economic duty were commenced and consideration of ESCRs was therefore 
integrated into HRIAs within the UK three key areas of challenge exist. These are ‘conceptual’, 
‘practical or logistical’, and ‘obstacles faced by practitioners.’1367 The most crucial challenge, 
especially given the status of the socio-economic duty even if it were commenced as requiring 
only consideration – that is its focus on process not outcome – remains the justiciability of 
ESCRs within the UK.  
For the purposes of a 2006 edited collection addressing the justiciability of ESCRs, 
Coomans defines the concept broadly to mean ‘the extent to which an alleged violation of an 
economic or social subjective right invoked in a particular case is suitable for judicial or quasi-
judicial review at the domestic level.’1368 More succinctly, justiciability is ‘the ability to bring 
legal action and receive decision from an independent and impartial body.’1369 In considering 
Langford’s conception of judicial review as being composed of ‘recognition’ - that is ‘the 
degree to which ESC rights are formally enforceable by the judiciary’1370 – and 
‘responsiveness’ – that is ‘the extent to which national courts are willing to entertain petitions 
in good faith’1371 it is clear that the justiciability of ESCRs rests on two requirements. Firstly, 
that ESCRs are given legal status (recognised) and secondly that the courts are willing to 
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1367 Nolan (n 1352) 42. 
1368 Fons Coomans, ‘Some Introductory Remarks on the Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights in a 
Comparative Constitutional Context’ in Fons Coomans (ed), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights 
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deliver judgment enforcing the realisation of such rights (responsiveness).  
The effective implementation of ESCRs ‘depends in part on whether these rights are 
treated as justiciable’1372 and this is due to the fact that it is ‘only when individuals can claim 
their rights in national courts and find redress can the ESCR of these individuals be realised.’1373 
In fact, adopting mechanisms of enforcement through law and policy has been described as 
one of the most ‘effective ways of realizing human rights.’1374 
However, currently, in the UK, ESCRs are not regarded as being justiciable and ‘one 
of the main arguments against justiciability of socio-economic rights is linked to the issue of 
resource allocation in society’1375 given that this ‘may have budgetary implications.’1376 This 
engages the difficult question that a promotion of ESCRs compliance raises regarding the 
nature and operation of power in contemporary societies. This is because budget making is 
regarded as belonging to the political as opposed to legal sphere1377 given that such decisions 
‘relate to policy issues and the implementation of political programmes.’1378 Consequently, 
human rights work in this area ‘is directed more explicitly at the political rather than the judicial 
arena.’1379 In the UK this has manifested itself in the courts being ‘concerned to be seen as 
interfering unduly in areas of economic and social policy deemed to be the prerogative of the 
 
1372 Margit Tveiten, ‘Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights: Reflections on Norwegian and South African 
Debate and Experience’ in Wenche Barth Eide and Uwe Kracht (eds), Food and Human Rights Development: 
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legislature’1380 even in instances where the court had recognised ‘that the government had 
failed to assess the discriminatory effects of its emergency budget law.’1381 Consequently, 
despite there having been opportunities to do so, the UK courts have not shown responsiveness 
to ESCRs which in turn has undermined the justiciability of these rights within the UK. 
In the UK context, this lack of responsiveness can in part be traced to the complex 
interplay of constitutional principles, to which if added constitutionalised ESCRs would further 
complicate. Regarding the budget as the sole prerogative of the political realm aligns with the 
constitutional principle of the separation of powers whereas allowing ESCRs justiciability 
would conflict with the mainstream understanding of this principle.1382 This is because if 
ESCRs were justiciable this would allow the courts the competence to ‘decide on matters of 
social and economic policy involving competing interests and budgetary allocations.’1383 This 
in turn would see ESCRs appearing ‘to replace democratic debate with rigid commands.’1384 
Thus, the issue of democracy is raised and making ESCRs justiciable ‘may be undemocratic’ 
due to the tendency to judicialize social issues which in turn requires the courts to interfere in 
the political sphere.1385 Given the redistributive nature of ESCRs, some argue that ‘attributing 
the power to judges to substitute their own views for those of democratically elected 
representatives is deeply problematic.’1386  
Even so, the judiciary is ‘already involved in a range of issues which have important 
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resource implications’1387 which in turn ‘makes their role in socio-economic cases more 
tenable.’1388 Thus, it can be suggested that separation of powers arguments in this regard are 
overstated. Such arguments are especially overstated given that, as will be demonstrated in the 
following sub-section, the judiciary in the UK is already involved in hearing cases related to 
the substance of some of the component rights - albeit not from a human rights-based 
perspective. The example of challenging a benefit decision through the tribunal system shows 
how the right to social security’s substance is justiciable albeit not in the language of human 
rights but instead via statutory entitlement. The ability of those subject to the Asylum and 
Immigration Act to challenge destitution further evidences that the court system in the UK 
already has experience dealing with destitution. Not only this, but the arguments made against 
ESCRs with regard to judges allocating resources are not raised against the judiciary’s role in 
making decisions with regard to Civil and Political Rights which also have a budgetary impact. 
For example, it has been argued that the cases of Airey and Steel and Morris relating to the 
right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR were decided by the ECtHR regardless of, and 
ignoring, ‘the economic consequences for the government.’1389 
 Additionally, other arguments can be made in favour of explicitly recognising ESCRs 
as justiciable. Davis argues that a commitment to ESCRs  
‘in a constitutional democracy rests on an assumption that a society whose government 
and legal order must reflect the will of the people … cannot expect a significant 
proportion of the people to submit themselves to a governance system without a 




1389 Shirley Shipman, ‘Steel and Morris v United Kingdom: Legal Aid in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2006) 25 Civil Justice Quarterly 5, 18. 
  
 248 
political life of the society.’1390 
Therefore, it can be suggested that a society which does not offer such protections – perhaps 
in the form of ESCRs – does not reflect the will of the people and is consequently 
undemocratic. More so, O’Cinneide highlights the ‘enforceable social rights hypothesis.’1391 
This hypothesis contends that ‘the process of constructing a rights-based constitutional 
democracy will remain incomplete as long as individuals do not enjoy the protection of 
justiciable social rights.’1392 This point can be restated given that the justiciability of ESCRs 
has been described as being ‘an example of how court interference in parliamentary and 
executive action and discretion is sometimes necessary in order to contribute to democracy.’1393 
Thus, contrary to the primary objections to the justiciability of ESCRs, it can be contended that 
the justiciability of ESCRs bolsters – as opposed to undermines – democracy. 
One means of making ESCRs justiciable in the UK would be through statute. This 
would be a recognition of the justiciability of ESCRs. However, given the sovereignty of 
parliament if one government were to enact legislation making ESCRs justiciable another 
government could just as easily undo this legislation. More so, given the discussion of 
Separation of Powers and the political characterisation of ESCRs discussed above, it is clear 
that such an approach may only ensure recognition of ESCRs and not responsiveness by the 
courts. Therefore, I argue that the goal of ESCRs advocate within the UK ought to be the 
Constitutionalisation of ESCRs. 
Currently the UK has no written constitution. However, a ‘constitutional moment’ 
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offers the potential to partially reshape the UK’s constitutional make up and deliver a written 
constitution which in turn would empower the courts to act responsively to ESCRs claims. This 
is especially important given that the enforcement of social welfare rights has been argued to 
depend ‘on the willingness of the constitutional judiciary to engage in reviewing the 
constitutionality of legal rules related to welfare rights.’1394 From this, it can be suggested that 
it will be the willingness of the courts to enforce any constitutionalised ESCRs which will 
determine the extent to which such rights are enforced. At the time of submitting this thesis in 
summer 2020 both the ramifications of COVID-19 and Britain’s looming Exit from the 
European Union may well form the basis for such a moment. Harvey et al. highlight an 
enforceable Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland as one approach to ensuring explicit protections 
for EU standards across a number of fields including ESCRs following Britain’s exit from the 
EU. They further argue that ‘a Bill of Rights should include protections for socio-economic 
rights that closely mirror the provisions set out in the EU Charter (and preferably ICESCR).’1395 
This could form the basis of a UK wide response which entrenches ESCRs within a new 
constitution. 
Giving ESCRs constitutional status would signal ‘that such rights belong to a category 
of fundamental minimal entitlements.’1396 Dissimilarly to enshrining ESCRs in ordinary 
legislation, the method of constitutionalising ESCRs ‘gives the courts the power to challenge, 
veto and, in some instances, strike down social and other incompatible/unconstitutional 
legislation.’1397 Thus, constitutional bindingness obviously implies ‘that findings of non-
compliance have consequences for the required and permitted conduct, and so presumably for 
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the actual, ensuing behaviours, of actors in state and society.’1398 
Relating back to the argument that making ESCRs justiciable can bolster democracy, 
such an approach may be regarded as viewing constitutionalisation as a process of allowing 
the courts to enhance democracy and accountability.1399 This is because constitutionalisation 
provides for an ‘adjudicative forum/space’ in which individuals and groups can seek 
governmental accountability.1400 It therefore follows that the argument that making ESCRs 
justiciable undermines democracy can be refuted. 
7.4.4. Enhancing Capability to Enforce Claims to Existing Legal Entitlements   
As the preceding section makes clear, enhancing the legal entitlements and protections (legal 
rights)1401 against destitution is crucial to eliminating destitution in the long term. However, 
legal rights alone are not enough. This is because legal rights can only be effective if they are 
claimed by individuals. Regardless of which approach, for example inter alia the approaches 
in the previous sub-sections, is taken in regard to enhancing legal protection against destitution, 
in order to claim legal rights individuals must firstly know (or have the opportunity to find out) 
the extent of their legal rights and secondly individuals must have the capability to enforce 
these legal rights. This is because, in relation to social security, ‘no level of benefit, however, 
will prevent destitution if people are unable to access their entitlements.’1402 This argument can 
be extrapolated from the example of social security alone to state that no provision of legal 
rights aimed at preventing destitution will achieve this aim if people are unable to enforce their 
rights. Thus, ‘to make a legal definition more meaningful, individuals need to be able to enforce 
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their right to be free from destitution. This requires access to justice (A2J), which itself is 
frustrated by the experiences of destitution.’1403 
Given the cruciality of adequate social security to combatting destitution in the UK, 
which I have addressed above,1404 in this respect I will focus on A2J specifically in relation to 
social security entitlements. Given the complexity of the law on social security entitlements in 
the UK individuals ‘frequently require legal help’1405 when they face problems accessing these 
benefits. This is in part due to claimants’ lack of awareness, which may be compounded by 
‘evidence of inconsistencies within the system.’1406 Consequently, ‘there is a clear role for 
expert advice in helping people understand their potential social security entitlements and to 
navigate the application process.’1407 
This analysis aligns with the recommendations of a report addressing ‘Destitution and 
Paths to Justice,’1408 commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. As well as the 
recommendation to establish ‘primary legislation to establish a clear definition of destitution 
and a duty on public authorities to protect all persons lawfully present in the UK from 
destitution’,1409 which aligns with my analysis in the previous section, this report recommends 
placing the ‘government under a positive duty to ensure that individuals are receiving the 
benefits they are entitled to.’1410 This recommendation pertains to social security and can be 
interpreted as negating the need for individuals themselves to know the extent of their legal 
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rights to social security. This is because such a duty places the onus on the government to 
ensure that individuals gain the benefits they are entitled to whereas currently the inverse is 
true. Such a duty would therefore require the government to address barriers to individuals 
accessing their full social security benefit entitlement.1411 Given the cruciality of the realisation 
of the right to social security to the realisation of the right to an adequate standard of living 
which I have stressed throughout this thesis,1412 entrenching such a duty in UK law has the very 
real potential to address destitution providing that other recommendations pertaining to the 
right to social security are met. 
However, such a recommendation only addresses the need for individuals to know their 
legal rights pertaining to destitution. This does not address the need to ensure that individuals 
have the capability to enforce their legal rights, which protect against destitution. The Equality 
and Human Rights Commission has highlighted CESCR concerns regarding a lack of A2J in 
relation to social security sanctions. 1413 This concern is rightly justified given that ‘major social 
security reforms and an increasingly punitive approach from DWP have led to a sharp rise in 
inaccurate decisions and benefit sanctions.’1414 For example, some benefits have a 70% success 
rate on appeal1415 and this suggests that for those benefits 70% of the decisions, which go to 
appeal are incorrectly decided in the first instance. This demonstrates the extent to which 
individuals are not receiving their full entitlement and is especially concerning given that with 
A2J individuals risk facing a double injustice as they may face ‘the consequences of a poor 
decision by a public authority and then have no means to rectify it through access to legal 
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Without such support individuals may enter into a state of destitution. For example, a 
study conducted by Organ and Sigafoos found that ‘many participants reported significant 
financial deprivation as a result of trying but not being able to resolve their legal issues.’1417 For 
some this resulted in an inability to ‘afford food, adequate housing or other essentials.’1418 This 
demonstrates how a lack of capability to enforce their existing legal rights undermines the 
realisation of the substance of those same legal rights. A lack of A2J in this example results in 
individuals being unable to access their full entitlement – if any of it at all.  
Not only does a lack of A2J in relation to social security law expose individuals to (the 
risk of) destitution but a lack of A2J in this area mirrors a key theme which I have extracted as 
being central to the destitution experience: a reliance on charitable assistance. Organ and 
Sigafoos highlight that ‘participants relied on charities and voluntary organisations for 
advice.’1419 I have, in greater detail above,1420 highlighted the incompatibility of charitable 
assistance as a means of realising the substance of rights, however this study highlights the 
limited scope and availability of such advice.1421 Even despite this assistance, individuals have 
often sought to represent themselves or have felt ‘forced to take no action.’1422 In sum, a lack 
of A2J in this area in the form of legal advice has undermined the ability of individuals to 
enforce their social security entitlements.  
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This can be traced to austerity influenced cuts to legal aid. Legal aid, ‘defined as 
government-funded legal support for people who are unable to pay for legal advice or 
representation, subject to certain eligibility criteria’1423 is a key vehicle for ensuring that 
individuals can access the legal advice they need to enforce their rights and consequently to 
access justice. Aimed at reducing government spending on legal aid and ‘primarily designed 
to achieve fiscal deficit reduction’1424 some provisions of The Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act (LASPO) 2012 removed many social welfare law cases from the 
scope of legal aid, including inter alia, most cases concerning housing, social security, debt and 
employment.1425 This is despite the fact that ‘the Government accepted in its initial consultation 
on LASPO that the removal of legal aid for most welfare benefits matters was likely to have a 
disproportionate impact on disabled people.’1426 Targeted at saving between £400 and £450 
million annually savings of about £950 million annually were actually made.1427 This 
constitutes an annual underspend of the legal aid budget of £0.5billion.1428 Thus the savings 
made by reforms to legal aid have been more extensive than those that were anticipated when 
the legislation restructuring legal aid was passed.1429 
Civil legal aid for welfare benefits advice was cut by ‘100 per cent’.1430 That is to mean, 
therefore, that no legal aid provision is available for welfare benefit advice or legal 
representation as  ‘the area of welfare benefits was removed from the scope of legal aid apart 
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from appeals to the Upper Tribunal and above on a point of law.’1431 Previously, before 
LASPO, legal aid allowed for funded help to provide ‘specialist advice and casework to support 
people in appealing a decision about benefits eligibility in the first-tier tribunal.’1432 However, 
since LASPO has taken effect individuals have been unable to access legal aid when once they 
were and ‘without legal aid, almost all the participants struggled to solve their problems.’1433 
More so, this demonstrates how legal aid for social welfare related claims only becomes 
available at a later stage once other procedural barriers have been surpassed. McKeever et al. 
highlight how this means ‘that early intervention for justiciable issues is less likely, which in 
turn means that it becomes more difficult to avoid the triggers for destitution.1434 
The reductions in funding for, and consequently availability of, legal aid has come in 
the context of austerity. This is something of which the government were warned. Hynes, 
highlights the Citizens Advice CEO as having stated that ‘the timing of the legal aid cuts due 
to be implemented in April 2013 could not be worse as they “will hit just as the biggest shake-
up in the benefits system in more than 60 years gets underway.”’1435 In relation specifically to 
social security entitlements this has therefore resulted in an ‘unlucky coincidence’ by which 
significant reductions in advice provision have coincided with ‘an increase in advice demand 
arising from social security reforms.’1436  This is a manifestation of the ‘double-bind’ of 
austerity which was addressed in further detail above1437 and has ‘exacerbated the impact of 
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recent welfare reforms’1438 as there is almost no specialist advice left to provide support to 
appeal benefits decisions.’1439 As such, given the restrictive nature of the changes to legal aid, 
demand for legal services has increased1440 whilst the extent of unmet legal need has also 
increased simultaneously.1441  The CESCR raises concern that legal aid reforms ‘have restricted 
access to justice in areas such as employment, housing, education and social welfare 
benefits’1442 This lack of access to legal aid in turn, as recognised by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, ‘exacerbates extreme poverty, since justiciable 
problems that could have been resolved with legal representation go unaddressed.’1443 This 
demonstrates how restrictive changes to legal aid can contribute to increasing destitution. 
Consequently, it is little wonder that the Bach Commission has recommended that ‘the 
government restores legal aid for early legal help to pre-LASPO levels for all social welfare 
law’ which includes, inter alia, welfare benefits.1444   
7.5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has offered a number of solutions aimed at addressing destitution in the UK. I 
have suggested that the UK’s current social security systems can be altered significantly in 
order to ensure that welfare benefits act as a safety net against destitution. Currently this is not 
the case and, in fact, many of those experiencing destitution do so due to failures in social 
security provision. I have also suggested practical solutions to specific issues, which I have 
 
1438 Organ and Sigafoos (n 1417) 7. 
1439 ibid. 
1440 Bach Commission (n 1405) 29–30. 
1441 Asher Flynn et al., ‘Legal Aid and Access to Legal Representation: Redefining the Right to a Fair Trial’ (2016) 
40 Melb U L Rev 207, 208. 
1442 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’ (2016) E/C.12/GBR/CO/6’ (n 613) para 20. 
1443 Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: Visit to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (n 5) para 38. 
1444 Bach Commission (n 1405) 28. 
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raised as constituting a part of the destitution experience in the UK. 
Beyond this, however, I have suggested more structural changes, which can be 
implemented to prevent destitution from occurring in the first place. These four 
recommendations are linked. The first recommendation is to commence the socio-economic 
duty in the Equality Act and, linking to this, the second recommendation is to make human 
rights impacts assessments a feature of governmental budget and policy planning. This second 
recommendation would be a natural consequence of the first as the socio-economic duty is the 
duty to engage in such assessments. The third recommendation in section 7.4.3. is to make 
ESCRs explicitly justiciable as ESCRs in the UK and this also links to the first two 
recommendations as without the ability to enforce the socio-economic duty or requirement to 
undertake HRIAs these recommendations may be rendered moot. Even so, justiciability alone 
may not be enough given the UK’s constitutional arrangements and as such a reshaping of 
these arrangements may be required in the form of adopting a written constitution which 
addresses ESCRs. All three of these recommendations reshape the legal duties and obligations 
of the state and in turn individuals must be empowered to hold the state accountable to these 
standards. That is why I have also recommended that access to justice provision be bolstered. 
This thesis relates specifically to destitution and, as such, for my purposes this recommendation 
is made only in relation to legal aid for social welfare benefits. This is especially so given that 
this recommendation will contribute to the other recommendations being met. For example, 
ensuring individuals can access their full social security entitlement. 
In summary, the recommendations in this chapter overlap in a multitude of ways and, 
for the purposes of addressing and eliminating destitution, are strongly interlinked. I believe 
that there is no one-stop solution to addressing destitution. However, by expressly framing 
destitution as a denial of ESCRs and bolstering the realisation of these rights using the 
recommendations outlined in this chapter, I contend that destitution can be massively reduced 
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in the short term and in the long term eradicated in the UK. Thus, the UK must better comply 
with its obligations under the ICESCR in order to address destitution. This warrants the serious 
consideration of human rights-based solutions as a policy response to destitution.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The aim, in writing this, thesis has been to address destitution in the United Kingdom through 
a human rights framework. Given the poorly defined nature of destitution, this has been no 
small endeavour. Consequently, in order to act as a basis for the analysis in this thesis, I firstly 
had to determine a human rights-based definition of destitution. This determination constituted 
part one and explicitly addressed my first research question: What is destitution and how should 
it be defined? How does destitution relate to wider poverty? What is the value-added of using 
a human rights lens? 
 In chapter 2, I demonstrated that destitution should be defined as a form of severe 
poverty. Destitution can be distinguished from poverty not simply by a notion of extremity but, 
also, through the application of destitution themes. Extrapolated from, and highlighted as being 
central to, existing definitions of destitution I have identified three destitution themes: survival 
needs, vulnerability, and indignity. Explicitly categorising destitution as an extreme form of 
poverty not only answers one aspect of my first research question, but additionally allows 
human rights-based analyses of poverty to analogously inform my human rights-based 
exploration of destitution. In turn, this addresses another aspect of my first research question: 
the benefits of the wide engagement of poverty from a human rights-based perspective are 
indicative of the value added of viewing destitution through this same human rights lens. The 
value added of using a human rights lens is that by framing needs claims as entitlement claims, 
a human rights-based approach empowers individuals. This concept of empowerment is also 
participatory. 
Turning to the dominant element of the first research question, how destitution should 
be defined, destitution so understood constituted the basis from which I translated the 
destitution experience into the language of human rights. This translation allowed the 
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destitution threshold and the component rights to be identified. The component rights are the 
right to an adequate standard of living, the right to housing, the right to water, the right to 
sanitation, the right to food, the right to clothing, and the right to social security. I have argued 
that an individual is destitute, from a human rights-based perspective, when their component 
rights are not realised to the level of the destitution threshold. This theoretical and logical 
human rights-based understanding of destitution was expounded upon throughout the 
remainder of part one in which I utilised the destitution themes to clarify, firstly, the destitution 
threshold and, secondly, the component rights. 
In chapter 3, I recognised that, in order for my human rights-based definition of 
destitution to be universally relevant and applicable, I had to resolve a tension between 
universality and context-specificity. My destitution threshold must be universal in that there is 
a minimum level of realisation below which an individual anywhere in the world is destitute. 
However, my destitution threshold must also account for the fact that the experience of 
destitution will vary between states. For example, a level of realisation above this universal 
minimum level may not guarantee freedom from destitution in contexts such as the UK. 
Through applying the destitution themes, I have enunciated a two-part destitution threshold 
and, thus, resolved this tension. This two-part composite understanding of the destitution 
threshold is composed of a universal base line and a supplementary, context-sensitive standard.  
As such, under my definition, no matter where they reside in the world an individual 
will always be regarded as destitute if they are not able to meet realise one (or more) of their 
component rights. To be explicitly clear, this encapsulates the destitution theme of survival 
needs. More so, an individual will be regarded as destitute even if they are able to realise the 
physical content of their component rights but can only do so on account of a reliance of 
charitable assistance. Whilst still an aspect of the universally applicable minimum conception 
of the destitution threshold, this captures the minimum that is required to ensure dignity and 
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freedom from vulnerability, thus engaging the latter two destitution themes. Given that the 
express purpose of this thesis is to address destitution from a human rights-based perspective, 
the categorisation of those who rely upon on charitable assistance to realise their component 
rights as destitute is further justified through my analysis of the relationship between charity 
and the realisation of human rights. Therefore, whilst at a minimum the destitution themes of 
dignity and vulnerability require that the minimum core content of the component rights are 
realised without reliance on charitable assistance, the destitution themes of indignity and 
vulnerability can be used to supplement this universal destitution threshold baseline on a 
context-by-context basis. These twin themes are therefore central to the supplementary context-
sensitive element of the destitution threshold. I have highlighted the reasonableness approach 
and the use of benchmarks and indicators as mechanisms which demonstrate how contextually 
relevant minimum standards of obligation may be realised.  This analysis informed my 
understanding of the second element of my destitution threshold: the supplementary standard. 
In chapter 4, I applied the destitution threshold to the component rights in order to, 
firstly, establish the universal minimum destitution threshold of each component right and, 
secondly, establish factors to be considered in the determination of the context-sensitive 
supplementary element of the destitution threshold.  
In sum, part one of this thesis (comprised of chapters 2, 3, and 4) has enunciated a 
human rights-based definition of destitution. An individual is destitute under this definition if 
their component rights are not realised to the level of the destitution threshold. This universally 
requires the minimum core content of the component rights to be realised without reliance on 
charitable assistance. However, in many contexts – including the UK– an individual would still 
be destitute even if this universal destitution threshold baseline is met. This is due to the 
supplementary context-sensitive element of the destitution threshold. 
In part two of this thesis, I applied this definition of destitution to the context of the 
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United Kingdom. Beyond serving as an example of how to apply the definition and how the 
supplementary context-sensitive destitution threshold may be determined, part two of this 
thesis addressed the majority of my research questions.  
Although touched upon in other parts of the thesis it is predominantly in chapter 5 
where, I addressed my second research question: the relationship between social security policy 
and provision and the occurrence, prevention and alleviation of destitution. Through focusing 
on the context of rising destitution in the UK over the last decade (austerity), I established that 
government social security policies, in the context of wider austerity, have been inherently 
destitution inducing. This is indicative of the intersection between the occurrence of destitution 
and failures in respect of social security. More so in chapter 7, I have demonstrated, irrefutably, 
that social security provision has the potential to alleviate destitution in the short term and – 
combined with other measures – is central to the long-term prevention of destitution.  
With respect of research question 2, these findings clearly indicate that destitution 
represents a failure to adequately realise the right to social security. Beyond this, destitution 
evidences a multitude of failures with respect to the realisation of ESCRs. More generally, a 
failure to realise a component right to the universal destitution threshold represents a failure to 
dispense of the minimum core obligation of that right. In failing to satisfy the obligations 
incumbent under the minimum core content, destitution constitutes an explicit failure to realise 
the most basic levels of realisation required by the ICESCR. As I make clear in chapter 6, in 
the UK destitution more widely constitutes a failure to realise ESCRs. Destitution undermines 
the availability, affordability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of the physical content of 
the component rights. In summary, by utilising a human rights-based definition of destitution 
I have demonstrated that inherent to destitution there is a failure to realise ESCRs.  
My fourth, and final, research question focused upon what can be done to address 
destitution in the UK more widely and was addressed in chapter 7 of this thesis. Not only have 
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I addressed the advantages inherent to the utilisation of human rights-based approaches but, 
also, I have argued that a number of mechanisms can be brought to bear against destitution. 
Using the metaphor of destitution as a disease, I highlight that there must be a two-pronged 
approach to addressing destitution: short term reactionary treatment (to address existing 
destitution) combined with the longer-term immunisation of UK society against destitution (to 
prevent destitution occurring in the future). 
Given the intimacy of the relationship between social security and destitution, the 
immediate relief for destitution in the UK is a dramatic altering of social security provision. 
The increased role taken by the state in response to COVID-19 has demonstrated that such an 
alteration is within its power. The re-conceptualisation of social security provision over the 
past decade must be undone. With regard to social security, the rationale behind its provision 
in the UK requires shifting. Social security provision must be guided by the aim of social 
protection as opposed to fairness to the taxpayer. Social security levels should be informed by 
a realistic minimum income standard. The minimum wage must also be raised to match this 
minimum income standard. Additionally, punitive policies such as sanctions must be 
immediately ended. By ensuring that social security provision aligns fully with ICESCR 
standards, social security will allow an adequate standard of living and will act as a safety net 
against the occurrence of destitution in the vast majority of instances.  
As well as this, the unaffordability of housing must be swiftly addressed. The UK must 
work to reduce the costs of housing so that income after housing has been paid for is sufficient 
to realise the other component rights through the market. Building more social housing will 
increase supply and in turn lower market rents. Less libertarian measures such as rent controls 
and increased regulation of landlords must also be considered.  
Charitable assistance to provide the content of the component rights must be ended. So 
long as such provision is required destitution will never be eradicated. Although the long-term 
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aim must be to eradicate the need for such provision through a combination of my other 
recommendations, as an interim measure these charitable assistance providers should be 
‘nationalised.’ As addressed in chapter 7.3.2, by taking responsibility for the funding and 
managing of these providers, this would recast the relationship between the individual and the 
provision of charitable assistance to one between the individual and state provision of aid. This 
recasting represents an expansion of what is understood by the phrase social security and will 
result in the individual having rights to aid provision in turn freeing them from the indignity 
and vulnerability inherent to a reliance on charitable aid.   
Beyond these short-term measures, in chapter 7.4. I addressed a range of long-term 
measures for immunising the UK against destitution. I recognised the need to address 
inequality and highlighted that the commencement of the socio-economic duty would work 
towards this aim. If commenced, the socio-economic duty would also engender the use of 
human rights planning in the budget. Such planning is crucial to ensuring that further 
government policies do not induce destitution. I have also made two recommendations 
regarding to justiciability. Firstly, to recognise the justiciability of ESCRs in the UK and, 
secondly, to enhance capability to enforce claims to existing legal entitlements through 
improving legal aid provision and access to justice. 
Combined, these measures will reduce the likelihood of destitution occurring and, when 
destitution does occur, enhance the capability of individuals to tackle destitution by 
empowering rights-based claims against the state. The measures which are needed to address 
destitution will also achieve more than this: they will contribute to the realisation of numerous 
ICESCR rights in the UK. The UK is currently failing in its obligations under the ICESCR. 
Redressing this failure will not only address destitution but may also, in framing destitution 
from a human rights-based perspective and framing destitution as a failure to realise human 
rights, act as a catalyst for bolstering the status of ESCRs more generally in the UK. 
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This thesis offers a highly original and significant contribution. This is not only due to 
the fact that, as a whole, it for the first time defines destitution from a human rights-based 
perspective. Other aspects of this thesis are – on their own merit – equally original and 
significant. My analysis of the ‘forgotten’ right to clothing clarifies the content of this right for 
the first time and forms the basis for a research paper which is under review and which 
delineates the content of the right to clothing with respect to Personal Protective Equipment in 
the context of COVID-19. More so, in framing destitution as being induced by governmental 
policies, the scholarship in chapter 5 aligns with – and acts as the foundation for - an emerging 
portfolio of work which seeks to secure accountability for – and tackle - such policies through 
transformative justice, the sustaining peace agenda, and international criminal law. A key area 
of future research based upon this thesis relates to the potential of destitution (as a violation of 
human rights) being challenged judicially outside of the Asylum and Immigration context in 
the UK. In expressly framing destitution as being caused by government action/policy this 
thesis may allow a broader understanding of the phrase ‘treatment’ to be argued and as such 
act as a platform for future research to engage Article 3 of the ECHR. Along this vein and 
building upon my 2018 publication, future research addressing the relationship between 
destitution inducing benefit withdrawals and international criminal law is required. Outside of 
this, my work with Cahill-Ripley places austerity (as understood as structural violence) as a 
period of non-peace from which we must transition towards peace.  This engages the sustaining 
peace agenda and the field of transitional/transformative justice. These alternative approaches 
may be all the more crucial in addressing destitution and ensuring basic ESCRs realisation in 
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